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I 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
The deregulation of rail transport and the opening of the market to competitors in the 
European Union have brought in Italy the very first competition in the high-speed rail 
market between two operators, induced by a new private open-access operator named 
Italo competing since 2012 with the incumbent state-owned operator, which is seen as a 
test case for other countries that will fully open to competition as of 2020. The aim of this 
dissertation is to examine Italo’s experience in order to identify the key points that may be 
worth considering for the setting up of a similar operator in Spain. 
 
Firstly, the context of the liberalisation of rail transport in Europe is introduced and followed 
by a brief review of the few instances of actual rail competition in the market. Subsequently, 
the study is focused on the Italian case through a comprehensive examination of its high-
speed rail network and an introduction to the newcomer Italo, covering all aspects that 
characterize the company in terms of business and service.  
 
The fieldwork later developed consists of an overview of the company’s strategy, financial 
results and position in the market in order to indentify the keys of their accomplishments. 
Taking into account that Italo is just a component of a transport system that has 
considerably changed since the advent of rail competition, it is convenient to review its 
impact from a wider point of view of the system. Finally, based on the results obtained, an 
indicative instruction manual for the launch of a similar high-speed rail competitor intended 
to operate in Spain has been elaborated. 
 
The research carried out evidenced the many factors that have favoured rail competition in 
Italy especially in terms of the role of the Government in promoting so and the infrastructure 
made available, the factors that determined the success of the newcomer from a 
commercial and financial point of view, the significant effects of the new rail competition 
regime on the overall long-distance transport system and finally some considerations on 
the feasibility of rail transport competition. 
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Abbreviations and Terminology 
 
 
 
 
AC  Alternating current. 
 
ADIF  Administrador De Infraestructuras Ferroviarias (Rail Infrastructure Manager). 
 
AGV  Automotrice à grande vitesse. 
 
ANSF  Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie (National Railway Safety 
Agency). 
 
ASK  Available Seat Kilometre: indicator typically used in air and rail transport measuring 
the sum of kilometres travelled by the total number of seats offered. 
 
AV/AC  Alta Velocità/Alta Capacità (high-speed/high-capacity). 
 
AVE  Alta Velocidad Española. Denomination of high-end, high-speed train passenger 
services operating in Spain. 
 
CASK  Cost per Available Seat Kilometre: indicator typically used in air and rail transport 
measuring the ratio between operating expenses and offered seat kilometres (ASK). 
 
CNMC  Comisión Nacional de los Mercados y la Competencia (National Commission of 
Markets and Competition). 
 
DC  Direct current. 
 
EBIT:  financial indicator denoting earnings before interest and taxes. 
 
EBITDA:  financial indicator denoting earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation on tangible and financial assets and on securities held as current assets as 
well as amortisation on goodwill from equity method investments. 
 
EEC  Energy Efficiency Certificate: documents certifying that a certain reduction of energy 
consumption has been attained. 
 
EMU  Electric Multiple Unit. 
 
ENAC  Ente Nazionale per l’Aviazione Civile (Italian Civil Aviation Authority). 
 
ERTMS  European Rail Traffic Management System. 
 
ETCS  European Train Control System. 
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EU  European Union. 
 
FS  Ferrovie dello Stato Italiane S.p.A. 
 
GDP  Gross domestic product. 
 
HSL  High-speed line. 
 
HSR  High-speed rail. 
 
HST  High-speed train. 
 
IPO  Initial Public Offering, or Stock Market Launch. 
 
Load Factor  Indicator typically used in air and rail transport measuring the capacity 
utilization of public transport as the ratio between the number of passengers transported 
and the number of seats available (RPK/ASK). It is generally used to assess how efficiently 
a transport provider fills seats and generates fare revenue. 
 
LZB  Linienzugbeeinflussung (Signaling system). 
 
NTV  Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori S.p.A. 
 
PSO  Public service obligation. 
 
RASK  Revenue per Available Seat Kilometre: indicator typically used in air and rail 
transport measuring the ratio between fare revenue and offered seat kilometres (ASK). 
 
RENFE  Red Nacional de los Ferrocarriles Españoles (Spanish national railway company). 
 
RFI  Rete Ferroviaria Italiana S.p.A. (Italian Railway Network). 
 
RFIG  Red Ferroviaria de Interés General (National railway network). 
 
ROSCO  Rolling-stock operating company. 
 
RPK  Revenue Passenger Kilometre: indicator typically used in air and rail transport 
measuring the sum of kilometres travelled by the total number of passengers. It reflects 
traffic better than ridership. 
 
SCMT  Sistema Controllo Marcia Treno (Train Speed Control System). 
 
SNCF  Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (French national railway company). 
 
SpA  Società per Azioni (Joint-stock company). 
 
TGV  Train à Grande Vitesse. 
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Train-km  Rail transport indicator corresponding to the total number of kilometres travelled 
by certain trains in a given period of time, used to measure the service supply.  
 
UIC  International union of railways. 
 
White Certificates  See EEC. 
 
Yield  Indicator corresponding to the ratio between the fare revenue and RPK. 
 
Yield management  Variable pricing strategy aimed at maximizing revenue. It involves 
strategic control of inventory to sell the right product to the right customer at the right time 
for the right price. 
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7 
1.1 Motivation 
 
 
As a response to the rail transport decline in the second half of the 20th century, the 
European Union has persevered in promoting competition in this sector since the 1990s as 
the core intervention to revert this unfavourable situation and to significantly improve 
railway competitiveness, trying to follow the predecessor success of air transport 
deregulation. Therefore, rail transport competition is called to be one of the new revolutions 
in the scope of transportation. 
 
Nevertheless, the intrinsic characteristics of rail transport have made the progress of the 
deregulation process much slower than it was in air transport. In fact, in 2018, only a few 
open-access operators compete in the passenger transport market in a few European 
countries, specifically in Austria, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Sweden.  
 
The most relevant example of liberalisation in terms of traffic carried is definitely Italo 
S.p.A., an Italian company that operates in the field of high-speed rail transport in Italy, 
which is in fact the very first private operator competing in this field with the incumbent, 
state-owned company. Despite its initial difficulties, Italo has already achieved a 35% traffic 
share in the routes where they operate with up to 84 daily services (May 2018) and it is 
rapidly growing thanks to the undergoing expansion of the fleet and the network. 
 
While it is yet to be seen to which extent passenger rail transport competition is actually 
feasible, full liberalisation of passenger rail transport will be effective by the end of 2020 
and the Spanish rail sector is currently preparing for this upcoming new setting, with 
competition presumably focusing initially on high-speed rail. Therefore, it is of the greatest 
interest to assess the pioneer Italian experience in this field in order to indentify the key 
points that may be worth considering for a similar framework in Spain and especially for the 
launch of a similar operator, particularly from the commercial, operational, financial and 
strategic points of view. 
 
The final goal of the liberalisation of rail transport carried out by the European Union and 
the subsequent advent of competition in the sector is broadly to reform the overall transport 
system by improving rail competitiveness and therefore to promote it as a more efficient, 
sustainable and environment-friendly means of transport. 
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1.2 Aims 
 
 
The goal of this document is firstly to examine thoroughly the Italian experience in the 
competition in the high-speed rail market through a wide range of aspects: 
 
 Introduction to high-speed rail transport. 
 The current context of rail transport competition in Europe, covering the background 
that motivated its execution, the new legislative framework in Europe and 
particularly in Italy, and the actual development of the new setting of rail transport. 
 The characterization of the Italian high-speed rail network in terms of its history, its 
most relevant technical specifications, as well as its current traffic and services and 
other operational considerations deemed as relevant to the topic treated. 
 The review of Italo’s history, its business organization, its network, rolling stock and 
on-board service. 
 The company’s strategic management, financial results and growth opportunities. 
 The outcomes of rail competition in Italy in terms of the impact in the overall long-
distance transport system, on the high-speed rail service and on the response of 
the incumbent company to competition. 
 
Secondly, as a synthesis, and based on the results obtained, an indicative instruction 
manual for the launch of a similar private open-access train company intended to operate in 
the Spanish high-speed rail network in competition with the incumbent, state-owned 
company Renfe will be established, with the preliminary considerations applicable to the 
Spanish case. 
 2 
 
The European High-Speed Rail Network 
2. The European High-Speed Rail Network 
9 
 
2.1 Prior Definitions 
 
 
According to the European Union Directive 96/48/EC, Annex 1, HSR is defined as the 
system consisting of rail infrastructure with minimum speed of 250 km/h on lines specially 
built for high-speed and of about 200 km/h on existing lines which have been specially 
upgraded, and the rolling stock specifically designed alongside its infrastructure to meet 
with the compatibility, safety and quality of service standards.  
 
On the other hand, according to the UIC, HSR are systems comprised by infrastructure, 
station emplacement, rolling stock, operation rules, signaling systems, marketing, 
maintenance systems, financing, management and legal aspects. 
 
 
 
2.2 Historical Perspective 
 
 
During the second half of the 20th century, three global factors led to major changes on the 
transport sector in Europe and North America that have caused significant effects on 
citizens’ daily life.  
 
Firstly, a major development of road transport took place due to the improvement of the 
road network, the construction of a highway network and the fact that cars were 
increasingly affordable for most of the society as a result of technological and industrial 
development. Secondly, the air transport saw a considerable growth as well, marked by the 
introduction of jet planes. And thirdly, by contrast, the decadence of rail transport, with the 
closure of numerous railway lines throughout Europe. 
 
The overlap of the three factors presented above led to some practical repercussion such 
as the increase in the accident rate, extra costs due to air congestion and the upgrowth of 
energy consumption in the transport sector as it is known that both air and road transport 
have a greater unitary energy consumption than rail transport. 
 
In the middle of the 20th century, passenger rail transport was reaching its limits when it 
comes to maximum speed, normally not higher than 140 km/h. Considering the critical 
situation of passenger rail transport in Europe in those times, it was of the greatest interest 
of railway companies to explore higher speeds in order to maintain rail competitiveness 
against its competitors. 
 
After the big success of the Japanese Shinkansen (launched in 1964, it was the very first 
HSR worldwide), several European countries developed new technologies and innovations 
aimed at introducing high-speed in Europe. Indeed, the French experience in the 1950s 
with powerful electric locomotives reaching the incredible speed of 331 km/h for the very 
first time in history proved the need to develop a new infrastructure and rolling stock 
2. The European High-Speed Rail Network 
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specifically designed to safely operate at the so-called high-speed, which would require 
many years of intense work. 
 
Finally, in 1974, the French government approved the construction of a HSR line that would 
link Paris and Lyon, and hence serving all southeastern France. The first section of the new 
infrastructure was opened in 1981, becoming the first HSR line in operation in Europe and 
establishing an important milestone in the European rail transport history. 
 
After its big success, other European countries joined the group of countries offering HSR 
services in Europe, such as Germany in 1991 (Hanover-Würzburg and Mannheim-
Stuttgart), Spain in 1992 (Madrid-Sevilla), Belgium in 1997, the United Kingdom in 2003 
and the Netherlands in 2009. Some of them developed its own technology while others 
imported it. In April 2007, an experimental TGV train broke the world speed record reaching 
574,8 km/h on the Paris-Strasbourg HSL. 
 
In 2015, HSR lines in the world extended over almost 30.000 kilometres. HSR has become 
a key transport infrastructure for the development of territories that generates a completely 
new socioeconomic context when it comes to offer and demand. Its importance is the main 
reason that justifies aids of the European Union for the financing of HSR network which, 
together with other important transport infrastructures, constitutes the Trans-European 
Transport Network (TEN-T).  
 
For the development of HSR systems, it has to be taken into account that a very advanced 
infrastructure and rolling stock capable to operate at very high-speeds in conditions of 
safety and comfort is essential, in addition to advanced security systems for the train 
operation control, compunctious maintenance tasks, intermodal stations, cadence schedule 
and the appropriate marketing in order to attract the largest possible number of users. It is 
clear that the implementation of HSR is almost equivalent to the deployment of a new 
means of transport from zero and that extremely high investments are required in order to 
materialize it. 
 
 
 
2.3 Advantages of High-Speed Rail 
 
 
The benefits of HSR from the society and global transport system points of view include the 
following: 
 
 High transport capacity. It is worth noting that the capacity of a double-track HSL is 
significantly higher than a 6-lane highway (3 lanes each way) while requiring 
approximately only one third of the land. 
 Reduction of traffic congestion and road accidents. 
 Respect of the environment through the efficient use of land -which is very relevant 
in densely populated areas-, energy efficiency and the reduction of the emission of 
greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide. 
2. The European High-Speed Rail Network 
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 Spatial coverage of the territory: ability to serve multiple stops, as trains spend only 
a few minutes stopping at intermediate stations. 
 Help to the economic development. 
 
On the other hand, the main benefits of HSR for passengers can be summarized as 
follows: 
 
 Commercial speed typically in the 180 to 250 km/h threshold and hence shorter 
travel times from door to door. 
 High frequency. Total travel times are assumed to include half the headway. 
 Reliability: less prone to delays. 
 HSR services are less dependent on weather conditions than road or air transport 
as it may be only affected by severe weather conditions. 
 Accessibility: stations are usually located in city centers and passengers can board 
trains just a few minutes before departure, without long check-in times. 
 Highest comfort standards among all long-distance means of transport: there are 
no abrupt accelerations and decelerations, no seatbelts, no annoying noises, 
significant spatial comfort (greater legroom, seat width, etc.), no bans on the use of 
electronic devices and freedom of movement inside the train. 
 Safety. 
 
 
 
2.4 The Current European High-Speed Rail Network 
 
 
The current extension of HSR in Europe is summarized below (Table 1 and Exhibit 1). 
 
 
Table 1 | High-Speed Lines in Europe 
 
 
 
Source: UIC. Updated 1 April 2018. 
 
Country In operation (km)
In construction 
(km) Planned (km) Total (km)
Maximum speed 
(km/h)
Spain 2.852 904 1.061 4.817 310
France 2.776 0 0 2.776 320
Germany 1.658 185 0 1.843 300
Italy 896 53 0 949 300
Russia 0 0 770 770 250
Poland 224 0 484 708 230
United Kingdom 113 230 320 663 300
Austria 244 243 24 511 250
Belgium 209 0 0 209 300
Switzerland 144 15 0 159 250
Netherlands 120 0 0 120 300
Denmark 0 56 0 56
Sweden 0 11 0 11
TOTAL 9.236 1.697 2.659 13.592
2. The European High-Speed Rail Network 
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2.5 Future Perspective 
 
 
According to 2015 expectations, and in spite of the development of other transport modes 
(for instance the Maglev, automatic driving cars and improvements in aviation among 
others), the extension of the world HSR network could reach more than 80.000 kilometres 
by 2030-2035, representing an important challenge for operators, industry, authorities, etc. 
High speed must be continuously developed and performed in order to continue to be 
present in passenger transport in the next 50 years (or more) (International Union of 
Railways, 2015). 
 
 
 
  
Source: Wikipedia. 
Exhibit 1 | Map of the European High-Speed Rail Network.                        
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2.6 Overview of some Technical Aspects of  
High-Speed Rail 
 
 
     2.6.1 General Specifications 
 
The main adjustments in the HSR infrastructure specifications include the adoption of very 
large curve radius, a greater distance between tracks, wider tunnel sections, electrification 
at very high tension and fences along the entire line. Regarding driving systems, traditional 
signalling is replaced by sophisticated automatic on-board systems and, as for the rolling 
stock, traditional locomotive carrying passenger cars compositions are replaced by electric 
multiple units either with two power cars at each end or with distributed traction along the 
train. Despite these differences with respect to conventional rail, the European HSR system 
is designed to be compatible with it so that high-speed trains can usually operate on both 
networks. 
 
     2.6.2 Maximum Operating Speed 
 
The maximum operating speed used to be set at 300 km/h, but trains operate at 320 km/h 
in some French lines and also some trains operate at 310 km/h in a 60 km long stretch of 
the Spanish Madrid-Barcelona HSL. Additionally, Italy hinted at raising top speed of certain 
trains to 350 km/h in part of the network. 
 
     2.6.3 Considerations on the Optimum Travel Time of HST Services 
 
Despite the maximum speed of commercial HST services is lower than that of jet aircraft, 
the total travel time turns out to be lower for short distances (let us assume less than 800 
km) as they typically connect city centre train stations, while air transport connects two 
airports that are usually away from city centres and require long check-in times. HSR is 
generally best suited for journeys in the 1 hour to 4 hours and a half threshold. 
Nevertheless, there are a high number of HST services with travel times longer than 4 
hours and a half in Europe and these considerations indeed depend on a wide range of 
factors. 
 
 
 
 3 
 
Rail Transport, Monopoly and 
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3.1 Background of Rail Transport Operators 
 
 
The earliest railways in the European countries were often run by private entrepreneurs. 
Nevertheless, this situation changed progressively during the first half of the 20th century 
due to the widespread tendency towards nationalization.  
 
In Spain, for instance, the major private companies were already facing a decline in 
profitability before the Spanish Civil War, and after the contention, the national rail network 
was devastated and therefore the companies went bankrupt. This situation forced the 
intervention of the Government in the major companies, which later resulted in the creation 
of RENFE in 1941 with the aim to nationalize all broad gauge railways, following a trend 
already common in other European countries which had to face a comparable situation with 
regard to severe financial difficulties. 
 
The fact is that nowadays rail transport as a public service requires large amounts of 
resources to be run and to fund new investments, and furthermore the vast majority of 
urban and regional services, which account for a very large portion of the total European 
rail traffic, require public financial support in order to be sustained (the so-called PSO). 
Therefore, these facts justify fairly well why governments take care of these issues.  
 
Urban, local and narrow gauge railways as well as some specific secondary railways are 
usually transferred to regional governments and operated by minor companies, whereas 
the general interest mainline railways are responsibility of the state and are operated by the 
corresponding state-owned company. 
 
More recently, the tendency has been towards privatisation, which allows to introduce a 
greater commercial and financial discipline and hence a better efficiency. Nonetheless, 
other countries such as the United Kingdom adopted mixed solutions with the 
nationalisation of the infrastructure and the privatisation of operations. 
 
Domestic HSR services have always been operated by these national companies as a 
market unit of their rail transport operations (Table 2). The only exception to this fact is the 
private Italian HSR operator NTV, which started its operations in 2012, made possible by 
the liberalisation of rail transport in Italy. On the other hand, international HSR services are 
operated by consortia of public companies from the countries where they operate (Table 3). 
 
 
3.2 The European Legislative Framework towards 
Rail Transport Competition 
 
 
Once introduced the common organization of rail transport operation, it is necessary to 
address the setting-up of the rail competition framework, covering the reasons that 
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motivated the European Union to make it possible, the legislative framework setup, its 
implementation and an insight into the current situation in the new stage of rail transport. 
 
Table 2 | Major Rail Operators in Some European Countries. 
 
 
 
(*) Foundation of the predecessor. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
Table 3 | European International HSR Operators. 
 
 
 
[1] Defunct in 2011. 
[2] Defunct in 2009. 
[3] Eurostar Ltd was a subsidiary of London and Continental Railways. 
[4] NS International is a joint venture of NS and KLM. 
Source: own analysis. 
 
 
Rail transport has traditionally evolved within the national borders and therefore each 
country created its own railway system. As a consequence, this lead to a structural 
fragmentation of the European railway system that is still one of the greatest barriers 
Operator Country Founded
British Rail (BR) UK 1948 (*)
Comboios de Portugal (CP) Portugal 1951
Danske Statsbaner (DSB) Denmark 1885
Deutsche Bahn (DB) Germany 1920 (*)
Iarnród Éireann (IE) Ireland 1945 (*)
Nederlandse Spoorwegen (NS) Netherlands 1938
Norges Statsbaner AS Norway 1883 (*)
Österreichische Bundesbahnen (ÖBB) Austria 1923
Polskie Koleje Panstwowe (PKP) Poland 1926
Renfe Operadora Spain 1941
Schweizerische Bundesbahnen (SBB CFF FFS) Switzerland 1902
Société nationale des chemins de fer belges (SNCB) Belgium 1926
Société nationale des chemins de fer français (SNCF) France 1938
Statens Järnvägar (SJ) Sweden 1887 (*)
Trenitalia Italy 1905 (*)
VR-Yhtymä Oy Finland 1862
Operator Owners Founded
Allegro VR and Russian Railways 2010
Alleo DB and SNCF 2007
Artesia [1] SNCF and Trenitalia 1995
Cisalpino [2] SBB and Trenitalia 1993
Elipsos Renfe and SNCF 2001
Eurostar SNCB, SNCF and Eurostar Ltd [3] 1990
Fyra NS International [4] and SNCB 2009
Lyria SBB and SNCF 1993
TEE Rail Aliance DB, ÖBB and SBB 2000
Thalys DB, SNCB and SNCF 1993
Thello Trenitalia 2011
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towards the creation of a single European railway market, entailing severe issues in terms 
of efficiency, flexibility and reliability, especially for freight transport. 
 
In the 1980s, the European Economic Community began to study possible interventions to 
brake the rail transport decline and subsequently initiated a regulatory reorganization aimed 
at overcoming those that were identified as the greatest obstacles to the development of 
rail transport (in particular the lack of a competitive market), and hence the creation of a 
single, efficient and competitive market for rail through Europe. 
 
Airline deregulation in Europe in the 1990s allowed air transport to become more efficient 
and competitive, while rail transport still had to face many technical and administrative 
drawbacks to its development. Therefore, rail liberalisation aims at reproducing the 
essence of airline deregulation (with its pertinent differences). Nevertheless, rail 
deregulation has progressed much slower than air deregulation. 
 
The basic choice of the CEE was the progressive abandonment of monopolistic 
management of the sector through a gradual process of deregulation involving freight 
transport first and then passenger transport; firstly international and then domestic. In 
relation to that, competition may be promoted while tackling barriers to market entry and 
harmonizing technical specifications, safety standards and certification. 
 
Consequently, in 1991, the EU Directive 91/440 relative to the community railways was 
created, that in fact, through the accounting separation between infrastructure and 
services, should enable competition in rail transportation. This process is mandatory on the 
accounting level while it remains optional on the organizational level. Specifically, this law 
made it a legal requirement for independent companies to be able to apply for non-
discriminatory track access on a European Union country’s track. Train operations can be 
undertaken by either public or private companies, but the infrastructure must be public 
owned. Nonetheless, competition is optional for regional and urban passenger transport. 
 
In addition to the 1991 directive, other directives (the so-called Railway Packages) have 
been approved over the years, which have expanded railway liberalisation to the current 
situation. Firstly, in 1995 the EU Directive 95/19 on the allocation of railway infrastructure 
capacity and the charging of infrastructure fees was created.  
 
However, this directive was replaced by the introduction of the First Railway Package in 
2001 (a collection of EU legislation), which allowed the beginning of the intense process of 
liberalisation of the sector with the following agreements: 
 
 Introduction of the principle of regulation of payment for access to the network and 
the regulation and allocation of access rights. 
 Regulation of the issue, extension and modification of licenses for railway 
undertakings. 
 Identification of a subject or an authority to deal with the allocation of train slots 
according to principles of fairness, non-discrimination, effectiveness and efficiency.  
 Identification of the requirements to configure certain companies as railway 
undertakings and the procedures to be followed for the allocation of the tracks by 
the network operator. 
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One of the most innovative elements is the introduction in the European railway systems of 
the system of access fees to the network. It is precisely this regime that must allow in fact a 
large liberalisation, allowing the use of networks by a multiplicity of operators, national and 
foreign, in competition with each other. Furthermore, it allows the infrastructure manager 
the coverage of at least a part of their costs, giving governments the possibility to reduce 
the amount of subsidies allocated each year significantly. 
 
As it can be appreciated, it took over ten years from the 1991 directive for the railway 
market to effectively begin to open. Indeed, these processes in rail transport are usually 
slow and tend to encounter many obstacles. 
 
In 2001, the European Commission elaborated the White Paper on Transport “Roadmap to 
a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport 
system”, establishing the future legal actions towards the revitalization and acceleration of 
the integration of the railway sector. The main provisions focused on a new organization of 
freight and passenger transport, a new transport policy, the harmonisation of the 
competition conditions and an improved safety. 
 
In 2004, the Second Railway Package was approved, covering the following issues:  
 
 Security of the European rail system. 
 Further developments to guarantee the interoperability of the system. 
 Allowance for open access for freight services, nationally and internationally, 
starting in January 2007. 
 Establishment of a European Railway Agency to coordinate safety and 
interoperability efforts. 
The Third Railway Package, approved in 2007, aims the following: 
 Open access for all international passenger services, including cabotage, across 
the railways of the EU starting in January 1st, 2010. 
 Introduction of certain rail passenger rights including assistance and a minimum 
level of compensation for delays, aiming to establish quality guarantees.  
 Harmonization of train driver licenses. 
In September 2010, the process of merging the directives into a single piece of legislation 
began with the addition of modifications to strengthen the regulatory framework. 
The Second Railway Package and the Third Railway Package aimed to push integration 
further. Hence, the Single European Railway Directive 2012 was established. 
 
The Fourth Railway Package, with the aim to make rail transport competition possible, is 
divided in two sections: the technical pillar and the market pillar. The first of them was 
adopted by the European Commission and approved in April 2016, whereas the market 
pillar is to be launched in January 2019, with permission for new entrants to start operating 
train services by the start of the winter timetable in December 2020. This set of changes 
cover the following issues: 
 
 Standards and authorization for rolling stock, workforce skills, independent 
management of infrastructure. 
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 Liberalisation of domestic passenger services in an attempt to reduce European rail 
subsidies.  
 Permission for tracks and trains to be owned by a single holding company. 
 Shift of the responsibility for authorizing rolling stock to use a network from network 
owners and towards the European Railway Agency. 
 
The restructuring of national railways requires the redefinition of the role of the government. 
The different models for the introduction of competition requires a government committed to 
play a new role in the railway industry: promote and enforce competition, limiting the 
regulatory tasks to protect consumers from monopoly abuse (when competition is not 
feasible or undesirable), and to guarantee fair competition between different operators, 
leaving productive decisions to the private sector (Beria et al., 2010). 
 
Overall, the rules vary according to whether it is freight transport, international passenger 
transport or national passenger transport. Regarding passenger transport, the models of 
competition applicable during the liberalisation of the market can be traced back to two 
cases: "competition for the market", that is the competition between several subjects to 
access a market that, once conquered, is temporarily managed exclusively by those who 
prevailed, and "competition in the market", i.e the presence of two or more operators 
competing on the same market. 
 
 
 
3.3 The Italian Legislation Towards  
Rail Transport Competition 
 
 
At the national scale, two are the relevant facts to refer to: the first of them was the 
Legislative Decree n. 146 of March 1999 for the implementation of the European directives 
that allowed the beginning of freight transport competition in Italy in September 2001. And 
secondly, the Law 388/2000 (the so-called Legge Finanziaria 2001) that in the article 131 
has introduced in Italy (ahead of the rest of Europe) the competition in the domestic 
transport of passengers.  
 
Since 2004, European legislation has liberalised international and domestic rail travel for 
freight and passengers, but there still is no obligation under European Union law to open 
domestic services to market competition as Italy did, hence different degrees of openness 
have been reached among European countries (Pianigiani, 2012). 
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3.4 Record of the Deregulation of Rail Transport 
 
 
     3.4.1 The Institutional and Economic Relationships among Actors 
 
In Italy and Germany, the actual separation between infrastructure operator and service 
operator is wider than in other European countries such as Spain or France. By contrast, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom are in a more advanced stage compared to the former 
four countries. However, both in Italy and Germany the network manager is still part of a 
public holding, together with the train company, whereas France recently moved back to a 
similar structure. In Italy, the owner of the FS Holding is the Ministry of Economy, while the 
responsibility of contracts and regulation is the Ministry of Transport. FS has the full control 
on RFI (the network manager) and Trenitalia (the service operator). 
 
With regards to independent regulatory agencies, in Italy and Spain, the non-discriminatory 
access to network is controlled by the Ministry, which also has a role in deciding the toll 
level applied. Their main responsibilities include monitoring rail transport and resolving any 
disputes. In Germany and Italy there is also a second controlling subject: the antitrust 
authority, which has power to intervene in case of complaints by private companies. 
 
Focusing on Italy, there is also the Network Information Prospectus (PIR), which is a 
document whose function is to regulate the relationships between railway companies and 
RFI. The PIR lists the specifications of the railway lines, facilities and the tariffs for using 
the railway infrastructure. Both Trenitalia and the various private operators operating on the 
railway lines are required to pay RFI the rights to use lines and services. 
 
     3.4.2 Market Access Conditions 
 
With respect to market access conditions, Italy has a system of conditions for licensing less 
strict than in other countries such as France, Germany and Spain, as it is only necessary a 
declaration that the required characteristics and certifications will be present at the moment 
of starting operation and not at the moment of the request. On the other hand, when it 
comes to access conditions to slots, services and terminals, the fixed assets in Italy are 
generally owned by RFI and open to new entrants. 
 
     3.4.3 Licensed Operators and Market Shares 
 
The available data show that in Italy, 16 operators provided actual service (2006) out of a 
total of 49 licensed operators in 2008, with less than 1% passenger market share (2009) 
and 13% freight market share (2008) (FS and the European Commission). Competition on 
passenger market was clearly not relevant, although it significantly arose with the entrance 
of NTV S.p.A. in the market in 2012. On the other hand, freight market competition was 
actually already considerable in the cross-alpine market, with a 30% share. 
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     3.4.4 Regulation of PSO 
 
Finally, it is worth making a few comments regarding social and market services and their 
regulation. In European countries, all regional services are commonly considered as PSO, 
which are the so-called social services, and hence worth subsidizing. By contrast, long 
distance services and freight services are usually classified as market services (thus it 
cannot be subsidized). Nevertheless, in France and Italy, some long distance services are 
subsidized and even freight is subsidized in some cases in Italy.  
 
An unclear relationship between social and market services is a source of distortions. In 
particular, the way in which unprofitable not-subsidized services are maintained for political 
reasons as social services, determines the existence of cross-subsidization. Cross-
subsidization, in the general definition, is a problem because a monopolistic unregulated 
market generates profits that may be used to dump on other markets: profitable 
monopolistic services can be used to lower the price of other non-monopolistic services, 
causing unfair competition on the latter market. 
 
Cross-subsidization is mainly undertaken from profitable to non-profitable services and 
typically seen in the long distance segment, as it happens in France, Italy and Spain. 
German railways managed to separate effectively profitable and unprofitable services 
instead by shifting them under the regional segment or cutting them. Hence, the theoretical 
solution to this balance problem (particularly while facing competition) is to move social 
services away from those hidden segments and subsidizing them explicitly. 
 
 
 
3.5 Situation in 2018 
 
 
Currently, there is a fairly large number of open access passenger operators competing for 
regional and local markets, granted and subsidized by public administrations: about 40 
operators in Germany, 3 in Denmark, 1 in the Netherlands, 1 in Portugal, 4 in the Czech 
Republic, 6 in Sweden, 30 in Switzerland, a dozen in Austria and a few in Italy, Poland and 
Romania. However, with respect to competition in the market, the number of operators is 
much smaller (Table 4). 
 
A couple of things should be noted regarding the list in Table 4 below. First of all, that the 
number of competing open-access operators in Europe and their sizes is quite limited. In 
general, only a new entrant competes with the incumbent operator. The only exception is 
the Prague-Ostrava link, which became in 2012 (and still to date) the only case in the world 
in which three operators compete simultaneously. Secondly, that competing operators 
generally focus on long-distance (non-subsidized) markets. Thirdly, all operators have 
focused in the routes with the highest demand in the country, which are usually those that 
have the best technical performances.  
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Table 4 | European Open-Access Passenger Operators in Competition with National 
Operators. 
 
 
 
Note: fleet size accounts for the number of unit trains (updated in May 2018). 
[1] Since 2011, they are not allowed to perform cabotage in Italy. 
[2] FlixTrain took over HKX and Locomore suspended links in 2018. 
[3] HKX suspended operations in October 2017. 
[4] Locomore filed for insolvency in May 2017 and suspended operations. LEO Express took over 
operations on August 2017 and relaunched services together with FlixBus. 
[5] Arenaways failed in 2011. 
Source: own analysis with data from different sources. 
 
Based on these experiences, passenger rail competition has brought a drastic reduction in 
the ticket price (in the routes with competition) and, as a result, a strong growth of demand. 
Nevertheless, in some cases, part of this growth is due to other factors such as the 
improvement of the rail infrastructure or the lower convenience of other means of transport. 
 
Even though competition has brought clear advantages for users, it has some drawbacks 
for the whole system. For instance, it is believed that it may lead towards a higher cost per 
user and a less efficient use of the infrastructure, and in some cases the increase in the 
overall system cost can outweigh the efficiency benefits of competition. For instance, 
competition forces railway companies to adjust prices where there is competition and to 
increase prices where there is none, causing the deterioration of services in other lines. 
 
With respect to Italy, the most relevant example of liberalisation is definitely Nuovo 
Trasporto Viaggiatori S.p.A., an Italian company that operates in the field of HSR transport. 
In fact, Italy is the very first country in which a private operator provides HSR passenger 
services in competition with the incumbent public operator (Trenitalia in this case) since 
28th April, 2012, and therefore it is the only country in the world where there is true 
competition on HSR transport (*). This singular situation is indeed being seen as a test 
case for Europe.  
 
On the other hand, international services are liberalised, but high-speed services are 
operated by consortia of public companies from the countries where they operate: Allegro, 
Alleo, Artesia (until 2011), Cisalpino (until 2009), Elipsos, Eurostar, Fyra, Lyria, TEE Rail 
Alliance, Thalys and Thello.  
Operator Country Started operations Routes operated Fleet size
WESTbahn Austria 2011 Vienna-Linz-Salzburg 17
LEO Express Czech Republic 2012 Prague-Ostrava-Košice, Prague-Brno-Vienna/Bratislava 7
RegioJet Czech Republic 2011 Prague-Ostrava-Košice/Kraków, Prague-Staré Město u UH 17
DB-ÖBB EuroCity [1] Germany/Austria 2009 Rome/Bologna/Venice-Verona-Munich, Rome/Venice-Vienna -
FlixTrain [2] Germany 2018 Hamburg-Cologne, Berlin-Hanover-Frankfurt Main-Stuttgart -
Hamburg-Köln-Express [3] Germany 2012 Hamburg-Cologne 1
Locomore [4] Germany 2016 Berlin-Hanover-Frankfurt Main-Stuttgart 1
Arenaways [5] Italy 2010 Turin-Milan -
Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori Italy 2012 Venice/Verona/Turin-Milan/-Rome-Naples-Salerno 36
MTR Express Sweden 2015 Stockholm-Gothenburg 6
Snälltåget Sweden 2009 (Âre)-Stockholm-Malmö-(Berlin) -
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(*) According to the UIC, WESTbahn could be considered as a HSR operator as well since 
it operates at speeds up to 200 km/h, but let us assume that this belongs to a different 
category than Italo-NTV, which operates at 300 km/h on newly built HSLs.  
 
Finally, the current status of the liberalisation of rail transport in the European Union 
members is summarized below (Exhibit 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: El País and the European Parliament (translated from Spanish). 
Fully liberalised Almost liberalised 
(liberalised but in practice 
there is no competition) 
Widely liberalised (more than 
33% of the network have been 
liberalised) 
Partially 
liberalised (less 
than 33% of the 
network have been 
liberalised) 
Non-liberalised market 
Exhibit 2 | Liberalisation of Rail Transport in the European Union in 2017.          
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4.1 Historical Perspective 
 
 
     4.1.1 The Direttissima Florence-Rome 
 
The origins of high-speed rail in Italy go back to the 1960s with plans to build a new rail link 
between Rome and Florence. The original railway line consisted of a union of lines planned 
in the 19th century by different companies and with different purposes, with a total length of 
315 kilometres of slow and tortuous tracks, while the real distance between both cities in a 
straight line is approximately 230 kilometres, whereas by road there are 277 kilometres. 
Taking into account that the Milan-Bologna-Florence-Rome axis had always been one of 
the busiest in the country, it seems reasonable that the improvement of one of the most 
difficult sections of the axis in terms of orography had been a concern for quite a long time. 
 
After many studies, proposals and projects, only after the Second World War a project was 
finally established, consisting of a new line that, instead of replacing the existing line, it 
would be a coordinated system integrated with it with several links. Besides, the new line 
aimed to be straight and faster but above all shorter than the original line with a total length 
of 237,5 kilometres, and hence its name Direttissima, which means very straight in Italian 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Works on the line started in 1970 and the first section of the line was opened in 1977. 
Nevertheless, the remaining sections to complete the line were opened in later stages, with 
the last 24 km section being opened in 1992. Many economic and political events had 
incredibly extended its completion duration to 22 years since the beginning of its works. 
 
     4.1.2 From the Direttissima to the Present 
 
In the 1980s, plans for a HSR network were already being carried out. The system was 
initially conceived as separated from the conventional rail network and fully dedicated to 
passenger transport along the Milan-Naples axis and the Turin-Venice transverse axis. Its 
main aim, according to the Piano Generale dei Trasporti from 1986 (amended in 1991), 
was to significantly transfer amounts of traffic from road to rail, seeking for a better 
integration of transport in connections with large urban centers, ports and airport facilities 
as well as connections with other European rail networks. 
 
The implementation of the aforementioned HSR project began in 1996, which was then 
conceived as a large-scale improvement of the railway network as a whole in order to allow 
a profitable interchange at the infrastructural level between new and existing lines with the 
aim to significantly increase the amount of traffic on the whole railway system. Therefore, 
the term Alta velocità (High-speed) was replaced by Alta capacità (High capacity) while 
keeping all mixed traffic (passenger and freight) HSR standards. However, only passenger 
services operate on the network at the present, except on the Direttissima.  
 
After the completion of the Direttissima, the expansion of HSR in Italy went on in 2005 with 
the opening of the main section of the Rome-Naples line, but the urban penetration 
stretches in Rome and Naples were completed in later stages, with the line being fully- 
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completed in 2009. Besides, a direct link with the Direttissima in Rome was added, aimed 
at passing trains so that it would not be necessary to call at Rome Termini and reverse, 
with a 15-minutes travel time reduction for those trains. 
 
Further completions include Turin-Novara section (opened in 2006), Padua-Venice and 
Milan-Treviglio sections (both opened in 2007), Naples-Salerno and Milan-Bologna 
sections (both opened in 2008) and Bologna-Florence and Milan-Novara sections (both 
opened in 2009). Therefore, the backbone of the Italian HSR network is fully operative 
since 2009. Finally, the Treviglio-Brescia stretch was opened in 2016. On the other hand, 
upgrades on the Bologna-Padua and Bologna-Verona lines had been carried out to allow a 
maximum operational speed of 200 km/h, including the addition of a second track in the 
entire stretches.  
 
The current high-speed network matches very well with the original projects, with a “T” 
shape consisting of a vertical axis from Milan to Salerno and a northern transverse axis 
from Turin to Trieste. However, this transverse axis is not yet completed. 
 
     4.1.3 Future Lines 
 
A number of projects to expand the network beyond the completion of the original plans are 
being carried out or are expected to be carried out in the future: 
 
 Completion of the northern transverse axis from Turin to Trieste: works on the 
Brescia-Verona stretch are about to begin in April 2018, while the Verona-Padua 
section is already approved and awaiting for funding, and the remaining Venice-
Trieste section is currently under planning. A further connection to Ljubljana is also 
considered in the long term. 
 Terzo Valico:  a new link 53 km link between Tortona and Genoa is under 
construction since 2011, aimed especially at freight traffic towards the Port of 
Genoa. This link is the part of the Milan-Genoa route that crosses the Ligurian 
Apennines and hence the orography in this stretch is very irregular (37 km will be 
constructed in tunnel), in contrast with the northern section towards Milan, which 
develops throughout the Po Valley, which is a fundamentally flat land.  
 Lyon-Turin: a planned 270 km long, 220 km/h railway line will cross the Alps 
through a 57 km long new base tunnel, intended for freight and passenger traffic. 
Works in the tunnel are already in progress. 
Figure 1. A train travelling 
on the Direttissima with the 
older line in the foreground 
(1980s).   
Source: 
nick86235.smugmug.com 
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 Brenner Base Tunnel: this one will connect Verona and Munich through the Eastern 
Alps, intended for freight and passenger traffic. A 189 km high-speed approach 
from the southern portal of the tunnel to Verona is planned. 
 Naples-Bari: an AV/AC project to upgrade the existing line has been carried out. 
Works began in 2016. 
 Milan-Chiasso: a new route connecting the Italian HSR network to Switzerland is 
conceived as part of the New Railway Link through the Alps along the Gotthard 
axis. It should help decongest the existing Milan-Monza-Chiasso line. No official 
studies have been reported so far. 
 
 
 
4.2 Technical Perspective 
 
 
     4.2.1 Overview of the Specifications of the Italian HSR Network 
 
The Direttissima is often considered to be the first HSR line in Europe since its first stretch 
was opened in the 1970s, some years before the opening of the French LGV Sud-Est. 
Nevertheless, at the time when it was planned, the line was not conceived as part of a 
future Italian HSR network, but rather as a corridor for both conventional passenger trains 
and freight transport. Therefore, the Direttissima can be understood as a purpose to 
significantly increase capacity by providing two additional tracks in this stretch and fitted 
with advanced technologies. 
 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to point out that its geometric standards were consistent with 
the long term duration of the new infrastructure: the minimum curve radius of 3.000 metres, 
the very gentle slopes adopted aimed at freight traffic and the distance between track 
centres (wider than in European standard conventional lines) makes the line actually 
suitable for operations at 250 km/h, provided that the rolling stock is homologated for this 
speed. 
 
The previous geometric parameters of the line are very relevant in the sense that they 
reduce the “flexibility” of the line throughout the territory in the planning stage considerably 
so that, combined with the orographic characteristics of the territory crossed, resulted in a 
large number of viaducts (65) and tunnels (42) necessary to be constructed for the line, 
accounting for 50% of the total length of the route. This fact had indeed significant 
implications in the final construction cost of the line, as well as in the successive lines 
constructed. 
 
The line was initially homologated for a maximum speed of 180 km/h. Anyway, no rolling 
stock was really capable of running faster at that time but, in 1985, the line was 
homologated for 200 km/h. Currently, HST services operate in the line at speeds up to 250 
km/h. Operational speed increase up to 275 km/h in the stretch between Rovezzano and 
Chiusi (approximately 100 km long) is expected in the short term, since the project speed of 
this section is in fact 300 km/h, featuring a wider distance between track centres (4.3 m) 
and a greater minimum curve radius (3.900 m) than the rest of the line. 
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It is important to note that the Direttissima features numerous connections with the 
conventional line (namely 10) configured in such a way that allow trains using the HSL to 
stop at certain stations on the conventional line without long detours and obviously with no 
requirement to turn around. On the other hand, the line does not have any railway crossing 
or any kind of intersections. Moreover, all connections are effectuated by grade-separated 
junctions that avoid conflict with opposite direction train movements. These junctions are 
indeed extremely beneficial in busy railway lines with branch lines but need large physical 
structures and hence they are quite expensive. Finally, double crossovers each 16,2 km 
allow to use either track in either direction or operation on a single track in case of need, 
and the rails were laid using the UIC 60 kg/m welded rail type. The line is currently being 
modified to meet the new AV/AC line standards established by RFI for HSLs. 
 
The Direttissima is a very convenient historical reference to introduce the AV/AC system 
introduced in 1996 due to its undeniable singularity from a technical point of view. The 
specifications for the new AV/AC system are presented below compared to those of the 
Direttissima (Table 5) and, additionally, other design parameters common for the whole 
network are presented as well (Table 6). 
 
 
Table 5 | Specifications of the Direttissima and the AV/AC System. 
  
 
 
Source: own analysis using data from different sources. 
 
Table 6 | Other HSL Specifications. 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis using data from different sources. 
 
Specifications Direttissima AV/AC
Maximum commercial speed (km/h) 250 250/300
Distance between track centres (m) 4,0 5,0
Minimum curve radius (m) 3.000 5.450
Maximum slope 0,80% 1,80%
Maximum load per axis (t) 25,0 25,0
Tunnel section (m2) 54 82
Maximum speed on crossovers (km/h) 160 160
Electrification 3 kV DC 25 kV 50 Hz AC
Security systems SCMT ERTMS/ECTS
Specifications
Maximum cant (mm) 105
Minimum curve radius in vertical 
arrangements (km) 20
Platform width (m) 13,6
Average distance between electrical 
substations (km) 50
Average distance between sidings (km) 48
Loading gauge UIC C
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Since then, all new Italian HSL have been built meeting these standards, which are very 
similar to those of other European, mixed traffic HSLs. The most relevant practical 
implications of the design for both freight and passenger traffic include the need to adopt 
large minimum curve radius, low cants and very gentle slopes as it was already done in the 
Direttissima. Aside, another very characteristic feature of Italian HSLs is the amount of 
interconnections of the new infrastructures with existing railway lines. Interconnections on 
the Turin-Milan-Naples-Salerno axis (858 km of HSLs, urban penetrations not included) 
account for a total length of 77 km. All HSLs feature double track, as usual in any HSR 
network. 
 
Since the opening of Treviglio-Brescia in 2016, the Italian HSR network is approximately 
950 kilometres long. Its HSLs are presented below (Table 7 and Exhibit 3). 
 
Table 7 | Current HSR Lines in Operation in Italy. 
 
 
 
Lengths above account for new infrastructure built (no urban penetrations). Interconnections are not 
included. All HSR lines listed feature double track. Minimum travel times between city centres.  
[1] Limited to 180 km/h between Milan and Treviglio. 
Source: own analysis using data from different sources. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Line Length (km) Opening Travel time (h)
Maximum 
speed (km/h) Voltage
Length in 
tunnel
Length in 
viaduct
DD Florence-Rome 238 1977/1992 1:18 250 3 kV DC 30% 19%
Rome-Naples 205 2005/2009 1:08 300 25 kV 50 Hz AC 19% 19%
Turin-Milan 125 2006/2009 0:44 300 25 kV 50 Hz AC 4% 16%
Padua-Venice 25 2007 0:14 240 3 kV DC 0% 14%
Milan-Brescia 67 2007/2016 0:36 300 [1] 25 kV 50 Hz AC 1% 6%
Naples-Salerno 29 2008 0:30 250 3 kV DC 52%
Milan-Bologna 182 2008 0:53 300 25 kV 50 Hz AC 2% 21%
Bologna-Florence 78,5 2009 0:35 300 25 kV 50 Hz AC 92% 0%
Source: RFI. 
Exhibit 3 | The Italian HSR Network.         
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     4.2.2 Network Geography 
 
The Italian geographic and demographic characteristics are favourable for HSR since it 
allows serving a large population in a string of large cities. The north-south axis serves a 
number of cities separated by distances ranging from 150 to 250 kilometres (especially in 
the north), which are indeed optimal distances to make HSR competitive against other 
means of transport, namely air and road transport. 
 
     4.2.3 Explanation of the Particularly High Construction Costs of the Italian 
HSR Network 
 
One of the things that characterize the Italian HSR network is its very high construction cost 
per kilometre compared to many other European HSR lines. Construction costs depend on 
a wide range of factors, such as the orography of the territory. In general, it can be 
assumed that they are found in the 10 to 30 M€ threshold. A comparison between the 
construction costs of some European HSLs is presented below (Exhibit 4). 
 
Exhibit 4 | Construction Cost of some European HSLs. 
M€/km 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis using data from different sources. 
 
 
Construction costs tend to increase significantly when the orography is more unfavourable 
as, for instance, it may cause the need to dig exceptionally long tunnels. However, the 
Milan-Turin HSL is clearly an anomaly in the examples listed above as it is constructed on 
a fully flat area. According to Mr. Antonio di Pietro, ex infrastructure minister, the average 
construction cost per kilometre of the Italian HSR lines is 44 M€ (Il Sole 24 Ore, 2007). The 
main reasons that explain this fact are the following: 
 
 The mixed HSL parameters, as mentioned previously, limit the “flexibility” of the line 
throughout the territory severely, requiring the construction of large and expensive 
works such as tunnels and viaducts. 
 The previous fact is aggravated by the irregular orography of many territories that 
some of the Italian HSR lines cross. 
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 The number of interconnections with conventional lines built stands for a large 
number of additional kilometres of infrastructure needed to be built in the addition to 
the HSL strictly. 
 High urbanization of the territories crossed. 
 On-ramps, off-ramps and underpasses often need to be rebuilt when existing 
highway corridors are used to build the new HSR. 
 Archaeological monitoring of the territory and eventual interventions. 
 Socio-environmental insertion of the new lines in the territory. 
 Others: amounts for “coordination and organization” and compensations for local 
administrations. 
 
 
 
4.3 Operational Perspective 
 
 
     4.3.1 HST Services 
 
HST services on the Italian HSR network are operated by Trenitalia and Italo (since 2012), 
and both companies compete with each other in the market. Trenitalia HST services are 
differentiated into two categories: Frecciarossa and Frecciargento. The first category is the 
premier service, which operates at speeds up to 300 km/h, while the second category 
services are operated by Pendolino tilting trainsets at speeds up to 250 km/h.  
 
The difference between both services, apart from the top speed, is mainly technological: 
Frecciarossa services are operated by non-tilting trainsets while Frecciargento services, by 
contrast, are operated by Pendolino trains with tilting systems, which allow these trains to 
raise the speed on conventional lines, specially on the tortuous ones. Therefore, only some 
stretches of Frecciargento services operate on HSLs, while in the remaining conventional 
line stretches they are able to run at higher speeds than ordinary trains.  
 
A third category, named Frecciabianca, operates long distance services on routes that are 
generally out of the HSR network, namely many routes along the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian 
coasts, at speeds up to 200 km/h or 250 km/h depending on the rolling stock used. 
However, some Frecciabianca services operate on the Direttissima in addition to the HST 
services listed above, as well as some Intercity (maximum speed of 200 km/h) and regional 
services (maximum speed of 160 km/h). At the end of 2016, Frecciarossa trains supplied 
nearly 60% of Frecce brand services. 
 
On the other hand, Italo operates a single brand of HST services named Italo (same as the 
company’s current name) which operates fully or partially on HSLs and hence they are 
comparable to both Trenitalia Frecciarossa and Frecciargento, with which Italo competes 
directly. 
 
The current travel times between the central stations in the major Italian cities by HSR are 
presented below (Table 8). 
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Table 8 | Trenitalia and Italo Shortest Travel Times Between Major Stations. 
 
 
 
(*) A transfer is required. 
Source: own analysis using data from Trenitalia and Italo (updated in April 2018). 
 
    
  4.3.2 Insight into the Rolling Stock Used 
 
In the beginnings of the Direttissima, passenger train services were hauled by E.444 class 
electric locomotives carrying Gran Confort passenger cars and, besides, the ETR 300 class 
EMU trainset operating the famous Settebello HST service that linked Milan Central and 
Rome Termini stations and belonging to the prestigious Trans Europe Express long 
distance train network. This service was withdrawn in 1984 and replaced by locomotive-
hauled Gran Confort cars.  
 
Later in 1988, the new ETR 450 class high-speed EMU trainsets entered in service on the 
Rome-Milan route at speeds up to 250 km/h, capable to link both cities in less than 4 hours. 
This EMU stands for a relevant milestone in the history of the Italian railways, as it was the 
first Pendolino to enter in a HST service in the world. Its successors currently operate 
Frecciargento and Frecciabianca services on the Italian HSR network (ETR 463, ETR 470, 
ETR 485 and ETR 600). Pendolino is a nowadays a family of Italian tilting trains used in 
Italy, Spain, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Finland, Russia, Czech Republic, the United 
Kingdom, Slovakia, Switzerland and China. 
 
Nowadays, HST services are operated by modern, cutting-edge, self-propelled, fixed 
composition bi-directional trainsets with maximum speeds of up to 250 and 300 km/h 
(depending on the train series and on the HSL). For further information and specifications 
on both Italo’s and Trenitalia’s rolling stock refer to the Appendices 1 and 2. 
 
     4.3.3 New Stations and Urban Operations 
 
For many years, no intermediate stations were constructed on the Italian high-speed rail 
network between major cities. However, the Reggio Emilia AV Mediopadana station was 
opened in 2013 on the Milan-Bologna HSL between Parma and Modena, thus becoming 
the first station of this kind. The station, designed by the Spanish architect Santiago 
Calatrava, serves central Po valley, including the cities of Reggio Emilia (140.000 
inhabitants), Parma (175.000 inhabitants), Modena (180.000 inhabitants), Piacenza 
(100.000 inhabitants) and Fidenza (24.000 inhabitants). The station provides connection 
with urban and interurban buses, as well as a direct connection with regional trains 
covering the Reggio Emilia-Guastalla route.  
 
Bologna Florence Milan (Centrale)
Naples 
(Centrale) Padua
Rome 
(Termini) Salerno
Turin (Porta 
Susa)
Venice (Santa 
Lucia) Verona
Bologna 0h 35min 1h 02min 3h 13min 0h 59min 1h 54min 3h 31min 1h 58min 1h 27min 0h 50min
Florence 0h 35min 1h 39min 2h 29min 1h 37min 1h 27min 3h 18min 2h 36min 2h 05min 1h 29min
Milan (Centrale) 1h02 min 1h 39min 4h 13min 1h 57min 2h 55min 4h 34min 0h 47min 2h 25min 1h 13min
Naples (Centrale) 3h 13min 2h 29min 4h 13min 4h 37min 1h 07min 0h 34min 5h 13min 5h 05min 4h 18min
Padua 0h 59min 1h 37min 1h 57min 4h 37min 2h 58min 5h 03min (*) 2h 55min 0h 26min 0h 42min
Rome (Termini) 1h 54min 1h 27min 2h 55min 1h 07min 2h 58min 1h 30min 3h 55min 3h 24min 2h 53min
Salerno 3h 31min 3h 18min 4h 34min 0h 34min 5h 03min (*) 1h 30min 5h 51min (*) 5h 44min (*) 5h 09min (*)
Turin (Porta Susa) 1h 58min 2h 36min 0h 47min 5h 13min 2h 55min 3h 55min 5h 51min (*) 3h 25min 2h 11min
Venice (Santa Lucia) 1h 27min 2h 05min 2h 25min 5h 05min 0h 26min 3h 24min 5h 44min (*) 3h 25min 1h 10min
Verona 0h 50min 1h 29min 1h 13min 4h 18min 0h 42min 2h 53min 5h 09min (*) 2h 11min 1h 10min
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Additionally, the Naples Afragola station was opened in 2017 on the HSL Rome-Naples 
near its end. Its purpose will be discussed in the following section. Both Reggio Emilia AV 
Mediopadana and Naples Afragola train station have the common scheme of tracks of 
intermediate HST stations, consisting of two central through tracks with no platforms for 
non-stopping trains and two lateral tracks with platforms for stopping trains. With this 
configuration, overtaking is possible if needed. 
 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that as part of the HSR projects, some major urban 
operations have been carried out, such as the new Turin Porta Susa station (which 
replaced the old surface station), the 18 kilometre urban tunnel and enlargement of 
Bologna central with new underground platforms for HST services (allowing to speed them 
up in the urban area), or the new Rome Tiburtina hub station for high-speed trains. 
 
     4.3.4 Operation Constraints due to the Terminus Configuration of Some Hub 
Stations 
 
Many of the busiest railway stations in Italy, such as Rome Termini, Milan Central, Turin 
Porta Nuova, Florence Santa Maria Novella and Naples Central (which are the main 
stations in each of those cities, where long-distance train services generally call), are 
terminus, which means that all main lines converge on these stations. This fact has brought 
some inconveniences for the operation of a HSR network throughout the country, since any 
train travelling through one of these cities and calling at one of these specific stations have 
to turn around necessarily. For instance, a Frecciarossa HSR service travelling from 
Salerno to Turin must reverse in Naples Central, Rome Termini, Florence SMN and Milan 
Central (up to four times). 
 
These operations are intensively time-consuming, compared to commercial stops in 
through stations, not only due to the turn around by itself, but also because the approaches 
to some of these stations, such as Milan Central, are very slow and congested. For 
instance, it is estimated that a through train serving Rome saves up to 13 minutes if it uses 
the link between the Direttissima and the HSL Rome-Naples, stopping at Rome Tiburtina, 
instead of stopping both at Rome Termini and Tiburtina. This is quite relevant to take into 
account if we recall that HSR is intended precisely to reduce travel times, but then it turns 
out that HST services waste time in turnarounds and urban penetrations. 
 
The Government and FS have tried to tackle these issues in two different ways: 
 
1) HSR services route patterns may be slightly modified in such a way that terminator 
services at one specific city call at the central, terminal station, whilst services not 
terminating at that city call at an alternative, through train station. In this way, travel 
time for passengers travelling beyond this city is not penalized, assuming that the 
terminal station is already well served by terminator services. 
 
2) Overall reconfiguration of rail infrastructure in one city with the construction of a 
new rail link through the city including a new, through station annexed to the 
existing terminal station or close to it. Nonetheless, it is obvious that the 
surroundings of existing central stations are already fully urbanized, so the only way 
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to implement this solution is to build the new link in underground, which entails a 
very high construction cost. 
 
Let us have a brief review of the current situation and solutions adopted for each of these 
cities: 
 
 Rome 
 
The former Portonaccio station, located in the north-eastern part of Rome, was replaced by 
the brand new, renamed Rome Tiburtina train station, conceived as a hub for the Italian 
HSR services instead of Rome Termini. North-south through services were supposed to be 
all moved to Tiburtina to make their way faster by jumping the stretch to Termini, while 
Termini would continue to be served by all terminator services (in addition to Tiburtina), but 
it failed since today a very few trains skip Termini.  
 
The conclusion, based on Trenitalia and Italo HSR operations, is that in Rome, in general, it 
is more efficient to spend the additional time required in urban penetration in order to call at 
Termini. This may be due to the fact that the centrality of Termini is difficult to be beaten by 
Tiburtina, which is away from the city centre and not so well connected with the rest of the 
city by rapid transit systems. 
 
 Milan 
 
The current configuration of railways in Milan require long-distance through trains to 
reverse in Milan Central. Any proposal to make Central into a through station would be an 
extremely expensive project, requiring extensive works. Therefore, this configuration will 
remain as it looks like nowadays in the very long term. 
 
 Turin 
 
Turin Porta station is not really an issue, as the majority of high-speed trains serving Turin 
are terminator services. Just a few international high-speed trains go through Turin, calling 
instead at the brand-new Turin Porta Susa station (which is a fairly well-located through 
station), where domestic high-speed services call as well in addition to Porta Nuova. 
 
 Florence 
 
A new underground station, called Florence Belfiore, is slowly being constructed one 
kilometre north of the existing Florence Santa Maria Novella station as part of a new HSR 
tunnel that will go through Florence. In this way, high-speed trains through Florence will be 
speeded up in the urban area and the existing tracks will be fully dedicated to regional and 
local traffic. 
 
 Naples 
 
A new station named Naples Afragola was built on the HSL Rome-Naples, about 10 km 
north of Naples Central. The main purposes of this station are two: firstly, to give a HSR 
service to the area north of Naples, because for many people leaving in the very large 
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Naples metropolitan area it is disadvantageous to head to Naples Central to travel 
northbound (Afragola is actually more central in the metropolitan area geographically). 
Secondly, similarly to the case of Rome, to cut travel time for trains covering the Rome-
Reggio Calabria route, speeding up those services up to 25 minutes without dropping the 
stop at the Naples metropolitan area. 
 
Currently, many of the Naples terminator services call at Naples Afragola, and through 
services seem to follow irregular patterns, with some of them calling only at Afragola, and 
others only at Central or at both stations. In fact, many of the Frecciargento and 
Frecciabianca through services that will use this station are yet to be deployed. For this 
reason, and taking into account that the station was opened recently in June 2017, 
conclusions based on the experience of the Naples Central-Naples Afragola coupled 
system cannot be drawn by now. However, its presented characteristics seem favourable 
for its success. 
 
     4.3.5 The Potential of Airport HSR Links 
 
Direct connection between HSR services and airports are a very recent concept of 
transport intermodality, which had its first example in 1994 with the opening of the Aéroport 
Charles de Gaulle 2 TGV train station directly beneath terminal 2 of Paris Charles de 
Gaulle Airport on the Interconnexion Est HSL, which surrounds the Paris metropolitan area 
on the east side. Other major European airports were later equipped with HST stations as 
well, such as Frankfurt International Airport or Schiphol Airport, but also did minor airports 
such as Lyon Saint Exupéry. 
 
The main purpose of these connections is to provide fast and efficient connections to 
travellers taking flights at an airport at a considerable distance (considering that HSR is not 
suitable for short distances), by taking advantage of a current HSR network. Therefore, it is 
clear that the potential of this kind of connections is indeed very interesting from many 
points of view as, if they are well planned, it is possible to transfer airport inbound flows to 
railways and hence achieve a higher use of the HSR network. In other words, HST services 
may be able to assume the role of many domestic air links to feed international flights, 
freeing slots for longer range flights at busy and congested airports. 
 
Based on the experience of proven success of these links at the Charles de Gaulle Airport, 
Frankfurt Airport and Schiphol Airport among others, we can conclude that the ideal 
configuration is that, as in the previous examples, the airport HST station is constructed 
directly on the HSL. Nevertheless, the feasibility of these links obviously depends on the 
geographical layout of the infrastructures concerned. In fact, in many cases, airports do not 
happen to be conveniently located in order to be connected to HSR networks and, 
consequently, it is not possible to implement this configuration. 
 
In these cases, alternatively, the option to route HST services through a dedicated branch 
line (which in many cases already exists for conventional railway) can be considered. 
Nonetheless, this solution is often less efficient for HST services: let us explain why. 
 
HST services are operated by advanced, expensive specialized rolling stock capable to run 
at 250 km/h or faster. Because of the high purchasing and maintenance costs, efficiency in 
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operations matters and HST operators seek to reach high annual mileages at full payload 
and, therefore, operators must carefully assess if it is worth to schedule regular HST 
services to run on conventional lines at lower speeds.  
 
Moreover, operation on conventional lines is less reliable than HSL, as rail traffic is more 
heterogeneous and generally more prone to incidents (older, unfenced infrastructure with 
less maintenance, railway crossings…), hence it has a non negligible impact on service 
robustness. 
 
In the specific case of the airport rail link, operation planners have to consider if it is worth 
allocating the amount of additional resources required in order to extend existing HST 
services from one of its ends to a certain airport through a conventional line, taking into 
account that the extension may be overlapped with local or regional trains to the airport 
running roughly at the same speed and, of course, operated by much more adequate trains 
to cover such a short link. This consideration can explain partly why, for instance, the 
Adolfo Suárez Madrid-Barajas Airport probably will not have direct HSR connections in the 
near future. 
 
From this reflection we can get a very interesting, generalist conclusion for HST services 
operation, which is that there is a trade-off between operating partially on HSR lines so as 
to serve certain destinations away from the physical HSL and confining services to full-HSR 
line routes (and hence achieving higher annual mileages). Furthermore, reliability issues 
must also be taken into account since the conventional network is typically more prone to 
delays than the HSR network. 
 
Airport HSR connections may be a matter of interest for the HST operators, so for the 
purpose of analyzing its possibilities in Italy, the case of each one of the busiest airports in 
the country (Table 9) are discussed below, based on infrastructure available at the present. 
Those airports not located near the actual HSR network are excluded from the analysis. 
 
 
Table 9 | List of the Busiest Airports in Italy. 
 
 
 
Source: ENAC. 
 
  
Rank Airport City served Passengers in 2017
1 Rome Leonardo da Vinci-Fiumicino Rome 40.971.881
2 Milan Malpensa Milan 22.169.167
3 Bergamo Orio al Serio Bergamo / Milan 12.336.137
4 Venice Marco Polo Venice 10.371.380
5 Milan Linate Milan 9.548.363
6 Catania-Fontanarossa Catania 9.120.913
7 Naples Naples 8.577.507
8 Bologna Guglielmo Marconi Bologna 8.198.156
9 Rome Ciampino Rome 5.885.812
10 Palermo Palermo 5.775.274
… … … …
24 Trieste Friuli Venezia Giulia Trieste 780.776
4. The Italian High-Speed Rail Network 
35 
 
 Rome Fiumicino Airport 
 
Fiumicino Airport has a rail link since 1990 consisting of a dedicated branch line (Figure 2) 
with direct train services to Rome Termini (Leonardo Express), regional train services to 
Fara Sabina, Poggio Mirteto and Orte (FL1), and finally two daily Frecciargento services 
covering the route from Rome to Florence, Bologna and Venice and vice versa. These long 
distance train services were launched in 2014 and are in effect very limited and hence 
conclusions on this experience cannot be stated so far. 
 
Due to too short platforms, it is not possible to operate Frecciarossa services, which are 
often powered by ETR 500 class trainsets too long to call at Fiumicino train station, 
whereas Frecciargento services are operated by shorter trainsets that fit in Fiumicino 
platforms. Nonetheless, there are plans to build a dedicated HSL to the airport in the long 
term. 
 
 Milan Malpensa Airport 
 
Malpensa Airport has a rail link since 1999 consisting of a dedicated branch line (Figure 3) 
with regional train services to Milan Central, Milan Cadorna (Malpensa Express services) 
and Varese-Mendrisio (Switzerland)-Como (TILO S40, as of 10th June 2018). 
 
However, operation of HST services using this link would not be simple. Firstly, the current 
station platform length is about 250 m, so it can only handle 200 m long configured HST 
and hence standard double compositions of up to 400 metres long are not feasible. 
Secondly, Malpensa is away from any Italian domestic route, so any HST service must end 
in Malpensa. The only long-distance service which could serve Malpensa without a long 
detour and without terminating there would be the Milan-Geneva and Milan-Basel (via 
Lötschberg-Simplon) Eurocity trains, for which a link from the current station towards the 
Simplon railway (Milan-Gallarate-Domodossola-Brig) both northbound and southbound is 
planned. 
 
The few HST services that served Malpensa in the past were short lived and with just a 
couple of services per day. These were Malpensa-Milan-Rome trains around 2011 and 
Malpensa-Novara-Turin during the weeks of the 2006 Winter Olympics. These services 
were operated by 8-car shortened ETR 500 class trainsets. At the present, all ETR 500 
class trains carry 11 cars. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Partial view of Fiumicino 
Airport. The viaduct of the rail link can 
be clearly seen on the right side.  
Source: stradeeautostrade.it. 
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 Bergamo Orio al Serio Airport 
 
There is no rail link nor any plans to build one. Besides, Orio al Serio is a low-cost airport, 
so it is not actually the target of airport HSR connections. 
 
 Venice Marco Polo Airport 
 
There is no rail link, but the Venice-Trieste HSL project foresees to include a station at 
Venice Airport. 
 
 Milan Linate Airport 
 
There is no rail link nor any plans to build one. 
 
 Naples Airport 
 
There is no rail link nor any plans to build one. 
 
 Bologna Guglielmo Marconi Airport 
 
There is no rail link nor any plans to build one. 
 
 Rome Ciampino Airport 
 
There is no rail link nor any plans to build one. Besides, Ciampino is a low-cost airport, so it 
is not actually the target of airport HSR connections. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Satellite view of the 
Malpensa Airport rail link.  
Source: own elaboration with 
Google Earth. 
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 Trieste-Friuli Venezia Giulia Airport 
 
Despite being a rather small airport, it is interesting to include it in the analysis since the 
Venice-Trieste rail line runs on the side of the airport very close to its terminal and, in fact, a 
new train station was opened on the line in 20th March 2018 with the purpose of serving it. 
A 425 metres long footbridge equipped with elevators, escalators and moving walkways 
connects the station with the air terminal.  
 
The station is served by about 70 daily trains, from which the majority are regional trains 
covering the Venice-Portogruaro-Trieste and Trieste-Cervignano-Udine-Tarvisio routes. 
However, a few long distance trains call at the station, including 4 daily Frecciarossa 
services covering the Milan-Venice Mestre-Trieste route plus 2 daily Frecciargento services 
and 4 Intercity services both covering the Rome-Venice Mestre-Trieste route. 
 
 Conclusions 
 
Since Rome Fiumicino Airport, Milan Malpensa Airport and Venice Airport are the main 
international gateways to Italy, it is of the greatest interest to HSR operators to assess the 
opportunity to take advantage of calling at these airports in order to get more potential 
users. Nevertheless, several technical constraints limit the possibilities to operate HSR 
services on the existing airport rail links at the present, but it could be feasible in the long 
term. Feeding traffic is currently mostly captured by Alitalia through Fiumicino Airport. 
 
Configurations of rail links to the aforementioned airports and their future scenarios in 
comparison with rail links to other European airports with long-distance train service are 
summarized below (Exhibit 5). 
  
Exhibit 5 | Configurations of Italian Airport Rail Links Compared with Those of 
Other European Airports with Long-Distance Train Service. 
Future scenarios are highlighted in italics. 
[1] In the particular case of Venice airport it is not yet defined whether the new link will be intended for 
high-speed or conventional railway. 
Source: own analysis. 
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5.1 Chronology 
 
 
2006 
 
December 11th  Establishment of Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori S.p.A. by a consortium of 
Italian businessmen including Mr. Luca Cordero di Montezemolo, Mr. Diego Della Valle, Mr. 
Gianni Punzo and Mr. Giuseppe Sciarrone with the aim to compete in the HSR passenger 
transport, as open access operations on railway lines by companies other than those that 
own the rail infrastructure is going to be allowed in the European Union. An initial 
investment circa €1 billion will be carried out. In its current previsions, the company expects 
to reach a 20% market share in the Italian HSR transport by 2015, carrying 10 million 
passengers per year. This market volume will be reached by operating 54 daily services 
along the axis Turin, Milan, Bologna, Florence, Rome, Naples, Salerno and Bari, a total 
production of 13.5 million km per year. The debut is scheduled for 2010. The company also 
shows interest to participate in tenders for other rail transport segments in later stages as 
well, such as freight and regional passenger services. 
 
2007 
 
February 6th  The Ministry of Transport, through the General Direction of Rail Transport, 
releases to NTV the railway license for the operation of national rail passenger services. 
 
July 28th  The General Direction of Rail Transport releases in favor of NTV the authorizing 
title for access to the national rail infrastructure. 
 
November 26th  NTV signs with the French manufacturer Alstom the contract for the supply 
and maintenance of 25 AGV 575 trains.  
 
2008 
 
January 17th  NTV signs with RFI the ten-year duration Framework Agreement for which 
the infrastructure manager undertakes to make available to NTV the required infrastructure 
capacity.  
 
July 15th  NTV holds its public presentation with the presence of its founding partners as 
well as the partners that joined the company later.  
 
October 10th  SNCF enters into the capital of the company with a 20% of the shares. 
Additionally, MaIs entered into the capital with a 5% of the shares. 
 
November 18th  “Italo” is selected as NTV’s service brand name through an internet 
survey. 
 
2009 
 
April 20th  The first training course for train engineers starts. 
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June 19th  Works on the new dedicated plant with a total area of 150.000 m2 in Nola 
(Naples province) for the maintenance of NTV fleet of trains begin. 
 
July 22th  NTV headquarters is opened in Policlinico avenue 149/b in Rome.  
 
2010 
 
February 9th  Start of ran tests with the AGV train prototype named Pegase.  
 
December  The first AGV train ordered by NTV arrives in Italy. Tests go on in 2011 with 
AGV series trains in order to obtain the homologation of the rolling stock. 
 
2011 
 
January 17th  The hospitality school for the training of on-board and ground staff is opened. 
 
March  RFI is about to approve an update of the PIR (Network Information Prospectus), 
which had previously established that the Security Certificate, needed for the homologation 
of the trains (essential to operate services), could be submitted at the time of signing the 
contract to use the infrastructure, by which NTV has scheduled their business plan and 
their investments. However, the updated PIR would establish that the Security Certificate 
had to be delivered within 4 months after the infrastructure capacity request, in a way such 
that NTV would not be able to obtain it by August 2012, hence putting off the beginning of 
commercial services 12 months until 2013. This would have meant a serious handicap for 
NTV. 
 
May  The update of the PIR is partially approved with no penalties to NTV. 
 
June  The Italian Government passes a surcharge on private operators using the HSR 
network, earmarked to reduce access charges on HSR tracks for public service contracted 
trains. This was indeed aimed at NTV.  
 
September 1st  Works on the maintenance plant in Nola are completed. 
 
September 16th  ANSF homologates the trains for its operation. 
 
October 19th  NTV receives the Security Certificate. However, FS CEO Mr. Mauro Moretti 
opens a controversy by stating that the NTV prototype was unstable while running at 
speeds higher than 250 km/h, a statement that was rebutted by NTV board and Alstom 
itself. 
 
December 13th  Inauguration of the maintenance plant and public presentation of the Italo 
train. 
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2012 
 
January  After many interpellations, the ANSF certified in January 2012 that NTV was 
ready to launch its commercial services by the end of the following March. 
 
March 6th  ANSF releases the authorization to launch Italo services. 
 
March 20th  ANSF releases the Security Certificate to NTV. 
 
April 21st  The maiden voyage of Italo is hold on the Milan-Bologna and Rome-Naples 
lines. 
 
April 28th  Italo makes its commercial debut on the Milan-Naples route, after many delays 
that have postponed this milestone for about two years. According to Mr. Marco Ponti, 
professor of transport economics at the Politecnico di Milano, consumers already benefited 
from the beginning of competition, as Trenitalia had lowered its ticket prices and improved 
the service. Nonetheless, Ponti highlighted that the circumstances were not favorable for 
NTV due to its relatively small size compared to Trenitalia, the economic crisis and the risk 
to go bankrupt, while Trenitalia (that at the same time owns the railway, the stations and 
the entire infrastructure) cannot fail as it is a state company. Following the launch of the 
initial services, NTV network would quickly expand in order to complete the planned 
network. 
 
October  Italo services reach Venice. 
 
October 24th  Mr. Antonello Perricone becomes the new NTV CEO, replacing Mr. 
Montezemolo, who remains on the company’s board. 
 
August  Some services are extended to Salerno and non-stop services Rome-Milan are 
launched. 
 
December  Italo services reach Turin. 
 
2013 
 
March  The fleet of the 25 AGV trains is now completely delivered to NTV. 
 
June 11th  The Italian antitrust authority announces that it will launch an investigation into 
FS and its subsidiaries following allegations by NTV that the national railway had engaged 
in anticompetitive practices against the newcomer. NTV alleged that they had been the 
victim of a deliberate strategy of exclusion by FS, including limiting access to infrastructure 
and selling tickets at below cost price. 
 
December 15th  A new service is launched between Milan, Bologna, Rimini and Ancona, 
one of which also serves Turin. 
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2014 
 
March 5th  NTV launches a cost cutting programme focused on staff and company 
directors due to the effects of Italy's continuing poor economic performance and strong 
competition from incumbent high-speed operator Trenitalia. On the other hand, NTV has 
reached an agreement with Hahn Air, which will give it access to more than 91,000 travel 
agencies worldwide. This will allow travel agents to offer passengers combined flights and 
rail travel. 
 
March 12th  The Italian antitrust authority declares that it has found no evidence of abuse of 
the FS dominant position following NTV’s complaints in June 2013. 
 
April 7th  RFI agrees to allow NTV to start running Rome services from Rome Termini 
station. 
 
June 15th  NTV transfers some services to Rome Termini station, while the rest of them 
remain at Rome Ostiense station. Italo’s presence at Rome Tiburtina station remains intact. 
 
September 24th  NTV votes to restructure its debts after a €77 million loss in its first full 
year of operation, with shareholders expected to contribute capital. The company has also 
decided to withdraw Italo services to Ancona from the start of the 2015 timetable on 
December 15th. 
 
October 24th  The Ministry for Economic Development announces that the proposed 
initiative regarding the “Creation of a new fleet of high-speed trains operating under the 
Italo - NTV brand” was eligible for inclusion in the White Certificates programme as a 
“Major Project”. 
 
October 30th  NTV presents to trade unions a major restructuring plan for the company 
which included the intention to lay-off up to 248 staff (a quarter of its workforce). 
 
November 5th  The Transport Regulation Authority’s president Mr. Andrea Camanzi 
announces a 37% reduction in HSL usage fees (for both Italo and Trenitalia) starting in 
2015. 
 
December 15th  NTV axes Italo services to Ancona after one year of its launch. 
 
2015 
 
February 26th  Mr. Flavio Cattaneo takes on the role of the company’s new CEO. Mr. 
Antonello Perricone remains with NTV as the company's president. Cattaneo makes it a 
priority to tackle the company’s €675 million debt through a new 2015-2020 Business Plan. 
 
March  The operator hints at several reforms to achieve its goal of breaking even by 2020, 
including a capital increase of €70-100 million and the purchase of six to 10 new high-
speed trains. Increasing NTV's service offerings is part of the strategy to boost revenues 
and its balance sheet. On the other hand, all employees are subject to a contract of 
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solidarity, which foresees a 9% cut in wages, but to avoid job losses NTV is proposing a 
20% cut and is currently negotiating the terms with unions. 
 
April 13th  Workers at NTV go on strike for the first time. Negotiations with unions are going 
on. 
 
April 17th  NTV reaches an agreement with Italy's rail unions, which aims to avert 
redundancy for 250 staff, around a quarter of the company's workforce. 
 
October 28th  NTV board approves the award of a contract for Alstom Transport for the 
supply and maintenance of new 8 trainsets, branded EVO. Their maximum operating speed 
will be 250 km/h, compared to the 300 km/h of AGV trainsets. 
 
December  All Italo services calling at Milan Garibaldi are transferred to Milan Central, 
while stops at Milan Rogoredo are not altered. On the other hand, NTV withdraws all 
remaining services from Rome Ostiense and transfers them to Rome Termini. Besides, 
trains in Turin now call at Porta Nuova station (in addition to Porta Susa) and new services 
from Naples to Verona via Bologna are added to the network. Finally, NTV launches 
Italobus services from Reggio Emilia train station. 
 
2016 
 
March 1st  Two daily Verona roundrip services are extended to Brescia. On the other hand, 
NTV releases its financial results of the previous year 2015, reporting a positive EBITDA for 
the very first time. 
 
May  The production of the new EVO trains is launched at the Alstom plant in Savigliano. 
On the other hand, summer seasonal services from Milan to Rimini are resumed. 
 
September 7th  NTV orders 4 additional EVO trains, bringing the number of trains in the 
new fleet to 12. 
 
December  The very first carriage of the new EVO trains is unveiled at the Alstom plant in 
Savigliano (Cuneo province) where it will be produced in series. Besides, two important 
agreements are signed with RFI: the first related to amendment and supplementation of the 
Framework Agreement until 2027 and makes more railway infrastructure available to NTV 
in line with the new requirements arising from expansion of the fleet; the second regards 
provision of a third maintenance facility near Venice Santa Lucia station (in addition to the 
ones already operating in Nola and Milan), aimed at a greater operating efficiency. 
 
2017 
 
July  EVO homologation tests are completed in line with schedules. 
 
October 3rd  The first EVO train is displayed during the Expo Ferroviaria 2017. 
 
November 9th  NTV orders 5 additional EVO trains. A fleet of a total of 17 EVO trains is 
now ordered. NTV will have a fleet of 42 trains as of 2019. 
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December  The first four NTV EVO trains begin commercial service on the Rome-Venice 
route. Along with that, a new stop at Rovigo, on the Bologna-Venice line is added 
 
2018 
 
January  NTV S.p.A. is renamed Italo S.p.A., the name assigned to its train services. A few 
days later, the company submits an application for the admission to the Consob in order to 
be listed on the Milan Stock Exchange. 
 
February 7th  Italo is instead sold to the US-based Global Infrastructure Partners for €1.98 
billion. 
 
April 5th  The European Commission approves the acquisition of Italo by GIP. 
 
May 1st  Italo launches new HST services on the Turin-Milan-Verona-Venice axis. 
 
Last update: June 2018. 
 
 
 
5.2 Shareholders 
 
 
Nuovo Trasporto Viaggiatori S.p.A was founded in December 2006 by the entrepreuners 
Luca di Montezemolo, Diego Della Valle, Gianni Punzo and Giuseppe Sciarrone. During 
the following years, many other shareholders have joined the company, including the 
French National Railways SNCF with a 20% of the shares. 
 
NTV carried out a recapitalization at the end of 2015 (increase by €100 million) that 
modified the shares of the company’s stock: SNCF reduced its participation from 20% to 
only 1.4%, while Cattaneo has increased it. MDP Holding remains the largest shareholder 
with 36.8%, followed by Intesa SanPaolo S.p.A. The current share capital accounts for 
€60.017.725,00  (updated in May 2018), and the shareholding structure is presented below 
(Exhibit 6). 
 
 
Exhibit 6 | Italo Shareholding Structure in March 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Italo S.p.A. 
18,81%
17,14%
14,31%12,71%
12,59%
7,85%
5,83%
5,72%
4,77% 0,27% Intesa Sanpaolo S.P.A.
Diego Della Valle (Founding Member) through MDP Holding Due S.r.l. + FA.DEL. 
S.r.l.
General Financial Holdings through ALLEGRO S.A.R.L.
Luca Cordero di Montezemolo (Founding Member) directly and through MDP 
Holding Uno S.r.l. + MDP Holding Quattro S.r.l.
Peninsula Capital through PII1 S.A.R.L.
Gianni Punzo (Founding Member) through MDP Holding Tre S.r.l.
Flavio Cattaneo directly and through PARTIND S.R.L. + PARTIND DUE S.R.L.
Isabella Seragnoli through MAIS S.P.A.
Alberto Bombassei thourgh NUOVA FOURB S.R.L.
Minor shareholders.
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5.3 The Up-Front Investment 
 
The total, fully-private up-front investment (period 2008-2012) of €1.016 million is weighted 
as presented below (Exhibit 7). 
 
 
Exhibit 7 | Italo Up-Front Investment (2008-2012). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Italo S.p.A. 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Network 
 
 
Italo operates the following routes (updated May 2018), which are drawn below (Exhibit 8): 
 
 Turin-Milan-Reggio Emilia-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples-Salerno (up to 25 daily 
departures in each direction, up to 9 of them direct between Rome and Milan) 
 Venice-Padua-Rovigo-Ferrara-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples-Salerno (up to 8 
daily departures in each direction) 
 Brescia-Verona-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples (3 daily departures in each 
direction) 
 Turin-Milan-Brescia-Desenzano Sirmione-Peschiera del Garda-Verona-Vicenza-
Padua-Venice (5 daily departures in each direction) 
 
Notes: Number of daily trips according to the official current Italo timetables (from April 1st 
2018 to June 9th 2018). It should be noted that not all train services cover the entire routes, 
but the Rome-Milan and Rome-Venice stretches are usually covered by all train services 
operating in the north-south axis. 
 
By summer 2018, some services are planned to be extended from Verona to Bolzano, 
calling at Rovereto and Trento. On the other hand, Italo plans to introduce services to 
Genoa, but no official announcements have been so far. 
62%
8%
4%
7%
2%
17%
€628 million: purchase of the fleet consisting of 25 Alstom AGV trainsets.
€87 million: construction of the Nola (near Naples) maintenance plant and related 
equipments.
€38 million: on-board telematics and corporate information systems.
€76 million: financial charges.
€19 million: training of operating staff.
€169 million: start-up costs and other investments (preparation of Casa Italo, and 
head offices among others).
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The network is completed by Italobus, consisting of a number of interurban bus routes fully 
integrated to Italo network linking some of Italo train stops with many other destinations not 
served directly by Italo train services (updated in May 2018): 
 
 Milano Rogoredo-Capriate-Orio al Serio-Bergamo 
 Verona-Rovereto-Trento-Canazei (the last stop is winter seasonal) 
 Reggio Emilia-Parma-Cremona 
 Reggio Emilia-Modena-Mantova 
 Salerno-Picerno-Potenza-Ferrandina-Matera 
 Salerno-Sala Consilina-Lauria-Frascineto-Cosenza 
 Venice Mestre-Treviso-Cortina d’Ampezzo (winter seasonal) 
 Torino-Aosta-Courmayeur (winter seasonal) 
 Naples Afragola-Caserta-Benevento (announced in May 2018) 
 
Services are timed to meet with Italo train services and hence to make connections 
convenient for users. 
 
Italo train services connect 17 Italian cities and 22 stations (updated in May 2018), 
intercepting 71% of Italy’s population (Italo S.p.A., 2018). Cities and stations served are 
listed below (Table 10). 
 
Direct trains between Rome and Milan call at Rome Termini, Rome Tiburtina, Milan 
Rogoredo and Milan Central, although a few of them skip Rome Tiburtina. Besides, some 
trains travelling on the Milan-Turin stretch call at Milan Rho Fiera as well on selected dates 
when special events are being held at the Milan fair. 
 
 
 
Source: Italo S.p.A. (updated in May 2018). 
Exhibit 8 | Italo HSR Network.          
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Table 10 | List of Train Stations Served by Italo. 
 
 
 
 
When Italo services were launched, trains called at Rome Tiburtina and Rome Ostiense in 
the Italian capital. Rome Tiburtina station, located in the northeastern part of the city, 
underwent an important redevelopment to become a high-speed rail hub. With its works 
completed in 2011, it became Italo main terminal in the city. On the other hand, Rome 
Ostiense station, located in the southwestern part of the city, was used by Italo Rome 
terminator services as a secondary stop and for overnight stay of trains and cleaning.  
 
In fact, Termini station is more centric and much better located and connected with public 
transport than Tiburtina station is, while its competitor Trenitalia has always operated high-
speed trains from Termini. Nevertheless, this situation came to an end and NTV has been 
able to operate from Termini since June 2014. After moving all operations to Termini 
station, Ostiense station was dropped by NTV for passenger service but kept for train 
maintenance tasks. 
 
Italo’s presence at Rome Ostiense was the subject of severe controversies between NTV 
and RFI as well. In June 2012, NTV filed an anti-competitive complaint against RFI after 
they put a fence between Casa Italo (a mix of customer services and waiting area) and its 
platforms, causing inconveniences to Italo users. RFI alleged this was due to safety 
reasons. 
 
With regards to Milan, Italo trains initially called at Milan Rogoredo and Milan Garibaldi. 
Milan Rogoredo station is located in the southeastern city limits and provides an easy 
access from all the Milanese hinterland. On the other hand, Milan Garibaldi was the main 
terminal in the city. In December 2015, all services were transferred to the neighbor Milan 
City Train stations
Bologna Centrale
Brescia -
Desenzano Sirmione -
Ferrara Termini
Florence S. M. Novella
Centrale
Rho Fiera [1]
Rogoredo
Afragola
Centrale
Padova Centrale
Peschiera del Garda -
Reggio Emilia Mediopadana
Termini
Tiburtina
Rovigo -
Salerno Centrale
Porta Susa
Porta Nuova
Santa Lucia
Mestre
Verona Porta Nuova
Vicenza -
Milan
Naples
Venice
Rome
Turin[1] Trains call at Milan 
Rho Fiera on selected 
dates. 
Source: own analysis 
(updated in May 2018). 
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Central station. In this case, the move did not stand for a significant improvement as it 
happened in Rome as Garibaldi station is already located in the central area of Milan and it 
is very well connected with the public transport network. As a matter of fact, Milan Central 
station is not served by the city’s suburban rail network. 
Finally, it is worth noting that Italo operated regular services to the Adriatic coast from 
December 2013 to December 2014, covering the route Milan-Bologna-Rimini-Ancona with 
3 round trips per day, one of which also served Turin.  
 
NTV operations at Rimini were subject of disputes between NTV and RFI as works of 
adjustment at Rimini station consisting in a platform rise were needed in order to operate 
AGV trains but were delayed by RFI several months. Moreover, it happened that Trenitalia 
decided to launch the same route after NTV announcement and managed to launch it a 
couple of months earlier than them since their trains met former standards appropriate to 
operate at Rimini station. 
 
 
 
5.5 Rolling Stock 
 
 
NTV chose to purchase Alstom’s new generation high-speed train AGV (known as ETR 
575 in NTV classification) for their forthcoming rail operations. In November 2007, NTV 
signed with Alstom the contract for the supply and maintenance of 25 AGV 575 trains, with 
an option for a further 10 trains. NTV was the first rail operator to acquire Alstom AGV 
trains and to date the only operator. Seventeen units were assembled at La Rochelle 
(France) and the eight remaining units were produced in Savigliano (Italy), at the former 
Fiat Ferroviaria plant. 
 
It is interesting to highlight some technical differences between NTV AGV and Trenitalia’s 
ETR 500, its closest competitor. Some technical features of trains ETR 575, ETR 500 and 
ETR 400 are displayed below (Table 11). These trains account for all existing high-end 
high-speed passenger services in Italy, equivalent to Spain’s AVE. 
 
The ETR 500 series lower power/weight ratio results in a lower acceleration in comparison 
to distributed traction trains. These superior performances of NTV AGV probably motivated 
Trenitalia to put forward an order for 50 trainsets class Frecciarossa 1000 (also known as 
ETR 400 in Trenitalia classification). Those trains indeed present some similarities to NTV 
AGV. 
 
Apart from that, the length of ETR 575 series is suitable to allow double compositions, as 
the platform length for HSR is standardized at 400 metres in Europe. Therefore, NTV may 
be able to increase capacity on certain trains if the demand requires so. However, no 
double traction services have been reported so far, allegedly due to the fact that the 
company does not really have spare rolling stock at present since the entire fleet is 
intensively destined to the regular service. 
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Table 11 | Technical Features of Trains ETR 575, ETR 500 and ETR 400. 
 
 
 
[1] Trevi: consortium formed by Ansaldo, Breda, Fiat Ferroviaria, ABB Tecnomasio and Firema Trasporti. 
[2] Hitachi Rail Italy was created in 2015 by taking over a company branch of AnsaldoBreda, which was 
responsible for ETR 400 series production. 
[3] Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of powered axles with respect to the total number of axles. 
In trainsets with concentrated propulsion, the two power cars always account for 8 powered axles. 
[4] 360 km/h is the design commercial speed, but current operational speed is limited to 300 km/h. 
Source: own analysis with data from UIC, Railfaneurope, Wikipedia and others. 
 
 
On the other hand, in October 2015, 8 Alstom’s Avelia family trains were ordered (known 
as ETR 675 in NTV classification and branded as EVO), though the order was later 
expanded up to 17 units. The ETR 675 series is in fact an evolution of Alstom’s Pendolino 
family, a name that remained as a brand, as those trains are not actually fitted with tilting 
technology since NTV considered it would not be necessary for the planned duties. These 
trains have a higher seating density than AGV trains but a lower maximum speed of 250 
km/h.  
 
The trains are being assembled entirely in Italy and will be used to expand the Italo network 
in mixed routes of HSLs and conventional lines, while ETR 575 series will be used 
exclusively on high-speed lines. EVO trains have a distributed traction as well. The first four 
units entered in service in December 2017. In late May 2018, 11 units were already 
delivered to Italo. 
 
Finally, the company owns two D 200 diesel locomotives from Vossloh (type G2000) for 
shunting and rescue duties. 
 
 
Class ETR 575 ETR 500 ETR 400
Manufacturer Alstom Trevi [1]
Hitachi Rail Italy [2], 
Bombardier 
Transportation
Axle formula EMU-11 EMU-13 EMU-8
Entered in service 2012-2013 2000-2005 2015
Operator Italo-NTV Trenitalia Trenitalia
Commercial service Italo Frecciarossa Frecciarossa
Traction [3] Distributed (10/24) Concentrated (8/52) Distributed (16/32)
Power output (kW) 7.600 8.800 9.800
Weight (unloaded) (t) 375 576 454
Weight (loaded) (t) 423 640 500
Power/weight ratio (kW/t) 18,0 13,8 19,6
Maximum speed (km/h) 300 300 360 [4]
Length (m) 201,2 327,6 202,0
Capacity 450 574 457
Cost (M€) 26,0 30,8
Seat cost (€/seat) 57.777,78 67.396,06
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5.6 On-Board Service 
 
 
Italo AGV trains feature four levels of service (denominated ambiences by Italo), 
denominated Smart, Comfort, Prima and Club Executive. The main differences between 
these classes focus on the seating configuration (2+2 in Smart, 2+1 in the rest of classes), 
the legroom and the service offered, both on ground and on-board. These levels of service 
are compared with those of full-service carrier airlines and Frecciarossa trains below (Table 
12). 
 
Comfort was added in 2016 (in AGV cars 4 and 5) as an intermediate class between Smart 
and Prima, replacing the former Smart XL (in practice it is its evolution), offering Prima 
seats without its additional services (such as Fast Track, welcome service, newspapers 
and magazines) at a lower cost. Therefore, the capacity was increased from 450 to 462 
seats. Additionally, each AGV train has a dedicated Smart cinema car (car 11), in which 
high-definition movies are projected during trips. Club Executive is equipped with individual 
video screens and two meeting rooms. All seats feature individual electrical sockets and 
free Wi-Fi is available for all passengers. 
 
Italo AGV trains are designed so that the number of cars offering Prima and Comfort can 
be adapted to meet demand. On the other hand, EVO trains are fitted with Smart, Prima 
and Club Executive levels of service. On-board bar-restaurant is not available, but trains 
are fitted with two vending machines and on-board catering is provided in Prima and Club 
Executive. 
 
 
Table 12 | Levels of Service Equivalences. 
 
 
 
[1] Only in AGV trains.  
Source: own analysis. 
 
 
For further detailed information and specifications on Italo’s and Frecce’s network, services 
list, levels of service, fares and rolling stock, refer to the Appendices 1 and 2. 
Airline standard Italo Frecciarossa
Economy Smart Standard
Premium Economy Comfort [1] Premium
Business Prima Business
First Club Executive Executive
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6.1 Strategic Management 
 
 
     6.1.1 Overview 
 
The aim of this section is to expose how the board of NTV configured the product Italo from 
a business model point of view in order to achieve the targeted market share. The key to 
success is, indeed, to make Italo competitive, which includes the setting up of an attractive 
product, the minimization of CASK (lower than Trenitalia’s HSR services, presumably 
feasible as Trenitalia was founded from the former public state-owned Ferrovie dello Stato 
holding, from which it inherited certain rigidities) and the maximization of revenue.  
 
In this sense, the company’s strategy must focus on a number of items, including the rolling 
stock (fleet size, capacity, technical performances, maintenance…), workforce (work shifts, 
wages, working conditions, tasks, on-board crew, relationship with unions…), product 
(target audience, levels of service, on-board services, fares, frequency), network (routes 
operated, stations served, integration with other transport services), marketing and other 
investments and determinant factors (the ticket distribution system, outsourcing…). 
 
Thus, the ambition and the innovative and entrepreneurial spirit of NTV was a key condition 
for the success of Italo since the company made a very large and risky investment of €1 
billion, including the purchase of 25 trains, a strategy that enabled them to benefit from 
economies of density and economies of scale.  
 
Italo’s cost structure is inspired by the low cost airline model, since fixed costs are 
minimized and the ticket distribution system adopted is overwhelmingly digitalized 
(Desmaris, 2016). Besides, pricing is based on the yield management system and many 
tasks are outsourced, such as the maintenance of the rolling stock, catering, security and 
the call centre. The objective is clearly to keep costs low in order to have a lower CASK 
than the competitor while providing a high quality service.  
 
     6.1.2 Focus on the Rolling Stock 
 
Italo initially ordered 25 brand new high-speed trains from Alstom with superior technical 
performances than the competitor’s rolling stock. One important point is that the company 
made the innovative decision to omit the inclusion of a dedicated bar-restaurant car. 
Instead, two vending machines were added on each train (cars 3 and 7 in AGV trains, cars 
3 and 6 in EVO trains) so that the company can still benefit from the income from these 
services. Additionally, on-board catering is offered in Prima and Club Executive, which is 
prepared in the galleys of the train.  
 
In this way, an entire additional car can be fully destined to seating, increasing the overall 
capacity of each trainset. For instance, as EVO trains are fairly comparable to Trenitalia’s 
ETR 600 (also from the Pendolino family), it can be pointed out that EVO trains feature 487 
seats compared to the 432 of ETR 600 and hence enabling Italo to reduce CASK by 9%.  
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The EVO fleet was ordered to Alstom in 2015 with even a higher seating density than the 
AGV fleet. This fleet has a maximum speed of 250 km/h, compared to 300 km/h of the AGV 
fleet. The main reason is that the EVO fleet is intended to be deployed on the 
Naples/Rome-Venice and Turin/Milan-Venice links, which barely have stretches with 
maximum operating speed exceeding 250 km/h, with no relevant effects on travel times. 
 
In this way, Italo acquired a less expensive fleet than the AGV fleet (partly explained by the 
lower maximum speed) with more suitable performances for certain routes of the network. 
As a consequence, the company will allocate all AGV trains in the HSL backbone Turin-
Salerno, where the maximum speed can be reached, leading to a more efficient use of the 
company’s resources. 
 
Finally, the fact that the entire Italo fleet has been produced by a single manufacturer has 
seen positive repercussions on the efficiency in the maintenance costs as well. 
 
     6.1.3 Levels of Service and Fares 
 
Italo has adopted a scheme with four levels of service (Club Executive, Prima, Comfort and 
Smart) and a pricing structure with three different fares (Flex, Economy and Low-cost) 
within the yield management system and also a number of promotional offers. Thus, the 
provision of a wide-range of offers covering most of the segments of users was made 
possible, from the most price-sensitive ones to the more demanding ones. 
 
     6.1.4 Target Audience 
 
Since its launch, Italo has aimed at targeting a wide range of passengers, but it has 
especially persevered in its goal of targeting business travellers. This is the segment of 
users with the highest yields since they typically seek higher-end levels of service and 
flexible fares. Therefore, high-yield passengers are key drivers of revenues. With the 
purpose of making Italo appealing from them, NTV has made sure to provide a very high 
quality service in Prima and Club Executive, including a meeting room, on-board catering, 
fast track train access, a convenient loyalty programme and a high frequency of services, 
especially in the Rome-Milan link, which is currently served by two hourly services in each 
direction for most of the day, including a number of non-stop services. Besides, lounges for 
premium passengers are available at the main stations of the network (Florence SMN, 
Milan Central, Naples Central, Rome Termini, Rome Tiburtina, Turin Porta Susa). 
 
     6.1.5 The Network Strategy 
 
The network strategy is another item that has to be analyzed. The company was born to 
operate in the backbone of the Italian HSR network, from Turin, Milan and Venice to Rome, 
Naples and Salerno, which sees the highest demand in the country and serves more than 
60% of Italy’s population. However, it is interesting that Italo showed interest to operate 
services in the Milan-Bologna-Rimini-Ancona route as well, and so did, from December 
2013 to December 2014. It is also worth noting that Trenitalia decided to launch 
Frecciarossa services in the same link after NTV announcement. 
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This lower demand route is more focused to leisure trips (typically lower yielding) compared 
to, for instance, Milan-Rome, which is more business-heavy (higher-yield). In fact, 
frequency is a key factor to appeal business travellers (Deutsche Magnet Bahn, 1993) and 
therefore, since NTV operated the route to the Adriatic with only three daily round trips, this 
seems to back up our hypothesis on the user profile in this route. After less than one year 
of operation, NTV board decided to withdraw from the route and hence it lasted only 12 
months. This move has to be contextualized in order to better understand the company’s 
strategy. 
 
In 2014, RFI agreed to grant NTV access to Rome Termini station. Beforehand, not having 
access to the central station in Rome was a competitive disadvantage for the company, so 
this was a good opportunity to attract more users in the Italian capital in a moment when 
NTV was facing financial difficulties. Therefore, it seems that this context motivated the 
company to strengthen their presence in the higher-yield Rome-Milan route by doubling the 
number of daily non-stop round trip services from 3 to 6 with trains freed from the Adriatic 
route, which would be discontinued. 
 
In any case, NTV resumed services to the Adriatic in August 2016 taking advantage of the 
large flows of people moving to the coast in peak season. Nevertheless, the service was 
limited to Milan-Bologna-Rimini and operated only from Friday to Monday. Since then, the 
service has not been resumed anymore. 
 
Regarding the overall network, NTV initially tried to make alternatives focusing on 
secondary stations in Rome and Milan and secondary lines such as Milan-Ancona, and 
ended up in the verge of bankruptcy. It was only in 2015 when they modified their strategy 
to focus on the central stations in Rome, Milan and Turin, along with allocating all their 
resources in the backbone Milan/Venice-Rome-Naples that the company saw a strong 
increase in ridership and finally became profitable. 
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6.2 Key Metrics and Financial Results 
 
 
     6.2.1 Introduction 
 
According to some authors, GDP per capita is highly correlated with passenger traffic 
volume. Therefore, passenger traffic tends to stagnate or even decrease during the 
economic crisis. In the particular case of Italy, the country plunged into a deep recession 
just before NTV launched its first services and its GDP dropped by 4% from 2011 to 2015, 
while in 2017 it is still about 2 percentage points below 2011. Nevertheless, it is very 
interesting to evaluate the effects that rail competition has had on the HSR traffic in Italy as 
shown below (Exhibit 9). 
 
 
Exhibit 9 | Total HSR Traffic (RPK), Italy’s GDP and Yield from 2011 to 2017 (Indexed 
Against Data for 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TRA Consulting. 
 
Total passenger traffic (RPK) increased by about 50% between 2011 and 2017 in the 
Italian HSR network. With regards to the previous statement of the relationship between 
traffic and GDP, it is seems reasonable to assume that at least a part of the increase in 
HSR traffic comes from other means of transport (air, road and conventional trains). 
 
In the meantime, yields decreased by 40%. Therefore, this fact has clearly been the key 
driver for the increase in the HSR traffic. It is worth noting that prices already started to 
decrease within a few months of Italo’s entry into the market. 
 
Hence, it is of the greatest interest to analyze Italo’s economic data and the main 
operational indicators in relation to its operational activity during this period in order to 
establish some substantial conclusions on HSR transport. Let us recall that we are focusing 
on Italo’s particular case since it is the only example of a private open-access operator that 
competes with the state-owned incumbent on its HSR network up to date. 
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     6.2.2 Quantitative Analysis 
 
The following analyses are based on the available data from Italo S.p.A. Financial 
Statements from 2014 to 2017, and hence we have data from 2013, which was the first full 
year of operation of Italo, to 2017. All the data presented below are collected in Appendix 3. 
Remark: data is not always complete and clear and hence some estimates were required. 
In any case, any potential inaccuracies will not affect our conclusions. 
 
First of all, the ridership and traffic (RPK) share are respectively presented below (Exhibits 
10 and 11). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. and others. 
 
Italo had a 24% traffic share in 2016, whereas the ridership share was near 16%, which 
means that the average trip of an Italo passenger is longer than Freccia’s.  
 
 Key Operational Metrics 
 
Let us focus now on Italo’s key operational metrics (Exhibits 12 to 14). 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
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Observation: The production of train.kms is expressed in global terms (Exhibit 12) and for a 
unit train (Exhibit 13). The latter is obtained simply by dividing the production of train.kms 
by the fleet of 25 trains. Data from 2017 is estimated from the Italo 2017 first 9 months 
Interim Report. Otherwise, data from the 2017 Financial Statement would be distorted due 
to the launch of the first EVO trains in December 2017, resulting in a slight overestimation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
 
 
 Ticket Revenues Performance: Key Metrics 
 
Italo’s ticket revenues performance is presented below (Exhibits 15 and 16). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
 
The average distance (i.e. the relationship between ridership and RPK) oscillates between 
415 and 435 kilometres in this period and hence it can be assumed that the proportion 
between ridership and RPK is roughly constant. 
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 Key Financial Metrics 
 
Italo’s key financial metrics are presented below (Exhibits 17 to 21). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
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The collected data above is now analyzed in relation to the company’s activity in this 
period. 
 
2014 
 
Overview 
 
The company’s operating performance was below expectations in 2014, especially in terms 
of revenue from ticket sales. This made it necessary to revise the Business Plan for the 
period from 2015-2018 in order to assess the timescale and initiatives required to reach 
breakeven and decide on the actions to be taken in order to put the company on a sound 
financial footing. 
 
On March 5th, a cost cutting programme was launched as NTV reached agreement with its 
five unions for about 1.000 contracts of solidarity that foresaw a cut in wages and a 
reduction in the number of company directors and their pays. 
 
Operating activities 
 
 16 daily services were transferred to Rome Termini station on June 15th.  
 Services on the Turin/Milan-Ancona link were terminated on December 15th. 
 
Key Operational, Commercial and Financial Metrics 
 
 ASK increased slightly by 2.4% with respect to 2013, due to the fact that the fleet of 
trains was entirely available in 2014, compared to 2013, as the ramp up was 
completed in March 2013.  
 Ridership grew by 5.7%, not in line with expectations, probably influenced by the 
economic crisis, while RPK increased by 4.5%. 
 Revenues increased by 9.2% due to the patronage growth and the yield increase 
(4.4%). According to Exhibit 9, despite the general tendency of strong yield 
decrease in this period, overall yields rather stagnated between 2013 and 2014. 
 Costs remained stable in general despite the greater production of train.kms, due to 
the introduction of the cost cutting programme that made possible a 10% reduction 
in staff costs, offsetting the 2% increase in cost of services attachable to the 
increase in the production of train.kms. 
 The EBITDA and the Net Profit improved but still in the red. 
 
2015 
 
Overview 
 
Even thought at the end of 2015 NTV was still engaged in completing its turnaround plan 
approved in February 2015, the positive results achieved at the end of the year proved the 
validity of the course of action undertaken via implementation of the plan. The 
restructuration was based on strengthening the service offered by using the fleet more 
efficiently, and was supported by shareholders via a capital increase of €60 million. The 
main activities accomplished in 2015 include: 
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 Increase in capacity, from 48 to 56 daily services, with boosted services on the 
Rome-Milan link and the launch of new services to Verona. NTV was able to 
persuade Alstom to increase train availability, hence this made possible this 
production enhancement with the same fleet of trains. 
 Launch of the new intermodal road-rail model, with Italobus connections launched 
from Reggio Emilia AV station. 
 Access at Rome Termini, Milan Central and Turin Porta Nuova stations. 
 Acquisition of eight new trains, to be delivered from 2017. 
 Enhanced presence in stations via new automated ticket vending machines and the 
opening of dedicated ticketing spaces and lounges in Rome and Milan. 
 Optimisation of onboard services and a new customer service model. 
 
Additionally, other corporate initiatives were underway all aimed at further improving 
corporate performance and oriented towards further growth in supply, the development of 
Italobus services from other network stations, the increase in the number of stations served 
and the opening of new Lounge rooms. On the other hand, in 2015 NTV benefited from a 
37% track access charges reduction approved by the Transport Regulation Authority. 
 
Nevertheless, this progress was not a path of roses, as the new industrial plan initially 
forecasted to dismiss a quarter of the company’s workforce, which cost the company a 
strike in April 2015. 
 
Operating activities 
 
 From June 2015, daily services to and from Rome Termini station were stepped up 
from 16 to 32, services from Rome Ostiense were terminated and  services to Turin 
and Salerno were further expanded. 
 In December, with the launch of the new winter timetable, several upgrades were 
turned on: 
- The overall Italo service grew from 48 to 56 daily services. 
- All Milan services were transferred from Garibaldi station to Central station and 
trains in Turin began to call at Porta Nuova station (in addition to Porta Susa). 
- New services to Verona were added. 
- The new intermodal road-rail model was launched with Italobus connections from 
Reggio Emilia AV station, which in turn saw Italo daily train services doubling from 
12 to 23. 
- Introduction of varied new offers to travel with Italo. 
 
Key Operational, Commercial and Financial Metrics 
 
 ASK increased by 4.2% with respect to 2014 as a result of the actions undertaken 
to achieve a higher fleet usage. 
 Ridership grew by 39.5%, from 6.6 million to 9.1 million (while RPK increased by 
43.8%), due to the strengthening of the network and the introduction of the new 
Italobus services, registering a Load Factor of 71.5%, compared to 51.7% in 2014. 
 Revenues from sales and services increased by 16.2% due to the patronage 
growth, even though yields dropped 19% to 7.7 €.cents/RPK. Regarding other 
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incomes, the company entered 8.7 M€ from EECs (the so-called White Certificates) 
(2.8% of the total revenue). 
 Production costs and CASK decreased by 6.3% and 10% respectively, mainly 
driven by 1) the reduction of a number of items included in the cost of services, 
namely track access charges paid to the network operator in particular despite the 
increase in the production of train.kms., and 2) reduction in costs of raw materials, 
consumables and goods and staff costs. Conversely, some items such as other 
provisions and other operating costs increased significantly. 
 The EBITDA was positive for the first time, whereas the Net Profit was still in the 
red. 
 
2016 
 
Overview 
 
In 2016, the positive trend observed at the end of the previous year was confirmed, thus 
providing a positive outlook for the company as a result of the turnaround plan launched in 
February 2015. All key operational, commercial and financial metrics registered great 
tendencies and even the net profit was positive for the first time. Along with that, the 
network was further strengthened with steeped up services in the backbone of the network, 
new train services to Brescia, Ferrara and to the Adriatic (seasonal) as well as new Italobus 
connections from Milan Rogoredo and Salerno. 
 
On the other hand, lounges were opened at Rome Termini, Rome Tiburtina, Milan Central, 
Naples Central, Turin Porta Susa and Florence, and at all network stations served, direct 
sales management was also strengthened, with automated ticket vending machines, sales 
points and mobile sales desks. 
 
In December, four months ahead of the agreed timeframe, the current solidarity contract 
was cancelled, entailing full termination of the related effects from January 2017. 
 
Operating activities 
 
 In March, two daily Verona roundrip services were extended to Brescia. 
 During August, weekend connections between Milan and Rimini were resumed. 
 From December, with the launch of the new winter timetable, several upgrades 
were introduced: 
- Further expanded services in the Milan-Turin and Rome-Naples links. 
- Two daily round trip services to Venice began to call at Ferrara. 
- New Italobus connections from Milan Rogoredo station to Capriate and Orio al 
Serio Airport and from Salerno to Picerno, Potenza, Ferrandina, Matera and 
Taranto. 
 
Key Operational, Commercial and Financial Metrics 
 
 ASK increased by 13.0% due to the stepped up fleet usage. The average 
production of train.kms per unit train was then 556.000 kilometres per year 
compared to 474.000 kilometres in 2014 (+17.3%). 
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 Ridership grew by 22.0% to 11.1 million while RPK increased by 20.8%. As a 
result, the Load Factor reached 76.4%. 
 Revenue from sales and services increased by 15.3% due to the patronage growth, 
whereas yields further decreased to 0.073 €.cents/RPK. Regarding other incomes, 
the company entered 15.5 M€ from EECs (4.1% of the total revenue). 
 Production costs rose by 4.7%, proportionally less than both revenue and capacity 
growth leading to a further decrease in CASK to 5.2 €.cents/ASK, hence it was a 
good symptom of the effectiveness of the Business Plan actions approved in the 
previous year. The most significant increases were driven by 1) track access 
charges and traction energy (due to the increased capacity), 2) direct cost of sales 
(related to the increase in revenue), 3) staff costs and 4) provisions for potential 
losses. By contrast, provisions for risks and charges and charges for amortisation 
and depreciation were significantly reduced. 
 The EBITDA increased by 56.4% and a positive Net Profit of €28.2 million was 
registered for the first time. 
 
2017 
 
Overview 
 
The company kept on with the positive trends of the previous year and, as a result, it was 
decided to begin the process of listing the company’s shares on the screen-based trading 
system managed by Borsa Italiana S.p.A. Even though the financial ratios significantly 
rose, the net profit saw a very limited growth due to the financial expenses incurred in 
relation to the refinancing of the company’s capital structure, a move taken by the company 
in preparation for the Initial public offering. 
 
Operating activities continued with the completion of all the initiatives intended to achieve 
the objectives established in the Business Plan, which has been implemented across all 
strategic growth areas. 
 
Furthermore, the first four EVO trains were delivered to the company and entered in service 
with the new winter timetable in December, allowing boosting the network up to 68 daily 
services. 
 
Operating activities 
 
 The Italobus network was expanded with a new connection from Verona to Canazei 
ski resort (winter seasonal), with stops in Rovereto, Trento, Cavalesa, Predazzo, 
Moena, Vigo di Fassa and Pozzo di Fassa; another link from Salerno to Cosenza 
with two stops in Lauria and Sala Consilina; and extended Parma link (from Reggio 
Emilia) to Cremona. 
 In December, new winter seasonal connections with ski resorts were launched: 
Courmayeur from Turin and Cortina d’Ampezzo from Venice. 
 In December 7th, the first 4 trains in the new EVO fleet entered in service, allowing 
to further expand Italo’s rail network up to 68 daily services with the new winter 
timetable, compared to 56 in the previous timetable. Therefore, services on the 
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Rome-Milan axis increased from 40 to 50, ensuring a train each 30 minutes in this 
link for most of the day. 
 
Key Operational, Commercial and Financial Metrics 
 
 ASK increased by 9.9% due to the stepped up fleet usage and the introduction of 
four new EVO trains at the end of the year. 
 Ridership grew by 15.3% to 12.8 million while RPK increased by 11.3%. As a 
result, the Load Factor reached 77.4%. 
 Revenue from sales and services increased by 18.4% due to the patronage growth, 
whereas yields slightly increased to 0.078 €.cents/RPK. Regarding other incomes, 
the company entered 32.8 M€ from EECs (7.2% of the total revenue). 
 Production costs rose by 5.9%, proportionally less than both revenue and capacity 
growth leading to a further decrease in CASK to 5.0 €.cents/ASK, hence continuing 
on a very positive trend. The most significant increases were driven by 1) track 
access charges and traction energy (due to the increased capacity), 2) direct cost 
of sales (related to the increase in revenue) and 3) staff costs (as a result of the 
growth in the workforce to keep pace with the expanded offering and larger fleet 
and increases in other items, such as incentives for employees). 
 The EBITDA increased by 47.6% and a positive Net Profit grew to €33.75 million. 
 
 
     6.2.3 Conclusions 
 
For obvious reasons, this section of the thesis inevitably collects a lot of data and hence it 
is very convenient to summarize the information presented above and other relevant data 
and facts in order to better understand the trajectory followed by the company during this 
short but revealing period. 
 
The Business Plan approved in February 2015, meant to overcome a very critical financial 
situation through an important turnaround to relaunch and develop the company is perhaps 
the key factor of these recent years of Italo’s history. Based on the data presented above, 
from 2014 to 2017 there has been a significant improvement on the efficiency of the 
company, as it was able to increase the production of train.kms by 24% with the equal fleet 
size. 
 
Indeed, one of the keys of the strategy pre-set in the industrial plan to boost revenues and 
balance sheet was to significantly expand NTV services productivity while keeping costs 
low. The main actions carried out to achieve so include the focus of operations on central 
stations in Milan and Turin, the strengthening of services in the Rome-Milan link and the 
addition of Verona into the network, and on the other hand, the launch of Italobus, which 
enabled NTV to expand the catchment area of its rail services and offset the lack of local 
and regional links which its competitor, by contrast, has.  
 
This was particularly useful at Reggio Emilia AV train station as its functionality was 
broadened thanks to the new integrated bus connections, taking into account that this 
station is located away from the major cities within its catchment area. 
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On the other hand, the new business plan included the introduction of greater flexibility in 
terms of the on-board service provided. Now in AGV trains the number of cars offering 
Prima and Comfort can be adapted to meet demand (2+2 or 3+1, respectively). In fact, in 
2013, one year after the start of operations, NTV decided to convert the fourth Prima car 
into a Smart XL car in order to adapt better to the user profile, which differed from the 
company initial expectations as a consequence of the economic crisis (today’s Comfort 
class). 
 
Furthermore, Italo’s promotion played an important role as well in this relaunch stage. As 
part of the industrial plan, the company executed an aggressive marketing strategy as NTV 
had taken to television to advertise its services, engaged in a social media public 
awareness campaign and focused on special events to hook new customers and retain 
them. A clear example is the extraordinary stops scheduled at Milan Rho Fiera on the 
occasion of major events that take place in the fair. 
 
Last but not least, the company’s finances benefited from the decision of the Transport 
Regulation Authority to reduce track access charges for operation on the HSR network by 
37%. This was possible due to the terms of the 2007 Financial Law, which granted RFI 
state funding to repay nearly all of the construction costs of the HSLs. 
 
The positive financial results have only improved year after year since the launch of the 
turnaround plan. NTV has proved to be able to overcome its most difficult times and enjoys 
now a much better financial situation. As a consequence, the company decided in 2017 to 
begin the process of listing the Company’s shares on the screen-based trading system 
(Mercato Telematico Azionario) managed by Borsa Italiana SpA. 
 
These outcomes also suggest that there was considerable room for improvement in the 
management of the company during the period from 2012 to 2014.  
 
Finally, the good performances achieved and the expansion of the fleet with the new EVO 
trains enabled the company to launch services on the Turin-Milan-Verona-Venice route in 
May 2018 and to further strengthen the routes already operated.  
 
According to the latest available data (from 2017), Italo’s yield was 7.8 €.cents/RPK, 
compared to 10.5 €.cents/RPK in Renfe’s AVE in 2016 (Observatorio del Ferrocarril en 
España, 2016). 
 
     6.2.4 Risk Factors 
Risk factors avowed by the company according to their financial statements are reproduced 
below. 
 
Operational risks of the company include: 
 
 Risks related to the manufacturer and maintenance provider for Italo’s fleet. 
 Risks related to maintenance facilities and interruptions to their operations. 
 Risks related to information systems, network infrastructure and data protection. 
 Risks related to industrial relations. 
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 Risks related to services provided by other suppliers. 
 
Risks related to the sector in which the company operates include: 
 
 Risks related to access and management of the infrastructure. 
 Risks related to the utilization of rail stations. 
 Risks related to changes in the fees for infrastructure access and in the cost of 
electricity. 
 Risks related to the suspension or revocation of licenses. 
 Risks related to changes in industry regulations. 
 
Strategic risks: 
 
 Risks related to the competition. 
 Risks related to the concentration of the business in Italy and changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. 
 Risks related to traffic volumes and changes in customer preferences. 
 
Finally, the company also faces fare evasion risks and litigation risks. 
6. Italo’s Performance Analysis: an Approach to Strategy and Costs Management 
64 
 
6.3 An Approach to Costs Management 
 
 
For the purpose of better understanding the structure of costs of Italo, an illustrative 
theoretical analysis based on a comparison between four operation models will be carried 
out: the low-cost airline, the French low-cost HSR, the traditional HSR and Italo (Table 13). 
However, it is not our purpose to suggest with this analysis that Italo should go into low-
cost, since this is just for informative purposes. The topic of lower-cost offering will be 
discussed in Section 6.4. 
 
OUIGO (pronounced “we-go”) is the brand name of the French low-cost HSR service 
operated by SNCF, the first of this kind in Europe (and practically the only). Spain’s Renfe 
has recently announced plans to start a similar concept of low-cost HSR service between 
Madrid and Barcelona.  
 
From Table 13 it can be evidenced that Italo is fundamentally based on the traditional HSR 
model focused on the provision of high-quality services, but it incorporates some items 
similar to those adopted by the Low-cost airline model or by OUIGO to head the model 
towards a higher efficiency, thus having positive effects on operating costs. For instance, 
as mentioned previously, Italo outsourced a wide range of tasks, its trains have a higher 
seating density (although it keeps a common range of classes) and its commercial use is 
more intensive than traditional HSR. 
 
But perhaps one of the most meaningful similarities is found with OUIGO when it comes to 
the network geography: both models focus on trunk routes and make a limited use of 
traditional lines with the purpose of guaranteeing robustness of the network. As previously 
stated, the conventional network is much more prone to incidents than the HSR network 
and hence the confinement of HST services to the HSR network has a significant impact on 
service reliability, which can be verified by comparing punctuality rates from different 
operators. 
 
This issue has indeed considerable implications in operating costs due to the fact that 
better reliability enables operators to reduce turnaround times (and thereupon to increase 
the commercial use of the fleet) and user compensation costs due to delays, which is 
basically what Italo aims at.  
 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that infrastructure charges in Italy do not favor or 
penalize in function of the station where the service calls at (similarly to Spain) unlike in 
France. Therefore, the fact that Italo initially operated from secondary stations in Rome and 
Milan had no relevant effect on track access charges. This is relevant in the sense that with 
the current infrastructure charges system in Italy, the possibility to reduce operating costs 
by calling at secondary stations instead of central stations is practically non-existent. By 
contrast, in France, this way of reducing charges is feasible, which is precisely one of the 
keys of the OUIGO model.                            
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Table 13 | Overview of the General Features of a Low-Cost Airline, OUIGO, the 
Traditional HSR and Italo. 
 
 
 
Low-cost airline OUIGO Traditional HSR Italo
Company origin
Launched from scratch; 
trad. airline's subsidary; 
regional or charter 
airline converting itself
Incumbent national, 
state-owned railway 
company (SNCF)
Incumbent national, 
state-owned railway 
company
Launched from scratch, 
private-owned
Company's legal form 
and carrier licence
Independent airline or 
traditional/charter, 
airline's subsidary
Business unit within 
SNCF. Operated under 
the SNCF's operator 
licence
Business unit within the 
company. Operated 
under the company's 
operator licence
Independent company. 
Own operator licence
Workforce origin Hired by the LCA
SNCF workers moved 
to OUIGO on a 
voluntary basis. 
Younger on-board 
workers except the 
drivers
Ticket inspectors: older 
because they work is 
HSTs after promotion
Hired by Italo
Wages Lower
SNCF's salary scale but 
younger workers mean 
lower fixed salary costs. 
Higher variable bonus 
related to on-board 
working time
Company's salary scale
Lower than competitor's 
(Trenitalia). It can 
increase thanks to a 
system of individual and 
collective bonuses. 
Profit sharing 
arrangement based on 
the company's results 
[1]
Working conditions Hard
Simpler ticket 
inspection given basic 
fare table. Cooler, less 
demanding travellers. 
Main task on-board is 
care instead of ticket 
inspections.
Good Good
Workforce's tasks Multitasking
Multitasking: same 
workers welcome and 
inspect tickets at the 
station then possibly go 
with the train
Single task Single task
Cabin crew Limited
Basically 6 per single 
train; may vary along 
the route depending on 
needs. No apparent 
hierarchical distinction 
between on-board staff 
members
Average Average
Relationship with 
unions
Banned as much as 
possible
No clash but most 
unions did not support 
OUIGO at the launch
Regular, institutional 
relationship
Regular, institutional 
relationship
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Low-cost airline OUIGO Traditional HSR Italo
Outsourcing Intensive Cleaning only Cleaning only
Intensive: rolling stock, 
catering, security and 
the centre
State aids and 
incentives
For specific airlines 
including Ryanair None
Local or regional 
authorities may 
contribute to operational 
costs
None
Load factor Higher than for traditional airlines 88% in 2016 Around 70%
Around 75-80% in 2016-
2017
Infrastructure charges
Often lower (secondary 
airports or dedicated 
terminals)
Lower because services 
do not start or terminate 
at one Paris central 
station
Higher Higher [2]
Planes/trains use Intensive More intensive (12 hours per day) Not intensive
More intensive (11 
hours per day) [3]
Planes/trains
Single aircraft type. 
Single class but extra 
fee for best seats
Updated double-deck 
rolling stock: single 
class layout, no buffet 
car
Traditional rolling stock: 
two, three or four 
classes and buffet car
Traditional rolling stock: 
three/four classes and 
no buffet car
Seat density High. Less space for legs
More seats per trains 
(single class, no bar) 
and per carriage (no 
luggage rack). 
Nevertheless, more 
space between seats
Average
More seats (no on-
board bar, vending 
machines and galley 
instead). Average pitch
Schedules Long operational times Long operational times Subject to routes Subject to routes
Target audience Leisure Leisure
All passengers but 
focus on high-yield 
ones
All passengers but 
focus on high-yield 
ones
Routes operated
Mix of trunk routes and 
niche routes (subject to 
airlines)
Trunk route to the 
Mediterranean, avoiding 
central stations at Paris 
and Lyon
Mix of trunk routes 
(often extended beyond 
HSLs) and of inter-
regional services
Trunk routes from 
Rome and Milan.
Airports/stations 
served
It depends on the 
airlines, typically 
regional or secondary 
airports, or dedicated 
terminals within large 
airports
Paris: no central 
station, only peripheral 
station served. Lyon: 
most trains avoid 
central station and call 
in the peripheral station. 
Other stations: no 
distinction
Central stations. 
Peripheral stations 
served only if it makes 
sense
Central stations. Both 
central and secondary 
stations served 
complementary in 
Rome, Milan and 
Naples
Tracks - Limited use of traditional lines
Mix of high-speed and 
conventional lines
Limited use of 
traditional lines
Connections None None
Yes: integrated tickets 
and timetables 
optimised to some 
extent
Yes: integrated tickets 
and timetables 
optimised to some 
extent
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[1] Source: Desmaris, 2016 
[2] Refer to the explanations in the text. 
[3] Author’s estimations based on Italo’s timetables. 
Source: adapted from Delaplace and Dobruszkes (2015), Italo column is own analysis. 
 
Regarding the ticket distribution system, Italo’s business model abandoned the concept of 
the traditional ticket offices and adopted an overwhelmingly digital system aiming at 
reducing sales commissions. Nevertheless, aside from the options to purchase tickets via 
website, mobile site, Italo Apps and self-service ticket sales machines in Casa Italo, tickets 
can also be acquired through the call centre (outsourced, with no sales fee) and at the 
welcome desk for assistance and information in Casa Italo (in the main stations served), 
although its staff is responsible for multiple tasks in addition to ticket sales. 
 
NTV management introduced an incentive-based remuneration model for staff. The share 
of individual and collective incentives in the remuneration is high, under an exception to 
national law. The total salary can increase by up to 25% above the base under a system of 
individual and collective bonuses. There is also a profit sharing arrangement based on the 
firm results (Desmaris, 2016). On the other hand, the personnel of Italo is, on average, 
younger than Trenitalia’s and therefore it can be deemed that Italo can assume slightly 
lower expenses per employee. 
 
Once completed this qualitative review, let us have a look at the following quantitative 
analysis. Operating costs from Italo S.p.A. Financial Statements are broken down as 
follows: 
 
 Amortisation, depreciation and impairments: depreciation of rolling stock (30-year 
accounting depreciation), depreciation of other property, plant and equipment and 
amortization of intangible assets. 
 Train management: rolling stock maintenance, Nola plant operating costs, cleaning 
costs for trains, plant and stations and other train costs. 
 Track access charges and traction energy: fees paid to the railway infrastructure 
operator for access costs and electricity costs for the fleet. 
 Commissions and fees: includes ticket sales commissions and commissions and 
fees charged by banks and payment providers. 
 Other operating costs: rest of items, including raw materials, consumables and 
goods, services (technical consultants, outsourced services, promotional costs, 
insurance expenses, utilities and onboard connectivity, external providers of 
transport, travel expenses for personnel, fees paid to consultants, freelance 
personnel and directors, staff catering, security and surveillance), lease expense, 
Low-cost airline OUIGO Traditional HSR Italo
Bookings Internet or by phone (premium fare)
Internet and 
smartphone only
Internet, (smart)phone, 
stations and travel 
agents
Internet, (smart)phone, 
stations and travel 
agents
Ticket
e-Ticket. Compulsory 
self-printing or smart-
phone-based e-ticket
e-Ticket. Compulsory 
self-printing or smart-
phone-based e-ticket
e-Ticket, self-printing or 
printed
e-Ticket. Self-printing, 
printed or smart-phone-
based e-ticket
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provisions, change in inventories of raw materials, consumables and goods and 
other operating costs. 
 
It can be assumed that all costs are fixed within the company’s structure except of track 
access charges and traction energy that depend directly on the production of train.kms. 
The evolution of each item from 2014 to 2017 is displayed below (Table 14 and Exhibit 22). 
 
Table 14 | Italo Operating Costs Breakdown from 2014 to 2017. 
 
 
The data presented is not totally consistent because data from 2017 Financial Statement is decomposed 
differently than in previous years, with some items being reclassified and shifted under other categories. 
Therefore, the author had to make some adjustments. 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
 
Exhibit 22 | Italo Operating Costs Breakdown Share from 2014 to 2017. 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
 
 
In order to make an in-depth analysis on Italo’s operating costs, the cost breakdown 
individualized for a single train and for a single seat is presented below (Table 15 and 
Exhibit 23). The following data is specific for the AGV fleet, so as to avoid distortions as a 
result of the beginning of EVO fleet operations in December 2017, data from the Interim 
Report for the nine months ended - 30 September 2017 are taken. 
 
 
Description 2014 2015 2016 2017
Amortisation, depreciation and impairments 43,8 39,9 38,4 29,0
Train management 46,7 53,1 53,9 53,6
Track access charges and traction energy 101,7 89,4 107,3 116,7
Commissions and fees 24,5 20,0 17,9 19,6
Personnel expenses 46,1 42,0 43,4 66,0
Other operating costs 66,7 64,3 62,4 57,0
Total 329,6 308,8 323,3 341,9
0,0%
10,0%
20,0%
30,0%
40,0%
50,0%
60,0%
70,0%
80,0%
90,0%
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2014 2015 2016 2017
Amortisation, depreciation 
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Train management
Track access charges and 
traction energy
Commissions and fees
Personnel expenses
Other operating costs
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Table 15 | Italo AGV Operating Costs Breakdown (9M 2017). 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
x 
Exhibit 23 | Italo AGV Operating Costs Break Down (9M 2017). 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
 
 
It is worth noting that, according to the data used, CASK turns out to be even lower than 
what was estimated in Exhibit 18. The increment at the end of the year 2017 is probably 
related to the beginning of EVO fleet operations. 
 
Track access charges corresponds to approximately 28% of the total operation cost (after 
deducting traction energy), which is fairly comparable to the HSR operation experience in 
France or Spain, and it is roughly the main cost driver that is generally not viewed as 
controllable by the train carrier. As it was pointed out previously, the decision to reduce 
track access charges by 37% as of 2015 played an important role in the amelioration of the 
company’s finances and in the achievement of a more competitive CASK. Hypothesizing 
that this reduction did not take place, overall costs would increase by 17% (resulting in 25 
€/train.kms and 5.4 €.cents/ASK). 
 
On the other hand, train costs (corresponding to the amortization of rolling stock and train 
management) account similarly for 25.5% of the total costs, which proves the importance of 
evaluating the selection of these assets in terms of the commission cost of rolling stock and 
its associate maintenance plan. Italo seems to have benefited from a competitive unitary 
Description Total (M€) Total per train and km (€/train.kms)
CASK 
(€.cents/ASK) Indexed to 100
Amortisation, depreciation and impairments 21,6 2,0 0,43 9,2
Train management 38,5 3,5 0,76 16,3
Track access charges and traction energy 86,0 7,8 1,69 36,5
Commissions and fees 15,3 1,4 0,30 6,5
Personnel expenses 35,8 3,3 0,70 15,2
Other operating costs 38,6 3,5 0,76 16,4
Total 235,9 21,4 4,6 100,0
Track access 
charges and 
traction energy
36,5%
Other operating 
costs
16,4%
Train management
16,3%
Personnel expenses
15,2%
Amortisation, depre
ciation and 
impairments
9,2%
Commissions and 
fees
6,5%
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purchase cost by ordering a fairly large fleet of trains, in contrast to having started 
operations with a smaller fleet, which would probably result in a higher cost per train. 
Furthermore, the company has fully outsourced the maintenance of its fleet of trains to 
Alstom, which presumably has helped to further adjust overall train costs. 
 
Additionally, Italo has focused on commissions and fees as well, which is a rather minor 
component of the total cost (near 6.5%), by adopting a particularly digital ticket distribution 
system similar to those of low-cost airlines. 
 
Nevertheless, it is not possible to make in-depth comparisons with Freccia HSR services 
since Trenitalia’s financial statements do not disaggregate its revenues and costs by 
market segment (Desmaris, 2016). In fact, it is common for transport companies to display 
CASKs that aggregate other costs and to have different accounting policies that bedevil 
attempts to compare CASKs. 
 
Furthermore, if we were to compare Italo’s costs with those of other operators, this would 
not be the best approach to operating costs as it does not really give us a deep insight into 
it nor identifies concrete levers to reduce them. A bottom-up view of the unit costs, volumes 
and productivity of the cost bucket would be more suitable for this purpose. In any case, the 
adopted approach is enough indicative to get an insight into the HSR transport industry.    
 
 Effects of Double Composition of Trains on Operating Costs 
 
Double compositions is indeed a method to operate trains more efficiently since despite the 
seat capacity is doubled, some items do not see its respective costs increase proportionally 
to the composition size. Basically, it is about track access charges and staff costs. 
 
On one hand, according to the Prospetto Informativo Rete 2018, track access charges for 
double compositions are only affected by the train weight component, as the composition 
may fall into a different category due to the increased weight, resulting in a rather small 
increase in charges. This factor seems to encourage operators to run longer trains. 
With regards to the cost of traction energy, it is assumed that it is directly proportional to the 
train energy consumption. In a theoretical approach, this depends on a wide range of 
factors, such as the line profile, the driving style, wind and external temperature among 
others in addition to the actual speed and the train weight (García Álvarez, 2010). In a 
simplified approach assuming that traction energy is directly proportional to the train weight, 
it can be assumed that the traction energy doubles. 
Finally, a double composition saves one train driver and in some cases it can be assumed 
that it saves a conductor as well. As a result, there is an additional, minor cut in operating 
costs. 
Taking into account the previous hypotheses and assuming that double compositions are 
run with the company’s own current resources, the reduction of CASK in a double 
composition can be estimated with the pertinent computations (Table 16). 
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Table 16 | Italo AGV Operating Costs in Double Composition Breakdown. 
 
 
Index 100 is the average operating cost of a single composition trainset.                                                                              
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. 
 
 
From these results it can be estimated that double compositions make it possible to reduce 
CASK by approximately 15-16%. 
 
Nevertheless, Italo has not operated multiple compositions so far due to the fact that it does 
not really have spare trains since the fleet use is already intensive. Therefore, this can only 
be understood from a business view point as a part of the company’s strategy in which 
frequency of service is prioritized over double compositions. 
By contrast, the French low-cost HSR OUIGO often operates double compositions, due to 
its strategy to provide a very high capacity (1.268 seats) and a low frequency of service 
with the aim to benefit from the reduction in track access charges per passenger and hence 
reach a very low CASK. But here the point is that OUIGO, unlike Italo, is focused on leisure 
users (more sensitive to the ticket price), for which frequency and optimum schedules are 
much less valued (Deutsche Magnet Bahn, 1993). 
 
In any case, the implementation of double compositions must be carefully assessed since 
depending on the situation, the gain in efficiency on one side may result in inefficiency on 
the other side. For instance, a double trainset travelling from Salerno to Turin may run fully 
loaded between Rome and Milan while half empty between Salerno and Rome and 
between Milan and Turin, resulting in an overcapacity issue. 
  
Description Total per train and km (€/train.kms)
CASK 
(€.cents/ASK) Indexed to 100
Amortisation, depreciation and impairments 3,9 0,43 9,2
Train management 7,0 0,76 16,3
Track access charges and traction energy 9,5 1,03 22,1
Commissions and fees 2,8 0,30 6,5
Personnel expenses 6,0 0,65 13,9
Other operating costs 7,0 0,76 16,4
Total 36,2 3,9 84,4
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6.4 Growth Opportunities 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to reach a better understanding of the situation that Italo is 
currently facing in terms of competitiveness and its position in the rail transport market. 
Therefore, a comprehensive analysis on the strategic moves available for its development 
focused on business growth has been carried out (Exhibit 24). 
  
 
 
1) Close market gaps. The following options are available for the company: 
 
1.1) Strengthening of the current network. The market has already been widely covered 
since the beginning of competition. Further expansion depends on the evolution of the 
demand growth trend and on capacity constraints in the Direttissima Rome-Florence (the 
backbone of the network), currently limited to 8 trains per hour on each direction (PIR, 
2018) with the SCMT security system. The implementation of the ERTMS, which will allow 
to significantly increase the capacity of the line, is due to be executed in the upcoming 
years. Short term HSR service expansion in the Salerno/Naples/Rome-
Milan/Turin/Venice/Verona routes most likely will focus on reinforcement of service in 
certain hours of the day. 
 
1.2) Expansion of the rail network. Scheduled expansion beyond the current network 
includes the introduction of Italo in the Turin-Milan-Verona-Padova-Venice axis (with 
potential extensions to Trieste) and the launch of services to Trento and Bolzano in the 
Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol region, most likely as extensions of existing Verona services. 
Other opportunities include the launch of services to Genoa. In fact, in early 2017, NTV 
requested slots to RFI to operate a daily round trip from Rome to Genoa via Florence, 
Bologna and Piacenza, but did not get clearance due to the capacity constraints in the 
Exhibit 24 | Available Moves for Each Strategic Option. 
Source: own analysis. 
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Direttissima Rome-Florence mentioned above. Nevertheless, in 2018, Italo requested slots 
to operate Rome-Milan via Florence, Pisa, La Spezia and Genoa instead. Nonetheless, 
Italo is prone to confine most of its services within the HSR network infrastructure in order 
to guarantee its network robustness and the efficiency of the fleet, hence new links using 
long stretches of conventional lines (which somewhat is the case of Genoa links) are rather 
unlikely. Besides, the short term priority is to establish a competitive service in the new 
Turin-Milan-Venice link especially in terms of frequency upon delivery of the new EVO 
trains to the company, as Trenitalia already operated up to 23 daily trains in each direction 
between Milan and Venice with a number of extensions to Turin, Genoa, Trieste and Udine 
prior to Italo services launch. In any case, any Italo potential service to Genoa is likely to be 
limited to one daily round trip, similarly to Trenitalia’s Frecciargento services to the Liguria. 
 
1.3) Intermodality development. The current intermodal model is fundamentally based on 
the Italobus network integrated to the Italo HST service, which has proven to be quite a 
success. It is convenient to highlight the main advantages of the model, which include the 
little investment required (with low associated risks) and the flexibility of its implementation. 
Therefore, the company is likely to further expand Italobus services with new destinations 
including airports, boosting feeding traffic and improving the capillarity of the overall 
network. Agreements with bus companies to provide feeding can also be considered. 
However, agreements with local or regional Trenitalia units are improbable. 
 
1.4) Airport rail links. Their possibilities are very limited at present due to technical 
constraints at the major airports (e.g. Rome Fiumicino, Milan Malpensa, Venice Marco 
Polo), but it could be feasible in the longer term with the construction of new dedicated rail 
links. Therefore, in the future scenario when it will become practicable, Italo can consider to 
extend the pertinent HSR services based on demand studies and to establish agreements 
with airlines operating at those airports, through alliances or code sharing. In order to 
provide a high-quality service, the agreement can consider setting up check-in counters at 
selected stations in the HSR network and provide checked through luggage between the 
rail and air journeys. It is reasonable to expect that, at this stage, the competitor will very 
likely aim at pursuing the same kind of operations and agreements. 
 
Some estimates can be made with the purpose of sizing the market gap for HSR regarding 
feeding traffic in Italy (by air) to long-haul destinations. Feeding traffic is currently based on 
Alitalia’s short-haul network from its hub at Rome Fiumicino Airport. It is worth noting that 
the network includes some very short-haul routes, including Pisa (258 km), Florence (239 
km from Rome), Bologna (313 km), Naples (199 km) (all according to the Great Circle 
Distance), all of them with four daily round trips equally timed with the main medium and 
long-haul departure and arrival banks at Fiumicino Airport. These links are fundamentally 
targeting connecting traffic and carry near to zero point-to-point traffic since it is clear that 
HSR services are far more convenient for this aim both in terms of travel time and ticket 
price. Many other longer domestic links overlapping the HSR network (Milan, Turin, Venice, 
Verona…) are scheduled similarly (often with greater frequencies) and carry large amounts 
of connecting traffic as well.  
 
Therefore, taking into account the airports of the cities directly connected to Rome by HSR 
(Turin, Milan Malpensa, Milan Linate, Verona, Venice, Bologna, Florence and Naples) and 
assuming that the overwhelming majority of its traffic to Rome is feeding, the traffic was 
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near 3 million passengers in 2017 according to the ENAC. As a comparison, Italo and 
Frecce carried altogether near 63 million passengers in 2016. Nevertheless, the estimated 
traffic is not the actual size of the potential market of an airport HSR link (in this case to 
Rome Fiumicino Airport), as it does not take into account feeding traffic by other means of 
transport or future agreements with airlines. 
 
2) Further operating costs adjustments. Taking into account the cost cutting programme 
carried out as part of the turnaround plan launched in 2015, it can be assumed that, 
presumably, there is no significant room for additional cuts (concerning those that depend 
directly on the company’s will). Therefore, the only realistic way to do so on a relative basis 
is by enhancing production, with respective increases in both workforce and fleet size. On 
one hand, the company may hire younger employees, which means lower fixed salary 
costs (on Italo’s salary scale), and on the other hand, the increase in the fleet size may 
benefit from economies of scale relying in some fixed cost items. Nevertheless, in any 
case, these actions must be earmarked for a well-defined expansion plan. 
 
3) Introduction of low-cost HST services. Based on the limited experience in this topic, 
low-cost HSR is aimed at offering a differentiated product with lower fares than traditional 
HSR focused on price-sensitive users so as to make HSR transport more accessible. 
Nonetheless, rail competition in Italy has already brought a significant reduction in ticket 
price along with a wide range of promotional offers and hence making HST services 
affordable for most of the potential users. On the other hand, it has been previously seen 
that operating from secondary stations instead of central stations has no relevant effects on 
HSR service operating costs on the Italian railway network. Besides, competition will most 
probably keep growing for many years as Italo expands its network and adds more 
services. Therefore, the introduction of low-cost HSR services in the current scenario is not 
realistic. Also, from the operator’s point of view, there is no point in further decreasing 
yields. 
 
4) Expansion into other markets. In October 2017, Italo launched its international 
expansion when applied for the UK Rail Franchising PQQ Passport, which was obtained 
from the Department for Transport in March 2018 and allows the company to participate in 
tenders regarding rail transport throughout the United Kingdom. The operator may 
participate in franchise competitions by itself or by means of an agreement with other 
companies. Nevertheless, these events are quite recent and hence further analysis will be 
needed to bring substantial conclusions. 
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7.1 Effects on HSR Demand 
 
 
In order to better appreciate the impact of Italo in the overall passenger transport system, it 
is convenient to review the outcomes of competition especially in relation to the incumbent 
Trenitalia and to the domestic inland air traffic. 
 
As it was previously stated, HSR has seen a sharp increase in traffic mainly driven by the 
widespread drop in ticket price since the beginning of competition (Exhibit 25), which even 
started to decrease within a few months before Italo services launch. 
 
 
Exhibit 25 | Total HSR Traffic (RPK), Italy’s GDP and Yield from 2011 to 2017 (Indexed 
Against Data for 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TRA Consulting. 
 
 
The evolution of traffic broken down by operator is reproduced both in terms of ridership 
and RPK below (Exhibits 26 and 27). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. and others. 
 
It is interesting to note that Trenitalia did not reduce its HSR supply and even increased 
ridership despite the launch of the competitor’s service. 
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Exhibit 26 | HSR Ridership in Italy from 
2011 to 2016. 
Mpax 
Exhibit 27 | HSR Traffic (RPK) in Italy 
from 2011 to 2016. 
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Passenger traffic data broken down by corridors is not available and hence it is not possible 
to estimate traffic share per corridor and neither the ASK per corridor due to the variety of 
rolling stock operating in the network and the fact that an undetermined number of service 
operates in double composition. Nevertheless, an approximation of the current share of 
each company based on the number of services in a number of links can be established 
(Table 17). 
 
 
Table 17 | Share of Italo Services in Major Links with Competition (in Each Direction). 
 
 
According to timetables for the first week of June 2018 on an average weekday. 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. and Trenitalia S.p.A. 
 
The average Italo supply share is about 32.5%. This value turns out to be fairly similar to its 
RPK share, which according to Italo S.p.A. it was 35% in 2017. This value supposedly 
counts the traffic strictly on HSL since it is significantly greater than the RPK share 
displayed in Exhibit 27, which counts Frecce entirely. 
 
On the other hand, further comparisons in terms of overall daily round trips and fleet size 
can be drawn respectively (Exhibits 28 and 29). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to timetables for the first week of June 2018 on an average weekday. 
Source: own analysis with data from Italo S.p.A. and Trenitalia S.p.A. 
Route (N-S and W-E) Trenitalia Italo Italo share
Turin-Rome 19 9 32,1%
Turin-Naples 9 4 30,8%
Turin-Salerno 4 2 33,3%
Turin-Venice 6 3 33,3%
Milan-Venice 18 5 21,7%
Milan-Rome 51 25 32,9%
Milan-Naples 33 13 28,3%
Verona-Rome 8 3 27,3%
Verona-Naples 2 2 50,0%
Venice-Rome 17 8 32,0%
Venice-Naples 6 5 45,5%
Florence-Rome 52 27 34,2%
Florence-Naples 24 16 40,0%
Rome-Naples 45 20 30,8%
Rome-Salerno 12 5 29,4%
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Exhibit 29 | Italo and Frecce Fleet Size. Exhibit 28 | Italo and Frecce Daily 
Round Trips. 
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7.2 Effects on Air Transport Demand 
 
 
Since it was assumed that at least a part of the increase in traffic comes from other means 
of transport, it seems convenient to observe the evolution of air traffic in domestic links 
where there is HSR service in order to better grasp the effects of competition in the modal 
share. The evolution of demand by other means of transport such as road or conventional 
railway cannot be assessed due to the lack of specific data.  
 
It is known from traffic data already presented that since the full completion of the 
backbone Turin-Salerno in 2009 until the beginning of competition, the overall HSR traffic 
saw a sharp increase. Therefore, data series will be set back to 2009 so as to better 
interpret the impact of competition, which began later in 2012. 
 
Air traffic in inland domestic links with more than 100.000 passengers per year (in both 
directions) with HSR service in competition is presented below, listed from the busiest route 
to the least busy route (Exhibits 30 to 40). All the data in here are collected in Appendix 3. 
 
Note: data from the ENAC only lists links with more than 50.000 passengers per year in 
each direction. Therefore, there is no data available for links below this traffic and in some 
cases such as the Rome-Milan link, traffic is not accurate in the years in which part of the 
data was not available (hence the error can be up to +100.000 passengers per year), but it 
is enough indicative. These cases are labelled with an asterisk in the respective figures.  
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 30 | Air Traffic in Rome-Milan (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: own analysis with 
data from ENAC and others. 
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March 2014: Ryanair terminates the Ciampino-
Bergamo route. 
April 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
February 2017: Alitalia terminates the 
Fiumicino-Malpensa route. 
October 2017: Easyjet terminates the 
Fiumicino-Malpensa route. 
March 2009: the Rome-Milan HSL is now fully 
completed. 
October 2015: Easyjet terminates the 
Fiumicino-Linate route. 
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Exhibit 31 | Air Traffic in Naples-Milan (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 32 | Air Traffic in Rome-Turin (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Exhibit 33 | Air Traffic in Rome-Venice (2009-2017). 
Pax 
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Source: own analysis with 
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Source: own analysis with 
data from ENAC and others. 
 
March 2009: the Naples-Milan HSL is now fully 
completed. 
April 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
May 2017: Ryanair launches 4 daily round trips 
Naples-Bergamo. 
December 2009: the Rome-Turin HSL is now 
fully completed. 
December 2012: competition between NTV 
and Trenitalia begins. 
September 2014: Vueling launches 3-4 daily 
round trips Rome-Turin. 
October 2015: Vueling terminates the Rome-
Turin route. 
March 2010: Ryanair cancels the Ciampino-
Treviso route. 
October 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
October 2017: Blue Air terminates the Rome-
Turin route. 
March 2009: the Rome-Bologna HSL is now 
fully completed. 
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Exhibit 34 | Air Traffic in Naples-Venice (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 35 | Air Traffic in Naples-Rome (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 36 | Air Traffic in Naples-Turin (2009-2017). 
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Source: own analysis with 
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Source: own analysis with 
data from ENAC and others. 
 
October 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
April 2017: Ryanair launches 2 daily round 
trips Naples-Treviso. 
April 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
December 2008: the Naples-Turin HSL is now 
fully completed. 
December 2012: competition between NTV 
and Trenitalia begins. 
October 2016: Blue Air launches daily Naples-
Turin flights. 
March 2009: the Naples-Bologna HSL is now 
fully completed. 
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Exhibit 37 | Air Traffic in Rome-Florence (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 38 | Air Traffic in Rome-Bologna (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 39 | Air Traffic in Rome-Verona (2009-2017). 
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Source: own analysis with 
data from ENAC and others. 
 
April 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
April 2012: competition between NTV and 
Trenitalia begins. 
March 2009: the Rome-Bologna HSL is now 
fully completed. 
March 2009: the Rome-Bologna HSL is now 
fully completed. 
December 2015: competition between NTV 
and Trenitalia begins. 
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Exhibit 40 | Air Traffic in Naples-Verona (2009-2017). 
Pax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, air traffic in 2017 in the links listed above is summarized below (Exhibit 41).  
 
 
Exhibit 41 | Air Traffic in Domestic Links with HSR Service in Competition (2017). 
Pax and variation from the year before the beginning of competition. 
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March 2009: the Rome-Bologna HSL is now 
fully completed. 
December 2015: competition between NTV 
and Trenitalia begins. 
Source: own analysis 
with data from ENAC. 
Rome-Turin 
550.244 (-41.5%) 
Naples-Turin 
278.128 (-12.6%) 
Naples-Milan 
1.177.222 (-14.4%) 
Rome-Milan 
1.183.753 (-55.0%) 
TURIN (TRN) MILAN (MXP, LIN and BGY) 
BOLOGNA (BLQ) 
VENICE (VCE and TSF) 
VERONA (VRN) 
FLORENCE (FLR) 
ROME (FCO and CIA) 
NAPLES (NAP) 
Rome-Venice 
500.485 (-36.5%) 
Naples-Venice 
486.905 (+46.0%) 
Naples-Rome 
295.159 (-5.2%) 
Rome-Florence 
247.498 (+4.8%) 
Rome-Bologna 
235.105 (-5.7%) 
Rome-Verona 
177.129 (-5.3%) 
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Based on the traffic in 2017 and the variation from the beginning of competition, the links 
analysed can be grouped in three differentiated classes: 
 Class 1: Rome-Milan, Naples-Milan, Rome-Turin and Rome-Venice. 
The busiest links have the most competitive HSR service in terms of travel time and 
have seen a strong decrease in air traffic. The Naples-Milan link presents a more 
limited decrease due to the recent entry of a low-cost carrier in the route. There is 
an important dependency on feeding traffic, which HSR is generally unable to 
capture (mainly due to the lack of presence at airports). 
 
 Class 2: Naples-Venice, Naples-Turin, Rome-Verona and Naples-Verona. 
Minor and often longer links have seen a moderate decrease in air traffic or even a 
significant increase in the case of Naples-Venice due to the recent entry of a low-
cost carrier in the route. HSR service is generally less competitive in terms of travel 
time, especially in the cases of Naples-Turin and Naples-Venice (both above 5 
hours). 
 
 Class 3: Naples-Rome, Rome-Florence and Rome-Bologna. 
Minor and shorter air links with a strong dependency on feeding traffic (not captured 
by HSR for the same reason as class 1 routes) present variations that do not 
depend on HSR competition since in these cases point-to-point travel by air is 
broadly uncompetitive and it is mainly funnelled by HSR. Therefore, fluctuations of 
air traffic in these routes are out of the scope of this document. 
Regarding the evolution of class 1 routes, it can be appreciated that the Rome-Milan and 
Rome-Venice links have been strongly influenced by both the completion of the HSL and 
the new HSR competition regime, hence it can be assumed that their competitive travel 
times (under 4 hours) played an important role in their traffic decline. On the other hand, air 
traffic in other links such as Naples-Milan and Rome-Turin were not actually affected by the 
completion of the HSL since their traffic even increased. However, by contrast, their traffics 
started to decrease with the beginning of HSR competition. 
 
With respect to class 2 routes, the Naples-Venice and Naples-Turin links were limitedly 
affected by the completion of HSL. However, HSR competition has had a positive effect on 
shifting passengers from air to train despite their less competitive travel times. On the other 
hand, the Rome-Verona and Naples-Verona links have seen a significant decrease in traffic 
since the completion of the Rome-Bologna HSL but the effects of HSR competition are still 
not very appreciable due to its more recent start in December 2015. 
 
Furthermore, the transfer of traffic flows from air to rail transport has evidenced the 
potential to free up capacity at congested airports, which can be intended for growth in 
markets other than domestic ones, served by HSR. This is the case of Easyjet, which after 
terminating the Fiumicino-Linate route in 2015 took advantage of their valued slots at the 
saturated Linate airport and launched new frequencies to Amsterdam, London and Paris. 
 
In conclusion, low-cost airlines have often proved to be unsuccessful in coping with the 
strong competition regime of HSR. Nevertheless, low-cost airlines have demonstrated to be 
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able to find opportunities to generate new demand and settle in the market, fundamentally 
in those links where HSR is less competitive in terms of travel time. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the generalized decline of traffic in inland domestic air links, Alitalia 
resumed the link Rome Fiumicino-Milan Malpensa in April 2018 with four daily round trips 
aimed at targeting feeding traffic and both Easyjet and Volotea plan to launch daily round 
trips Naples-Turin in September and October 2018 respectively. 
 
 
 
7.3 Impact on the Quality of the High-Speed 
Rail Service 
 
 
The outcomes of the competition regarding user benefits cover a wide range of items. It 
should be noted that both operators offer the exact same travel times (at least for now) and 
hence the competition is focused on the quality of services.  
 
Firstly, users benefited from a strong growth in the overall HSR services supply, which 
means from a practical point of view a high frequency of services and a wide range of 
schedules. 
 
Users have also benefited from the widening of HSR services coverage especially in major 
cities such as Rome and Milan due to the fact that Italo initially operated from secondary 
stations in both cities, which despite the company later focused on central stations (Rome 
Termini and Milan Central), they have remained as complementary stops where most of 
their services call, and even Trenitalia has added to Frecce train services a number stops 
at these stations (Rome Tiburtina, Milan Porta Garibaldi and Milan Rogoredo). 
 
Positive effects have been seen in the ancillary services as well, such as the introduction of 
free Wi-Fi, on-board entertainment, door-to-door luggage and local access and egress 
transport (car renting, parking reservation, local public transport ticket integration…). 
Furthermore, the launch of the Italobus network by Italo in 2015 prompted Trenitalia to 
launch Freccialink a few months later, which is roughly the same style of service intended 
to bring certain destinations closer to the HSR network. 
 
The competition in the HSR had also a direct impact on the on-board levels of service and 
on the fare structure. From a simple base tariff with 1st and 2nd class, the service in 
Frecciarossa trains was restructured in 2011 with four levels of service (Executive, 
Business, Premium and Standard) and a new pricing structure with three different fares 
(Base, Economy and Super Economy) for each class. Thus, the provision of a wide-range 
of offers for all segments of users was made possible. NTV launched its train services in 
the following year with a similar structure of levels of service and fares. 
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Given that Trenitalia has been forced to adjust their offer and earn less where there is 
competition, some authors have suggested that the incumbent has been forced to charge 
users more where there is none, which is bad news for these routes. 
 
Finally, it gives the impression that competition also prompted Trenitalia to put forward the 
commission the Frecciarossa 1000 fleet of brand-new high-speed trains, which became the 
flagship of the company and are currently the most modern trains in its fleet. It seems 
reasonable to think that Trenitalia would not have rushed to put forward so many upgrades 
in their service without the pressure of competition. 
 
 
 
7.4 Barriers to Entry and Risk of Non-Cooperative 
Behaviour of the Incumbent 
 
 
The rail industry is characterized by many barriers to entry, namely fair access to existing 
network infrastructure, terminals, depots, maintenance facilities and retail areas, owned by 
RFI (Desmaris, 2016). 
 
It is suggested that NTV had to face barriers to entry and the risk on non-cooperative 
behaviour of the incumbent Trenitalia. For instance, it took one year for NTV to obtain the 
railway license and even longer to obtain the authorization from ANSF to operate the new 
trains after three years of assessment, which was perceived by the company as an 
excessive long time and as a barrier to entry to the market. 
 
On the other hand, the company did not initially operate services to central stations in Milan 
and Rome and they lacked ticket machines in a number of train stations. However, there 
are no actual proofs that these issues were due to a supposed unfair behaviour of the 
incumbent. But there are other instances that were actually subject of public controversy 
that have already been reviewed throughout this document, such as the fence that RFI put 
in front of Casa Italo at Rome Ostiense train station or the platform height issues at Rimini 
train station.  
 
In June 2013, the Italian antitrust authority launched an investigation into FS and its 
subsidiaries following allegations by NTV that the national company engaged in 
anticompetitive practices against them. NTV alleged that they had been the victim of a 
deliberate strategy of exclusion by FS, including limiting access to infrastructure (rejection 
to grant access to the depots of the incumbent, inability to secure train slots at certain 
hours…) and selling tickets at below cost price (Chiandoni, 2013). These events suggest 
that the regulations intended to ensure fair competition between operators are not enough 
to manage properly all aspects of competition (Giuricin, 2017). The Italian antitrust authority 
found no evidence of abuse of the FS dominant position following NTV appeals. 
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Besides, the Italian rail regulator was only made truly independent from government 
through the creation of ART (Transport Regulation Authority) on 17th September 2013, 
becoming operational on 15th January 2014. 
 
The competition stage seems to be now in a much more stable position after Italo has 
overcome a number of obstacles and both the new entrant and the incumbent have 
benefited commercially and financially from the new situation. Nevertheless, there are still 
some pending issues, such as the lack of vertical separation between the public operator 
and the infrastructure manager (which can result in further problems for new entrants), the 
risk of cross-subsidisation in the incumbent or the lack of competition at regional level.  
 
Clearly, it is difficult to compete with such a large former monopoly capitalized with public 
money (Stefanato, 2014). Some authors suggest that Italo has probably underestimated 
Trenitalia’s ability to adapt its services, pricing and operational costs to respond to 
competitive pressures (Desmaris, 2016). 
 
Finally, it is also worth remarking that regulation to guarantee the stability of the operators 
in the market is a very important element for the business. For instance, track access 
charges and energy costs should remain stable, since regulatory instabilities could affect 
users with increases in ticket price (Giuricin, 2017). 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some pieces of advice on the launch of operations 
of a hypothetical private open-access train company intended for the supply of a HSR 
passenger transport service in the Spanish HSR network in competition with the incumbent, 
state-owned company Renfe, based on the experience in the competition in the Italian HSR 
network already synthesized in the present dissertation. 
 
The application in other countries of the lessons learned should be made with caution 
taking in mind the specific factors of the Italian case. Nonetheless, a number of meaningful 
guidelines on the configuration of a rail competitor can be stated in order to contribute to a 
better practice in other countries and in Spain in particular. 
 
 
 
8.2 Overview on the Deregulation of 
Rail Transport in Spain 
 
 
Since the last decades, the Spanish railway system has undergone a deep organizational 
realignment towards the future setting of rail transport in the European Union.  
 
The First Railway Package (amendment of the EU Directive 91/440) was implemented in 
Spain through the Railway Sector Law 39/2003, which established the creation of two new 
public companies by January 2005: ADIF and Renfe Operadora, the rail infrastructure 
manager and the freight and passenger rail service operator respectively. 
 
In 2013, Renfe Operadora was split into four commercial societies: passengers, freight, 
manufacturing and maintenance, and rolling stock leasing. The latter is intended to favour 
the opening to competition in both freight and passenger rail transport. On the other hand, 
ADIF was split into two differentiated public entities: ADIF and ADIF-Alta Velocidad. The 
first of them would keep its responsibility on the conventional network whereas the second 
would be in charge of the HSR network.  
 
The CNMC regulatory organ is currently in charge of the supervision and control of the 
correct functioning of the rail sector (among other markets and sectors) and, among a 
number of other particular functions, it is responsible for ensuring fair competition in this 
sector. 
 
With regards to the requirements for access to the RFIG entrants must comply with the 
provisions of the Railway Sector Law that include, amongst the most relevant requisites, to 
have a Railway Company License, a Security Certificate and the allocation of the needed 
infrastructure capacity. Additionally, homologated rolling stock (own or leased) and staff are 
logically necessary. 
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According to the market pillar of the Fourth Railway Package, full liberalisation of 
passenger rail transport (affecting all lines and a priori without limit of operators) will be 
compulsorily implemented as of January 2019, whereas the train service will be effective 
with the start of the winter timetable in December 2020. 
 
 
 
8.3 Introduction to the Spanish Framework 
 
 
In order to better adjust the guidelines on the setting-up of the competitor to the Spanish 
railway framework, it is necessary to review a number of inherent items that represent 
significant differences with the Italian framework, which has already been extensively 
inspected. 
 
     8.3.1 Network Geography 
 
The current Spanish HSR network is near 3.000 kilometres long, radial-shaped, and links 
most of the main cities in the country (Exhibit 42). However, the Spanish population density 
is less than half that of Italy and it is irregularly distributed over the inland territory and 
concentrated in a few areas (nearly 65% of the inland population live near the coast and 
another 15% lives in the Madrid region) whereas its area is nearly 65% greater. 
 
As a result, from a territorial coverage point of view, it has been necessary to build an 
extensive network in order to reach all the major urban nuclei, often through extensive low-
populated areas in contrast to Italy, where many of the major cities served are separated by 
distances ranging from 150 to 250 kilometres, which is very favourable for HSR 
competitiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ADIF. 
Exhibit 42 | The Spanish HSR Network in 2018.                        
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     8.3.2 Technical Perspective of the Spanish HSR Network 
 
The Spanish HSR network adopted the technical specifications of interoperability of the 
European Union. Specifically, the network adopted the UIC track gauge, it is equipped with 
the ERTMS signalling system (N1 and N2) and it is electrified at 25 kV AC. However, the 
Madrid-Seville HSL, built in an earlier stage, is fitted with the LZB signalling system instead. 
The overall network is designed exclusively for passenger traffic. In fact, the load per axis is 
limited to 17 tons (compared to 25 tons in the Italian AV-AC system) and slopes are 
generally greater than the maximum allowed for freight. According to the Capacity Manual, 
the actual average capacity use is 4 to 5 trains per hour in each direction, far from the 
maximum theoretical capacity of 24 trains per hours in each direction.  
 
The network is generally designed for a maximum speed of 350 km/h. Nevertheless, the 
current maximum operating speed is limited to 300 km/h, except for a section of the 
Madrid-Barcelona HSL, which allows a maximum speed of 310 km/h to some trains. 
 
A very relevant trait of the Spanish HSR network is the fact that it is mostly independent 
from the conventional rail network due to the different track gauge adopted. This is a very 
positive point in terms of service reliability of the network since it is much less dependent 
on the incidents that take place in the conventional network. The very high punctuality rate 
of Renfe HSR services clearly reflects this fact when compared with HSR services from 
other networks. In any case, the variable gauge trains by Talgo and CAF are technically 
capable of operating in both the conventional and the HSR network by travelling through a 
break of gauge. 
 
Another consequence of the aforementioned point is that there is not much room to be 
innovative when it comes to the selection the train stations where to operate in each city 
served, since all trains are physically confined to the HSR network that gives direct access 
to selected stations where the incumbent operator already operates. 
 
Nevertheless, as a curiosity, the Spanish Government announced in February 2018 that 
the El Prat de Llobregat train station (8 kilometres south of Barcelona’s central train station 
through the Madrid-Barcelona HSL) would be adapted to serve as a secondary station for 
HSR services in the Barcelona area, specifically for the new Renfe’s EVA low-cost HSR 
services. Therefore, this station will become the first alternative to a central station within 
the Spanish HSR network. 
 
On the other hand, another positive aspect of the network in terms of efficiency is that there 
are no terminal stations in the cities served along each line (except at the ends of the lines) 
and hence there is no need to turn around at any point of the network during a journey. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that airport HSR connections in Spain are non-existent and it can 
be assumed that they will not be available in the near future.  
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     8.3.3 The Long-Distance Passenger Transport Market 
 
The size of the HSR market in Spain in terms of ridership and RPK can be obtained by 
adding the traffics of Renfe’s AVE, Avant, Alvia and Altaria HSR services (brand names of 
differentiated services), obtaining near 36.5 million passengers and 14.082 RPK in 2016 
(Observatorio del Ferrocarril en España, 2016). The overall traffic has seen a sustained 
substantial growth over the last few years as a result of the progressive expansion of the 
network and hence of the HSR services, the new commercial policy adopted by Renfe in 
2013 and the economic recovery. Therefore, it is expected that this trend will go on in the 
upcoming years. 
 
Despite the considerable extension of the Spanish HSR network, the current domestic 
inland air passenger transport is still significant among many of the links with HSR service. 
A clear example is the Madrid-Barcelona link, which has the greatest demand in the 
country since in 2017 (9 years after the full completion of the HSL between both cities) 
there were still 2.34 million passengers who travelled by air (part of which is Iberia’s and Air 
Europa’s feeding traffic), whereas Renfe’s AVE reached a 61.1% of the air-train modal split 
in the route (Renfe and Aena, 2017). This example suggests that there is still considerable 
room for growth of the HSR traffic, or in other words, there is room for improvement in 
efficiency, commercial policy and innovation among other elements. Let us address so in a 
different way: it can be seen as a matter of creativity. 
 
 
 
8.4 An Approach to the Setting-up of a New 
HSR Competitor 
 
 
A procedure has been elaborated to guide the start-up of a new HSR competitor 
comparable in terms of product to Renfe’s AVE, Italo or any other European traditional 
HSR service. This procedure covers comprehensively all points previously identified as key 
to success, in terms of key assets and investments, operations, marketing, pricing strategy 
and ground and on-board service, and the interactions between them and with each cost 
and revenue component, as shown in the exhibit below (Exhibit 43). Additionally, a degree 
of flexibility is assigned to most of the components within the chart with the purpose of 
better indicating the approach required for each of them, as well as a quality label aimed at 
highlighting the opportunities for the company to outstand especially in terms of product 
quality. 
 
The goal of these points is to enable the new operator to achieve a lower CASK than the 
competitor’s while providing a competitive and appealing service for users. In fact, most of 
them are required by the Spanish administration to be defined in the business plan of future 
tenders. Due to the nature of these guidelines, the procedure presented below is not only 
applicable to competition regimes, but also for any train company operating in the field of 
HSR in monopoly that seeks for the aforementioned goals. 
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Firstly, it is essential to carry out a market study in order to gather the appropriate data, i.e. 
basically the technical and socioeconomic components that characterize the transport 
system in the target market, which will allow quantifying the variables of the problem. Then, 
the business plan is carried out based on the results obtained through an iterative process 
that guarantees the future equilibrium of the transport system after introducing the new 
supply of train services. The guidelines presented in the exhibit and explained below have 
to be appropriately applied according to the results of this process. 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: own analysis. 
 
Exhibit 43 | Outline for the Setting Up of a HSR Operation. 
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[1] Rolling stock. There are basically two ways by which the new entrant can gain access 
to rolling stock: by purchasing brand-new trains or by resorting to leasing. The latter is very 
limited due to the fact that there are only a very few ROSCOs, which is explained by the 
inherent property of rail transport related to limited interoperability of networks, and that in 
the Spanish case there is no surplus of HSTs. Therefore, the new company will have to 
commission its own fleet of new trains, which entails a large up-front investment and 
consequently a considerable risk. It is clear hence that the railway sector is capital 
intensive, which results in a strong barrier to the entry of competitors.  
 
[2] Fleet size. It is important to note that incumbent companies, by operating in all 
passenger and freight markets, benefit from large and positive economies of scale and 
scope, which represent a substantial economic advantage over smaller companies such as 
new entrants. Therefore, it is highly recommended to the new company to venture to 
launch their operations with a considerable initial fleet size in order to benefit from a more 
competitive unitary purchase cost (with respect to having started operations with a smaller 
fleet), but always according the well-defined business plan. 
 
     Low degree of flexibility. As a fixed asset requiring a high investment, it must be 
carefully assessed in the very first planning of the company in a long-term view, with the 
aggravating inherent constraints of the rail industry such as the lack of a single European 
railway market and the lack of a market of used rolling stock that makes the investment 
even more risky. In later stages, in accordance with the business development and market 
studies, the company can consider to expand the fleet of trains. The delivery of new trains 
can take about two years from the signing of the contract. 
 
[3] Technical specifications. The fleet of trains will have to meet the aforementioned 
requirements to operate in the Spanish HSR network, namely the track gauge (fixed), the 
loading gauge, the electric systems, signalling and security systems. Furthermore, a 
maximum operating speed of 300 km/h is required to compete directly with Renfe’s AVE 
and to ensure high operation efficiency (in terms of average mileage). A number of HST 
platforms that can meet the conditions pointed out properly are currently available in the 
market, such as Talgo’s Avril, CAF’s Oaris, Alstom’s Euroduplex, Avelia and AGV, Siemens 
Velaro and ICE 4, or Hitachi’s ETR 1000. 
 
     Very low degree of flexibility. Technical specifications cannot be substantially 
modified. Nevertheless, changes that may propitiate the need to do so are highly unlikely. 
 
[4] Levels of service. The optimal configuration of levels of service within the fleet has to 
be defined based on market studies that determine the business plan and hence the target 
audience. The common scheme adopted among most operators in HSR has two levels of 
service (First and Second class), but there are some exceptions such as Renfe’s AVE or 
the Austrian and Czech Railjet, which adopted a 3-class scheme, whereas in Italy both Italo 
and Frecciarossa have a 4-class scheme. 
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. Adjustments of the seat layout (for instance 
increase seats in one class at expenses of seats in another class) can be made in a short 
time span with a relatively low investment, based on the business plan updates in a 
medium-term view. However, it is worth considering the option to introduce a greater 
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degree of flexibility in the layout by making possible to easily adapt services in order to 
better meet demand in a very short time (from one train service to the immediately 
following, similarly to what Italo did with Comfort and Prima classes), which requires a very 
flexible and integrated IT architecture. This is especially relevant when it comes to the 
routes operated (business heavy links vs. leisure-oriented links) or the time of the year 
(fluctuations in the peak season in summer or other holidays). 
 
[5] Capacity. It is highly advised to attempt to provide a similar or higher seating capacity 
on the fleet than the competitor since capacity is inversely proportional to CASK. However, 
this has to be set in accordance with the established levels of service, passenger comfort 
standards and obviously within the physical limits of the train and fulfilling the safety 
conditions. 
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. In general, train capacity can only be modified by 
means of the medium-term adjustments mentioned in the previous point, which consists in 
varying the weight of the levels of service (since each one of these have different seating 
densities). 
 
[6] Other features. The company can consider other ways to manage the available space 
on each car. For instance, the traditional on-board bar-restaurant can be ruled out in favour 
of vending machines and galleys, enabling the company to free up valuable space for more 
seats. In these cases, rest rooms can be added in order to offset the lack of bar standing 
areas for passengers. In some cases, a few arrangements in the train design can make it 
possible to add space for further seats. 
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. Adjustments in these features belong to the same 
sort of adjustments in the seat layout already explained. Therefore, they can be made in a 
short time span with a relatively low investment, based on the business plan updates in a 
medium-term view. 
 
[7] Maintenance sites. The company may be granted access to existing maintenance sites 
(in a context of cooperative behaviour of the incumbent and hence fair competition) or it 
may have to establish its own maintenance plant. In any case, since maintenance is 
generally carried out overnight, these plants ought to be located as close as possible to the 
main network hubs (at the ends of the lines), where trains stay overnight. Furthermore, 
since it is assumed that trains stay at both ends of a line, it is convenient to have plants at 
both ends so that maintenance schedules can be flexible and hence they can be carried 
out efficiently. Last but not least, outsourcing is an opportunity to adjust train maintenance 
costs. 
 
     Low degree of flexibility. The availability of maintenance sites provided by the 
incumbent depends on their capacity and the predisposition of the incumbent to grant 
access. On the other hand, own maintenance plants may require a significant investment. 
Therefore, the flexibility of this factor depends on the solution adopted and it is rather low in 
general, since shared maintenance sites may be a more inexpensive solution but it would 
be out of control of the new entrant by contrast to own plants, which is a long-term 
investment.  
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[8] Workforce. The company ought to forecast the required workforce for the different 
tasks of the business: on-board and on ground crew (train drivers, conductors, train 
attendants, lounge attendants…), office staff, outsourced staff, officers, managers, etc. 
Besides, work shifts, wages, working conditions, specific tasks and relationship between 
unions have to be defined as well. Experience shows that more variable working hours per 
day (with the same weekly working hours) favour more efficient planning of schedules by 
allowing a better match between shifts and trips. On the other hand, there is some room for 
innovation when it comes to remuneration systems. 
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. Since most of the aforementioned parameters are 
always subject to union approvals, the possibilities of modifying labour agreements are 
deemed to be limited to some extent. 
 
[9] Corporate culture. The company should shape a broad corporate culture covering a 
wide range of traits such as the dress code, employee benefits, hiring decisions, treatment 
of clients and other operation aspects, since these factors contribute significantly in setting 
a distinctive product in the market. 
 
     Fully flexible. Corporate culture can be considered an intangible asset and often 
develops organically over time from the cumulative traits, but in any case, it is not a matter 
of investment and can be appropriately redefined or enhanced at any time. 
 
[10] Station lounges and ticket offices. These assets are key to the visibility of the 
company in train stations and have direct implications on ground services for passengers. 
Therefore, it can be distinctive of the company and part of the marketing strategy. 
 
     High degree of flexibility. The introduction of station lounges and ticket offices 
depends on the allocation of appropriate spaces in train stations where the company is 
willing to operate by the incumbent and require low investments.  
 
[11] Routes. As it has been discussed previously in Section 3, all competing private 
companies operating in the long-distance passenger rail transport market in Europe have 
focused in the domestic routes with the highest demand (which are usually those that have 
the best technical performances). Indeed, the plans of the Spanish government towards the 
liberalisation of the HSR network have always referred to the lines with the highest traffic as 
well. Therefore, it seems reasonable that the hypothetical company should focus on these 
corridors, namely the north-eastern corridor (Madrid-Zaragoza-Barcelona-French border), 
the eastern corridor (Madrid-Valencia/Alicante/Murcia) and the southern corridor (Madrid-
Córdoba-Seville/Malaga). Operation beyond the HSR network is not advisable due to the 
lower reliability of the conventional network and the need of specific rolling stock with 
variable gauge. 
 
     Low degree of flexibility. As explained above, room for creativity regarding the routes 
operated within the HSR network is limited by the network physical limits. Furthermore, the 
selection of a certain route to operate is a long-term decision involving the introduction of 
such a product in a market that was previously monopolistic, requiring an undefined period 
to settle in the market. On the other hand, the withdrawal of a trunk route in a short or 
medium term should be avoided since it could damage a brand that is still settling. 
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However, minor routes are generally more flexible to be implemented and to be dropped 
whenever the company decides to do so. With regards to network expansion, unless 
substantial adjustments are planned with current resources, it may require an expansion of 
the fleet, which as mentioned previously is a long-term high investment. Subsequently, the 
process of introduction of the service in a new market will have to be repeated. 
 
[12] Stations served. As mentioned previously, the range of stations where a HSR 
operator may choose to operate is limited by the network limits. Within the options 
available, the stations at which the company will operate and the number of stops of each 
of their services will have to be specified based on the business plan. 
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. The presence of the operator in a certain station is a 
key market factor, similarly to the routes operated, and hence it is rather rigid. However, 
with regards to the intermediate stops of each train service, there is a much greater room 
for adjustments either to add or to drop calls at train stations along the way. 
 
[13] Frequency and timetables. There is a direct relationship between frequency and 
timetables since both factors determine the production of train-km, which is subject to the 
fleet size. It is important to understand that in order to stay competitive against Renfe’s 
AVE, the entrant must provide a comparable service in terms of frequency (and hence in 
terms of daily round trips) and therefore an intensive supply of trains is required. 
Furthermore, in order to capture business travellers, the cadence of trains in busy routes 
should be at least 1 hour in each direction, which can be stepped-up in rush hour. In less 
busy routes, the frequency can be lowered to 2 hours. With regards to timetables, 
schedules are granted by the infrastructure manager based on available slots on the line 
whereas travel times are based on the performances of the infrastructure (collected in the 
statement of the network). The operator may request the slots that best fit with their 
operations plan. Assuming that timetables are subject to fixed cadences and not to the 
maximization of rotation schedules (operational times of each service), some sorts of 
inefficiency in turn around times may arise, which have to be carefully assessed.  
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. The adjustment of frequency and timetables is 
subject to the capacity of the infrastructure concerned and to the infrastructure manager 
approval. Additionally, it is clear that the operator’s ability to substantially modify the supply 
of trains (i.e. the production of train-km) depends directly on the fleet size (assuming that 
operations are already optimized to some extent) and hence it is a rather rigid factor. 
However, schedule modifications with the resources at the time are feasible.  
 
[14] Fleet utilization. There is a direct relationship between the fleet utilization, 
frequencies and timetables since the first factor defines the quantitative possibilities of 
schedules. The availability of the trains should allow an operation schedule ensuring an 
average production of train-km per unit train between 550.000 and 600.000 kilometres per 
year.  
 
     Low degree of flexibility. The optimization of the fleet utilization is mainly driven by the 
maintenance cycles and the efficiency of schedules. The first depends on the responsible 
of the train maintenance and it can be assumed that it can be optimized to some extent, 
whereas the second strongly depends on dwell times, which ought to be minimized when 
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possible in correspondence with schedules. Nevertheless there is very little room for 
improvement beyond these basic adjustments. In any case, it is highly advised to maximize 
the fleet utilization since it is inversely proportional to CASK. Experience shows that it is 
reasonable to achieve a production of train-km per unit train of 600.000 kilometres per year 
with the appropriate operational adjustments. 
 
[15] Intermodality. Various models of intermodal transport involving the new train service 
can be implemented, such as agreements to provide integrated tickets with local transport 
companies to ease mobility within major cities or bus companies to reach destinations not 
served directly by their HST services. Additionally, other arrangements for car rental or to 
take a taxi would be ideal. 
 
     Fully flexible. Despite these sort of activities often involve agreements with third 
parties, it can be assumed that they are very flexible and often require very low investments 
and hence they can be adjusted or improved relatively frequently. 
 
[16] Ground and on-board service. There are a number of factors that define the ground 
and on-board services to passengers, which is related to the corporate culture and 
contribute significantly to the distinction of the train service. With regards to the ground 
service, it involves mainly the train station hospitality by the train crew on the platform (fast 
track train access and reception) and in the station lounge and its facilities (for instance Wi-
Fi, a relax area with comfortable seating, newspapers and magazines, catering, real-time 
information on the train service, etc.). With regards to on-board service, this is defined 
similarly to the ground service as already commented and according to the levels of 
service. 
 
     Fully flexible. In general, it can be assumed that these factors require low investments 
and are very flexible despite the fact that ground services are subject to agreements with 
the infrastructure manager for the use of public space in train stations for lounges, ticket 
vending machines and fast track train access. 
 
[17] Marketing strategy. This factor is responsibility of a fully independent unit that can 
carry out a wide range of actions to promote the new train service, such as television 
advertisement, engagement in a social media public awareness campaign, increase 
visibility in train stations through lounges and ticket offices, etc. Also, it is a good idea to 
focus on special events to hook new customers and retain them (the MWC, as an 
example). 
 
     Fully flexible. The sort of activities within this unit can be implemented at any time and 
entail low investments. 
 
[18] Branding. Brand management should be taken as an exception within the market 
strategy and the aforementioned marketing actions since the brand has to be defined from 
the very beginning and functions as an umbrella for the entire subsequent marketing 
strategy. It is deemed essential in order to introduce a distinctive service in this market. 
 
     Very low degree of flexibility. Once the brand of the new train service is defined, 
considering that it always takes some time to settle in the market and taking into account its 
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long-term relevance from a marketing point of view, it can be assumed that it becomes 
inflexible for a long time and only minor arrangements that do not alter its essence can be 
considered realistic. 
 
[19] Train livery. Closely related to branding, it is one of the most visible factors of the 
product since it acts as an identifier of the company’s trains for all of their passengers an 
even for those that are not theirs but who may notice their trains at stations. It has to be 
defined from the beginning as well and it is often defined together with the brand. 
 
     Low degree of flexibility. While brands are usually maintained unaltered, liveries may 
be updated in the long term, which roughly speaking means above 20 years since its 
inception. 
 
[20] Pricing strategy. This strategy is fundamentally based on the yield management 
system, which allows maximizing revenue by segmenting the offer and providing low ticket 
prices for low demand periods or with change restrictions, which makes the service 
accessible to price-sensitive users, and maximizing yields from those that are less price-
sensitive or that privilege flexibility in timetables. Therefore, a range of fares in each level of 
service as a function of the allowance to make changes in the ticket is required. On the 
other hand, the set up of a programme intended for customer loyalty is also a required 
element and promotional offers play an important role in the marketing strategy. Last but 
not least, it must be taken into account the importance of the ticket distribution system, 
since there is room for cost adjustments in commissions and fees by adopting a particularly 
digital system and outsourcing some of the linked activities, similar to those adopted by 
low-cost airlines. 
 
     Fully flexible. The definition of the pricing strategy requires a low investment and it can 
be adjusted at any time (with the pertinent assessment) with immediate effects. This is 
responsibility of the market unit, which can be assumed to be an independent unit.  
 
[21] Other operating revenues. The company can expect to have other incomes apart 
from those of ticket sales and the transport service in general, such as from white 
certificates (provided that the company is included in a White Certificates programme) and 
from royalties and advertising spaces. These incomes can represent approximately up to 
10% of the revenue from transport service. 
 
     Intermediate degree of flexibility. EECs can be considered as long as they have been 
implemented in the country, whereas incomes from marketing depend directly on the 
activity of this unit of the company. 
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9.1 Conclusions on the Features of the Italian  
High-Speed Rail Network 
 
 
1) The favourable economic and demographic conditions for HSR. The economic and 
demographic characteristics of Italy are very favourable for HSR since it allows serving a 
large population efficiently from a network coverage and competitiveness point of view.  
 
2) The non-optimal preliminary layout of rail infrastructures towards a fully 
integrated HSR network throughout the country. A number of hub train stations in the 
network are terminus, which results in some inconveniences for the operation of through 
train services since travelling through slow approaches to stations and turnarounds are 
required and hence travel times are slightly penalized (in a sector in which travel time 
matters). Nonetheless, solutions such as the reconfiguration of some route patters or new 
urban rail links have been adopted or are currently being adopted with the aim to sort out 
these issues. 
 
3) The infeasibility to take advantage of long-distance traffic flows to airports. The 
review of the possibilities to bring HSR to airports reveals that the current infrastructure 
limits its viability and that the geographical layout of the infrastructures concerned around 
major airports often makes so even more complicated. Nevertheless, long-term 
investments in new rail links could make it possible. 
 
 
 
9.2 Conclusions on Italo’s Experience 
 
 
4) The favourable circumstances for rail competition and the entrepreneurial spirit of 
the newcomer. The fundamental conditions of Italo’s success include preliminarily the role 
played by the Italian Government to promote rail competition and the pre-existence of a 
newly-built high performances HSR network covering a large part of the country. 
Subsequently, of great importance is the risk the company assumed by allocating near €1 
billion Euros in the up-front investment, the development of an innovative business model 
and other circumstances out of the company’s scope such as the reduction in track access 
charges.  
 
5) The innovation in the rail transport industry. The Italian experience and especially 
Italo’s business model has evidenced that there is room for innovation in the rail transport 
market despite the inherent constraints of the rail industry such as technical rigidities and 
market regulations, which make more difficult to differentiate a product from the 
competitor’s. Some of the innovation instances identified include the levels of service, 
ancillary services, stations served, remuneration models for staff, ticket distribution 
systems, outsourcing activities, station lounges, intermodality through local bus feeding...). 
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6) The ability to respond to adverse economic circumstances. The first years of 
operation were extremely challenging for Italo since the deep economic crisis of 2008 was 
definitely unpredictable when the company was established in 2006, which hurt their 
financial forecasts. Nevertheless, the company proved to be able to react to these adverse 
circumstances by launching a turnaround plan in 2015 covering a wide range of operating 
activities, meant to overcome its very critical financial situation. The positive commercial 
and financial results later achieved proved the validity of the course of action implemented. 
Last but not least, it is important to highlight the capacity of Trenitalia to cope with the 
competitive pressure and to improve its services. 
 
7) The importance of operations efficiency. In relation to the previous point, it is 
noteworthy that a key point of Italo’s turnaround plan of 2015 was to use the fleet more 
intensively, and its outcomes evidenced that there was actually significant room for 
improvement in this aspect (the production of train.kms increased by 24% with the same 
fleet size) and hence some doubts arise on the company’s early management decisions. 
This is of special relevance so as to achieve a CASK lower than the incumbent’s (one of 
the main goals of the newcomer in order to become successful), since operating costs 
strongly depend on how companies use their most expensive assets –trains.  
 
8) The implications of the company’s size. The size of the entrant seems to play a very 
important role in determining its competitiveness since small-sized operators are prevented 
from benefiting from economies of scale, scope and density, and hence this has obvious 
implications in the overall cost structure. Therefore, the most convenient strategy appears 
to be the launch of operations with a considerable supply of services (i.e. the fleet size). 
 
9) The positive effects of network reliability. The quality and the technical performances 
of the infrastructure appears to be key to encouraging competition since it allows operators 
to achieve a certain degree of robustness of their networks. In other words, a new entrant 
may be prone to assume low risks as much as possible in terms of reliability by confining to 
those high-performance lines (often HSLs) in order to achieve a certain competitive 
advantage over the incumbent.  In fact, reliability has direct implications on required 
turnaround times at the end of a trip and hence on the maximum possible production of 
train.kms, and as a consequence on CASK.  
 
 
 
9.3 Conclusions on the Impact of Rail Transport 
Competition in Italy 
 
 
10) The potential of rail competition to reform the overall long-distance transport 
system. The experience of HSR competition in Italy and the resulting widespread fall of 
yields proved its capability to bring about a significant redistribution of traffic flows by 
diverting traffic flows from air, road and other rail services to HSR and to induce new 
demand. 
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11) HSR has overcome domestic inland air traffic. HSR has already conquered a 
considerable part of the Italian long-distance passenger transport market. The evolution of 
domestic inland air traffic since the completion of the backbone Turin-Milan-Rome-Naples-
Salerno in 2009 shows that the completion of the this infrastructure brought a significant 
reduction in air traffic and that the new rail competition regime, started in 2012, has 
accentuated this tendency even more, which proves the effects of the overall reduction in 
ticket prices in HSR even in long links with less competitive HSR point-to-point travel time, 
which in some cases is above 5 hours. 
 
12) The redistribution of transport infrastructure capacity. Rail competition results in a 
higher use of the infrastructure capacity provided by the HSR network, which is very 
positive taking into account the massive investments that this sort of infrastructures require. 
Furthermore, the shift of traffic flows from air to rail transport may have positive effects on 
congested airports by freeing up capacity that can be intended for growth in markets other 
than domestic ones served by HSR. 
 
13) Benefits for users in the HSR market. Rail competition in Italy has been able to bring 
significant benefits in the long-distance transport market such as the possibility to choose 
carrier, the overall decrease in ticket prices, the increase in the overall supply of HSR 
services, the improvement in frequencies and in the quality of services and more 
differentiated levels of service. 
 
14) Benefits for the overall long-distance transport system. Some authors have 
suggested that despite rail competition brings a reduction in ticket price for users, it is not 
clear that the overall cost of the transport system is actually reduced since the liberalisation 
may lead to a greater financial pressure on the system (Montero, 2016). For instance, in 
the Italian case, the reduction of track access charges effective from 2015 aimed at “the 
general interest” (La Repubblica, 2014) forced the infrastructure manager (i.e. the state) to 
assume a higher part of the cost of the system. Nevertheless, the increase in HSR traffic 
has allowed RFI to increase the overall track access charges revenue and hence to offset 
the cut in charges. Furthermore, the competition appears to be commercially and financially 
positive for both the incumbent, which has been pressed to improve its services and to 
adjust operational costs, and Italo, which is already in a sound financial footing. Therefore, 
in any case, a greater regulatory intervention with the aim to control the negative effects of 
competition should be taken into consideration by governments. 
 
 
 
9.4 Conclusions on the Feasibility of Rail 
Transport Competition 
 
 
15) The role of the Single European Railway Area. The technical inherent characteristics 
of rail transport still represent great obstacles towards a competitive rail market, which 
provides strong support to the Single European Railway Area (currently in process of 
implementation) that aims at overcoming these barriers. This is especially relevant in the 
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context of the liberalisation of rail transport, since the lack of ROSCOs and the limited 
interoperability of networks represent a significant barrier to the entry of new operators to 
the market and therefore it is more difficult for governments to promote rail competition. 
 
16) The market size may limit the possibilities of efficient rail competition (I). The 
Spanish Report of the technical-scientific Commission for the study of improvements in the 
railway sector of June 2014 suggests that the liberalisation should be carried out gradually 
and regulated carefully in order to avoid economic difficulties and the lack of profitability of 
operators due to the limited market size. In fact, in the Italian case, it is not likely that a third 
company will join the HSR market due to the lack of room in terms of infrastructure capacity 
and especially its doubtful profitability since the market is currently governed by low yields. 
With regards to Spain, since traffic figures are lower, it can be assumed that the market is 
tighter in order to take on a new HSR operator and that only a few HSR lines have enough 
passenger traffic so that the introduction of competition is feasible from an overall economic 
point of view, understanding that competition in low traffic lines could lead to sorts of 
inefficiency and the deterioration of the service. 
 
17) The market size may limit the possibilities of efficient rail competition (II). 
Similarly to what has been already stated, it could be difficult to introduce competition in the 
lines of the Spanish HSR network in which the new entrant would be unable to offer a 
supply of at least one train per hour in each direction likewise the incumbent (assuming it 
would be optimum from their business point of view) due to the market size. The newcomer 
could consider entering the market with a smaller supply of trains, but it has to be taken into 
account that other drawbacks may arise such as the lower benefit of economies of scale 
and density. Furthermore, these benefits are precisely what have made Italo’s success 
possible, which is the only available experience of real competition in HSR. In conclusion, 
HSR competition in Spain is only likely to take place in the busiest routes, at least in a first 
stage. 
 
18) Move on towards fair competition. The experience also backs up the importance of 
non-discriminatory access to the rail network (namely lines, slots, stations, maintenance 
facilities and others) in order to ensure fair competition, which could be ensured with a 
more independent network manager. 
 
19) The applicability of the lessons learned. The application in other countries of the 
lessons learned should be made with caution taking in mind the specific factors of the 
Italian case, such as the different contexts, railway networks, economic and demographic 
characteristics, regulatory and antitrust institutions, etc. In this sense, the instruction 
manual stated in Section 8 must be employed with wise foresight. The guidelines included 
within it are also applicable for any train company operating in the field of HSR in 
monopoly.  
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9.5 What is Next? 
 
 
The present dissertation can be seen as a necessary preliminary step to begin to mull over 
the entry to the market of HSR long-distance passenger transport in Spain with the aim to 
compete with the incumbent, state-owned operator Renfe. Therefore, the stated guidelines 
and conclusions of the thesis encourage going ahead with further research on the treated 
topics and beginning the process to project the setting up of a competitive private operator 
of HSR services. 
 
The goal of the advent of the hypothetic company would be to reform the outlook of the 
overall long-distance transport system in Spain by introducing a considerable supply of 
services that would substantially modify the equilibrium of the system. Specifically, it is 
expected that the new hypothetic competition regime would be able to bring meaningful 
benefits for users including the improvement of rail transport competitiveness, the reduction 
in ticket prices and hence an increment in HSR traffic (and subsequently a reduction in air 
and road traffic), as well as to improve the quality of the overall long-distance rail transport 
services.  
 
Besides, the regulatory intervention should endeavour to ensure that competition is fair, 
that it is efficiently carried out and that it is able to bring about a reduction of the overall cost 
of the transport system. 
 
Altogether, this is what the process of liberalisation of rail transport carried out by the 
European Union has been persevering in over the last few decades. Finally, a successful 
rail competition could certainly help to promote HSR as a more efficient, sustainable and 
environment-friendly means of transport. 
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Appendix 1 | Trenitalia High-Speed Rail Offer 
 
     1.1 Network 
 
Trenitalia’s HSR services network is presented below (Exhibit 44). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Source: Trenitalia S.p.A. (Updated in April 2018). 
Exhibit 44 | Frecce Services Network. 
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     1.2 Service List 
 
The current Frecce HSR services are detailed below (Table 18). 
 
Table 18 | List of Frecce HSR Services. 
 
 
According to the timetables for the first week of June 2018 on an average weekday. 
[1] 1 begins in Brescia, 18 in Turin and 34 in Milan; 1 ends in Florence, 1 in Perugia, 18 in Rome, 24 in 
Naples, 8 in Salerno and 1 in Taranto. 
[2] These services are included in the number of daily departures immediately above. 6 begin in Turin and 
9 in Milan; 7 end in Rome and 8 in Naples. 
[3] 1 begins in Udine and 12 in Venice; 7 end in Rome and 5 in Naples. 
[4] 2 begin in Udine, 4 in Trieste and 17 in Venice; 13 end in Milan, 9 in Turin and 1 in Genoa. 2 additional 
Eurocity trains operate Venice-Padua-Vicenza-Verona-Brescia-Milan-(…)-Geneva/Zürich. 
[5] 1 ends in Pescara and 1 in Bari. 
[6] 1 begins in Trieste; 2 end in Fiumicino Airport. 
[7] 3 begin in Bolzano, 5 in Verona; 3 end in Rome. 
[8] 1 ends in Foggia. 
[9] 9 begins in Milan, 1 in Turin; 3 end in Ancona, 1 in Bari, 5 in Lecce and 1 in Taranto. 
[10] 1 begins in Milan, 1 in Turin and 4 in Genoa. 
Source: own analysis with data from Trenitalia (updated in April 2018).  
 
 
     1.3 Levels of On-Board Service 
 
Frecciargento and Frecciabianca services offer the traditional First and Second 
classes, while Frecciarossa services have adopted a different scheme, offering four 
levels of service: Executive, Business, Premium and Standard (from the most exclusive 
to the most affordable). It can be assumed that Business is equivalent to First class 
and Standard is equivalent to Second class. An insight into Frecciarossa classes is 
presented below (Figures 4 to 7). 
 
 
 
 
Route (from north to south and from east to west) Category of service
Daily departures in each 
direction
Brescia/Turin-Milan-Reggio Emilia-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples-Salerno-Potenza-Taranto Frecciarossa 53 [1]
Turin-Milan-Rome-Naples-Salerno (non-stop between Milan and Rome) Frecciarossa 15 [2]
Udine-Venice-Padua-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples-Salerno Frecciarossa 13 [3]
Trieste-/Udine-Treviso/-Venice-Padua-Vicenza-Verona-Brescia-Milan-Turin/Genoa Frecciarossa 23 [4]
Milan-Reggio Emilia AV-Bologna-Rimini-Ancona-Pescara-Foggia-Bari Frecciarossa 2 [5]
Trieste-Venice-Padua-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Fiumicino Airport Frecciargento 7 [6]
Bergamo-Brescia-Verona-Bologna-Florence-Rome Frecciargento 2
Bolzano-Trento-Verona-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples Frecciargento 8 [7]
Mantova-Carpi-Modena-Bologna-Florence-Rome Frecciargento 1
Genoa-La Spezia-Pisa-Florence-Rome Frecciargento 1
Rome-Naples-Salerno-Paola-Lamezia-Reggio di Calabria Frecciargento 2
Rome-Caserta-Benevento-Foggia-Barletta-Bari-Brindisi-Lecce Frecciargento 4 [8]
Rome-Bari Frecciargento 1
Milan/Turin-Piacenza-Bologna-Rimini-Falconara-Ancona-Pescara-Foggia-Bari-Lecce/Taranto Frecciabianca 10 [9]
Venezia-Padua-Bologna-Rimini-Ancona-Pescara-Foggia-Bari-Lecce Frecciabianca 2
Milan/Turin-Genoa-La Spezia-Pisa-Rome Frecciabianca 6 [10]
Rome-Naples-Salerno-Lamezia-Reggio di Calabria Frecciabianca 2
Ravenna-Rimini-Falconara Maritima-Terni-Rome Frecciabianca 1
TOTAL (Frecciarossa+Frecciargento) 117
TOTAL 138
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Figure 4. Executive class on 
the ETR 400.  
Source: International 
Railway Journal. 
Figure 7. Standard class 
on the ETR 400.  
Source: Gazzetta dei 
Trasporti. 
Figure 6. Premium class 
on the ETR 400.  
Source: TripAdvisor. 
Figure 5. Business class on the 
ETR 400.  
Source: mattiachiaruttini.com. 
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     1.4 Fares 
 
Trenitalia’s HSR services standard fares include Base, Economy, Super Economy tickets, 
the Young offer and the Senior offer (from the most flexible to the least flexible), which are 
presented below (Table 19). All of them are available in all levels of service except of the 
Young offer and the Senior offer, which are not available for Executive.  
 
 
Table 19 | Frecce HSR Services Standard Fares. 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from Trenitalia.  
 
 
Apart from the standard fares listed above, Trenitalia has a wide range of additional offers 
with specific conditions, such as Same day return, Carnet 10 journeys, Family, Weekend 
return, 2x1 special, Special 3x2, Group Travel, Green and Silver cards and Night & AV. 
Furthermore, Trenitalia has its own loyalty programme, called CartaFRECCIA. 
  
Base
Modify Date/Hour: Free
Ticket changes: Free
Refund: Allowed, subject to a deduction
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy
Modify Date/Hour: Allowed upon payment of 
a change fee
Ticket changes: Not allowed
Refund Fee: Not refundable
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Super 
Economy
Modify Date/Hour: Not allowed
Ticket changes: Not allowed
Refund Fee: Not refundable
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Senior (>60 
years old)
Modify Date/Hour: Not allowed
Ticket changes: Not allowed
Refund Fee: Not refundable
Yes Yes Yes No
Young (<30 
years old)
Modify Date/Hour: Not allowed
Ticket changes: Not allowed
Refund Fee: Not refundable
Yes Yes Yes No
Offer Standard / Second Premium
Business / 
First Executive
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     1.5 Rolling Stock 
 
Trenitalia’s fleet of HSTs and their main characteristics are presented below (Table 20). 
 
Table 20 | Frecce Fleet of HSTs. 
 
 
 
[1] E 414 trainsets are fixed-formations featuring two E 414 locomotives and 9 Gran Comfort/UIC Z1 cars 
(E 414 + 9 cars + E 414). 
[2] Trevi: consortium formed by Ansaldo, Breda, Fiat Ferroviaria, ABB Tecnomasio and Firema Trasporti. 
[3] Numbers in parenthesis indicate the number of powered axles with respect to the total number of axles. 
In trainsets with concentrated propulsion, the two power cars always account for 8 powered axles. 
Source: own analysis with data from UIC, Railfaneurope, Wikipedia and others.  
 
Class E 414 trainset [1] ETR 400 ETR 460/463 ETR 470
Manufacturer Trevi [2]
Hitachi Rail Italy 
(AnsaldoBreda), 
Bombardier
Fiat Ferroviaria Fiat Ferroviaria, Schindler, Vevey Technologies
Axle formula EMU-12 EMU-8 EMU-9 EMU-9
Entered in service 1996 (refurbished in 2006-2008) 2015- 1994 1996
Units produced 60 50 10 9
Commercial service Frecciabianca Frecciarossa Frecciabianca Frecciabianca
Car formation 2 First class, 1 Second class+Bar, 6 Second class
1 Executive, 1 Business, 1 
Busines+Bar, 1 Premium, 3 
Standard
3 First class, 1 Bar, 5 
Second class
3 First class, 1 Bar, 5 
Second class
Capacity 605 457 480 475
Seat configuration 10 Executive, 69 Business, 76 Premium, 300 Standard
137 First class, 341 Second 
class
151 First class, 322 Second 
class
Length (m) 20,2 (single locomotive) 202,0 236,0 236,6
Weight (loaded) (t) 136 (2 locomotives, cars not included) 500 445 460
Maximum speed (km/h) 200 300 250 200
Traction [3] Concentrated (8/44) Distributed (16/32) Distributed (24/36) Distributed (24/36)
Power output (kW) 8.800 9.800 5.880 5.880
Electric systems 3 kV DC 1.5 kV DC, 3 kV DC, 15 kV 16,7 Hz, 25 kV 50 Hz 3 kV DC 3 kV DC, 15 kV 16,7 Hz
Signaling systems SCMT ETCS SCMT SCMT
Class ETR 485 ETR 500 ETR 600
Manufacturer Fiat Ferroviaria Trevi [2] Alstom
Axle formula EMU-9 EMU-13 EMU-7
Entered in service 1997 (refurbished in 2005) 2000-2005 (refurbished in 2012) 2008
Units produced 15 59 12
Commercial service Frecciargento Frecciarossa Frecciargento
Car formation 3 First class, 1 Bar, 5 Second class
1 Executive, 3 Business, 1 
Business+Bar, 1 Premium, 
5 Standard
2 First class, 1 Second 
class+Bar, 4 Second class
Capacity 480 574 432
Seat configuration 139 First class, 341 Second class
8 Executive, 91 Business, 
67 Premium, 408 Standard
100 First class, 332 Second 
class
Length (m) 237,0 327,6 187,4
Weight (loaded) (t) 422 640 443
Maximum speed (km/h) 250 300 250
Traction [3] Distributed (24/36) Concentrated (8/52) Distributed (16/28)
Power output (kW) 5.880 8.800 5.600
Electric systems 3 kV DC, 25 kV 50 Hz 3 kV, 25 kV 3 kV DC, 25 kV 50 Hz
Signaling systems SCMT, ETCS SCMT, ETCS SCMT, ETCS
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With respect to Frecciabianca services rolling stock, E 402B class electric locomotives 
have been added to the fleet with fixed formations of 9 UIC Z1 class cars (including a pilot 
car). Each train series is illustrated below (Figures 8 to 15). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. E 414 class locomotive 
on an ordinary Frecciabianca.  
Source: Maurits90 (Wikipedia). 
Figure 9. ETR 400.  
Source: Simo483 (flickriver). 
Figure 10. ETR 463.  
Source: Mario Serrano 
(iPdT community). 
Figure 11. ETR 470.  
Source: Russo Vincenzo 
(Ferrovie.info). 
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Figure 13. ETR 500 at Milan 
Lambrate.  
Source: Simone Aveta (flickr). 
Figure 14. ETR 600.  
Source: FS (flickr). 
Figure 15. E 402B class 
locomotive pulling an ordinary 
Frecciabianca service.  
Source: Mitch Schlosser 
(Bahnbilder). 
Figure 12. ETR 485 in Bolzano.  
Source: Vale93b (Wikipedia). 
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Appendix 2 | Italo High-Speed Rail Offer 
 
 
     2.1 Network 
 
Italo’s HSR and Italobus services network are presented below (Exhibit 45). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 45 | Italo HSR and Italobus Services Network. 
 
Source: Italo S.p.A. (updated in May 2018). 
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     2.2 Service List 
 
The current Italo HSR services are detailed below (Table 21). 
 
Table 21 | List of Italo HSR Services. 
 
 
 
According to timetables for the first week of June 2018, on an average weekday. 
Note: Italo timetables are not fully symmetrical when comparing north-south and south-north directions. 
[1] 9 begin in Turin, 16 in Milan; 12 end in Rome, 9 in Naples and 4 in Salerno. 
[2] These services are included in the number of daily departures immediately above. 6 end in Rome, 2 in 
Naples and 1 in Salerno. 
[3] 4 end in Rome and 4 in Naples. 
[4] 1 ends in Verona and 2 in Brescia. 
[5] 2 end in Milan and 3 in Turin. From July, increase to 7 daily roundtrips. 
Source: own elaboration with data from Italo (updated in May 2018). 
x 
     2.3 Levels of on-board service 
 
Italo offers up to four level of service: Club Executive, Prima, Comfort (only if operated by 
AGV trains) and Smart (from the most exclusive to the most affordable), which are 
illustrated below (Figures 16 to 19). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Route (from north to south and from east to west) Category of service
Daily departures in each 
direction
Turin-Milan-Reggio Emilia AV-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples-Salerno Italo 26 [1]
Turin-Milan-Rome-Naples-Salerno (non-stop between Milan and Rome) Italo 9 [2]
Venice-Padua-Rovigo/Ferrara-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples Italo 8 [3]
Brescia-Verona-Bologna-Florence-Rome-Naples Italo 3 [4]
Venice-Padua-Vicenza-Verona-Peschiera-Desenzano-Brescia-Milan-Turin Italo 5 [5]
TOTAL 42
Figure 17. Prima ambience 
on an EVO trainset.  
Source: italotreno.it. 
 
Figure 16. Club Executive 
ambience on an AGV 
trainset. Source: italotreno.it. 
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     2.4 Fares 
 
Italo standard fares include Flex, Economy and Low Cost tickets (from the most flexible to 
the least flexible), which are presented below (Table 22). All of them are available in all 
levels of service except of Low Cost, which is not available for Club Executive. 
 
Table 22. Italo HSR Services Standard Fares. 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from Italo.  
 
 
 
Flex
Change name: Free
Modify Date/Hour: Free
Refund Fee: Deduction 20%
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Economy
Change name: Free
Modify Date/Hour: Supplement 20%
Refund Fee: Deduction 40%
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Low Cost
Change name: Free
Modify Date/Hour: Supplement 50%
Refund Fee: Not refundable
Yes Yes Yes No
Smart Comfort Prima Club ExecutiveOffer
Figure 19. Smart ambience 
on an AGV trainset.  
Source: italotreno.it. 
Figure 18. Comfort ambience 
on an AGV trainset.  
Source: italotreno.it. 
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Apart from the standard fares listed above, Italo has a wide range of additional offers with 
specific conditions: the Day return ticket, the Day return ticket Milan-Rome, Italo Family, 
Italo Senior, Carnet Italo, Business Pass and Group Travels. Furthermore, Italo has its own 
loyalty programme, called Italo Più. 
 
     2.5 Rolling Stock 
 
Italo’s fleet of HSTs and their main characteristics are presented below (Table 23). 
 
Table 23. Italo Fleet of HSTs. 
 
 
 
[1] Number of Prima and Comfort cars can be adapted to meet demand. 
Source: own elaboration with data from Da Zero a Italo. Così è nata la concorrenza (2013), UIC, 
Railfaneurope, Wikipedia and others. 
 
Each train series and the Italobus are illustrated below (Figures 20 to 22). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Class ETR 575 ETR 675
Manufacturer Alstom Alstom
Axle formula EMU-11 EMU-7
Entered in service 2012-2013 2017-2019
Units produced 25 17
Car formation 1 Club, 2/3 Prima, 1/2 Comfort, 6 Smart [1]
1 Club/Prima, 1 Prima, 4 
Smart
Capacity 462 (450 initially) 478
Seat configuration 
(original)
19 Club, 143 Prima, 288 
Smart
19 Club, 128 Prima, 331 
Smart
Cost (M€) 26 21,5
Seat cost (€/seat) 57.777,78 44.979,08
Length (m) 201,2 187,3
Weight (loaded) (t) 423,0 400,0
Maximum speed (km/h) 300 250
Traction Distributed (10/24) Distributed (16/28)
Power output (kW) 7600 5664
Wheelbase (m) 3,00 2,70
Electric systems 25 kV 50 Hz, 3 kV DC 25 kV 50 Hz, 3 kV DC
Signaling systems SCMT, ETCS SCMT, ETCS
Figure 20. NTV AGV train. 
Source: raileurope.hk. 
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Appendix 3 | Other Data 
 
 
     3.1 Italo Key Metrics and Financial Results 
 
Italo data presented in Section 6.2 is collected below (Table 24). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21. NTV EVO train at Rho 
Fiera. 
Source: Flickr Lorenzo Corci. 
Figure 22. Italobus.  
Source: trasporti-italia.com 
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Table 24. Summary of Italo Key Metrics and Financial Results. 
 
 
 
[1] Adjusted. 
Source: own elaboration with data from Italo, Trenitalia and others.  
 
 
     3.2 Air Traffic in Domestic Inland Air Links 
 
All the data used in Section 7.2 is collected below (Table 25). 
 
 
Table 25. Air Traffic in Italian Domestic Links with HSR Service in Competition. 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration with data from ENAC.  
 
Concept 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Traffic revenue (M€) 239,5 261,5 303,9 350,5 414,9
Total revenue (M€) 249,6 267,8 322,4 380,3 454,9
Production costs (M€) 327,1 329,6 308,8 323,3 342,4
EBITDA (M€) -34,5 -13,7 61,5 96,2 142,0
EBITDA Margin (%) -13,8% -5,1% 19,1% 25,3% 31,2%
Net income (M€) -77,6 -62,0 -12,6 28,2 33,8
Profit Margin (%) -31,1% -23,1% -3,9% 7,4% 7,4%
Production of train.km (Mtrain.km) 11,6 11,8 12,3 13,9 14,9
Production of train.km per unit (train.km) 462.908 473.796 492.000 556.000 587.200 [1]
Ridership (Mpax) 2,1 6,2 6,6 9,1 11,1 12,8
Average distance travelled (km) 425,0 420,0 434,9 430,5 415,5
RPK (Mpax.km) 900,0 2.634,5 2.752,7 3.957,5 4.778,8 5.318,7
ASK (Mseat.km) 5.207,7 5.330,2 5.535,0 6.255,0 6.871,7
Load factor (%) 50,6% 51,7% 71,5% 76,4% 77,4%
Yield (€/RPK) 0,091 0,095 0,077 0,073 0,078
RASK (€/ASK) 0,046 0,049 0,055 0,056 0,060
CASK (€/ASK) 0,063 0,062 0,056 0,052 0,050
Frecce Ridership (Mpax) 37,9 39,8 42,0 51,4 55,0 57,2
Frecce+Italo Ridership (Mpax) 37,9 41,9 48,2 58,0 64,1 68,3
Frecce RPK (Mpax.km) 14.100 14.000 14.600 15.100 15.900 15.200
Frecce+Italo RPK (Mpax.km) 14.100 14.900 17.235 17.853 19.858 19.979
Route (from south 
to north) Air links 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Rome Fiumicino-Milan Linate 1.720.951 1.522.817 1.522.184 1.379.567 1.416.886 1.455.244 1.366.450 1.189.185 1.183.753
Rome Fiumicino-Milan Malpensa 671.396 683.081 674.836 600.620 454.569 332.226 317.286 291.701 NA
Rome Fiumicino-Bergamo NA 105.277 108.550 NA NA NA NA NA NA
Rome Ciampino-Bergamo 406.331 317.729 326.714 288.618 238.017 NA NA NA NA
Total Rome-Milan 2.798.678 2.628.904 2.632.284 2.268.805 2.109.472 1.787.470 1.683.736 1.480.886 1.183.753
Naples-Bergamo Orio al Serio NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 312.389
Naples-Milan Linate 728.499 674.851 672.468 689.663 633.345 635.221 597.186 481.905 509.251
Naples-Milan Malpensa 572.653 703.031 702.984 640.752 505.955 444.365 435.226 349.972 355.582
Total Naples-Milan 1.301.152 1.377.882 1.375.452 1.330.415 1.139.300 1.079.586 1.032.412 831.877 1.177.222
Rome-Turin Rome Fiumicino-Turin 869.564 884.068 940.279 879.721 663.741 619.130 670.016 638.229 550.244
Rome Fiumicino-Venice Marco Polo 743.470 794.066 787.769 729.233 619.131 527.642 552.997 540.397 500.485
Rome Ciampino-Treviso 202.834 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Rome-Venice 946.304 794.066 787.769 729.233 619.131 527.642 552.997 540.397 500.485
Naples-Venice Marco Polo 296.859 327.301 333.403 395.100 313.378 290.568 247.366 305.440 320.618
Naples-Treviso NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 166.287
Total Naples-Venice 296.859 327.301 333.403 395.100 313.378 290.568 247.366 305.440 486.905
Naples-Rome Naples-Rome Fiumicino 269.809 279.968 311.409 280.187 275.680 289.965 299.854 326.541 295.159
Naples-Turin Naples-Turin 321.800 311.922 318.368 300.179 231.436 255.715 216.794 240.429 278.128
Rome-Florence Rome Fiumicino-Florence 211.968 226.077 236.273 232.357 223.510 196.884 214.489 228.543 247.498
Rome-Bologna Rome Fiumicino-Bologna 226.653 222.531 249.422 232.683 211.434 238.796 207.848 253.531 235.105
Rome-Verona Rome Fiumicino-Verona 384.104 337.190 287.849 248.911 211.521 198.981 187.080 195.967 177.129
Naples-Verona Naples-Verona 151.513 153.838 147.491 114.564 107.575 NA NA NA NA
Naples-Bologna Naples-Bologna NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total 7.778.404 7.543.747 7.619.999 7.012.155 6.106.178 5.484.737 5.312.592 5.041.840 5.131.628
Naples-Milan
Rome-Venice
Naples-Venice
Rome-Milan
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